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This thesis is motivated by the challenges and opportunities the energy sector faces as a 
result of climate change. Traditional power generation based on fossil-fuel use has 
contributed significantly to the historic increase of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere. While low-carbon energy technology is often regarded as a key solution to 
climate change mitigation, the successful transformation to a clean energy economy 
requires a solid scientific understanding of the technological change process and the role 
of public policies. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to examine the interplay between 
technology and policy to support the design and implementation of effective policy 
practices for the scaling up of clean energy technologies. It investigates the diffusion 
mechanisms underlying both technology and policy innovations in the energy 
infrastructure system, focusing on smart grid and renewable energy technologies. 
In this thesis, quantitative and qualitative methods are integrated to evaluate the role of 
public policies in smart metering technology diffusion. In particular, I collect and analyze 
market penetration data for 50 U.S. states and D.C. between 2007 and 2012 to assess the 
effectiveness of government interventions in driving smart metering technological change. 
I also conduct a comparative case study to investigate how the design of policies and the 
subsequent policy processes have led to the cross-national variation in smart meter 
deployment in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. My study has 
shown that polycentric energy governance, particularly the interdependencies between 
 xi 
different government actions, plays an important role in smart meter deployment in the 
U.S. context, whereas a coherent policy framework that addresses institutional, financial, 
and social barriers is proven to be more effective in promoting smart meters in the cases 
of five European countries. To further explore the driving forces of clean energy policy 
adoption, I apply logit event history analysis models and stratified Cox conditional gap 
time models to investigate determinants for the adoption of five types of renewable 
energy policies by 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. The results show that 
initial renewable energy policy spread across countries can be well explained by the 
learning and competition mechanisms, while the four diffusion theories have largely 
failed to explain subsequent policy modifications and changes. In addition to each 
paper’s individual contributions, the findings of this thesis collectively provide important 
implications for the adoption and implementation of clean energy technologies and 
policies to enhance the sustainability of the electric grid system.  
 1 
 




1.1. Climate Change and Clean Energy Technology Innovations  
Climate change is one of the greatest threats to the world. Many of the observed changes 
to the global climate system are unprecedented over decades to millennia, including 
warming atmosphere and ocean, diminishing amounts of snow and ice, and rising sea 
level (IPCC, 2013). Research has related these phenomena to the anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), which have increased by 40% since pre-industrial 
times. 
Traditional power sector based on unsustainable fossil-fuel use has contributed 
significantly to the historic increase of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere (IPCC, 
2011). In 2010, electricity and heat production accounted for 25% of global GHG 
emissions, ranking the first among all sources (IPCC, 2014b). The demand for energy and 
associated services is still increasing, particularly in developing countries, to meet social 
and economic development, and improve human wellbeing (IPCC, 2011). Lowering 
GHGs emissions from the energy system while still satisfying the global increasing 
demand for energy services remains a pressing challenge for the human society. 
An increasing dependence on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other low-carbon 
energy technologies is expected to deal with concerns of global warming and fossil fuels 
depletion (Dresselhaus & Thomas, 2001). These technologies are often referred to as 
“clean energy”, with a variety of forms ranging from solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, 
marine, biomass and waste, and biofuels to smart energy (such as smart grids, energy 
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efficiency and electric vehicles) (OECD, 2013). Decarbonizing electricity generation 
through the wide adoption of clean energy technologies offers a cost-effective climate 
mitigation strategy (IPCC, 2014b). An IRENA report estimated that a doubling of the 
share of renewable energy by 2030 could deliver around half of the required carbon 
emissions reductions, and keep the average increase in global temperatures below 2°C 
(IRENA, 2015). The mitigation costs for long-term (year 2100) stabilization level of 550 
ppm are less than 1% of the global GDP when all clean energy technologies are 
encouraged, while more ambitious stabilization levels (i.e. 400 ppm) may not be 
reachable if renewable and other clean energy technologies are constrained (IPCC, 2011).  
Currently, large-scale penetration of clean energy technology is still rare in the 
worldwide. Take renewable energy for example, it accounted for approximately 19% of 
global electricity supply in 2008, with only 3% from non-hydro renewable energy 
sources (IPCC, 2011). A variety of approaches have been proposed to accelerate the 
deployment of clean energy technologies and to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon 
energy future (Sagar & Van der Zwaan, 2006; Van Alphen, Hekkert, & Turkenburg, 
2010). This thesis focuses on the role of public policy in this process. 
1.2. Understanding Climate and Energy Governance  
Without policy actions, the current global trends in energy development would most 
likely lead the world towards a temperature increase of 3-6 ºC by 2100 (OECD, 2013). 
The existence of many barriers creates rationale for government interventions. Some 
barriers are associated with market failures, such as information asymmetry, principal 
and agent problem, and externalities, while some are non-market failures: private 
information costs, high discount rates, and heterogeneity among adopters (Brown, 2001; 
 3 
Hirst & Brown, 1990; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). Government policies play a critical role in 
overcoming these barriers and accelerating the adoption and diffusion of clean 
technologies (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2005; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). Empirical studies 
have confirmed the positive role of public policy, such as in the cases of wind technology 
transfer in China and India (Lewis, 2007), wind technology diffusion in Denmark and 
Norway (Buen, 2006), and solar technology deployment in California (Taylor, 2008). 
However, many are still debating about the effective forms of energy and climate 
governance.  
A group of studies advocate for the polycentric governance approach, which mixes 
governance scales, policy instruments, and policy actors (Goldthau, 2014; Ostrom, 2009; 
Pasqualetti & Brown, 2014; Sovacool, 2011). This school of thought evolved out from 
the discussion related to the common pool resources and collective action problems 
(Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). “Polycentric” implies many centers of decision-
making, which could function independently or constitute an interdependent system of 
relations (Ostrom et al., 1961). The main difference between conventional and 
polycentric approaches in policy studies is the scope of analysis: the polycentric 
perspective looks beyond the performance of a government unit and consider the 
relationships among government actors at different levels of governance (Andersson & 
Ostrom, 2008). Polycentric energy and climate governance refers to the way people and 
institutions make and enforce decisions concerning various aspects of climate change and 
energy use when jurisdictions and scales overlap (Sovacool, 2011). Several works 
postulate that polycentric governance provides more efficient overall solutions and 
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facilitates the transition to a more sustainable energy infrastructure system (Brown & 
Sovacool, 2011; Goldthau, 2014; Pasqualetti & Brown, 2014), 
One school of thought focuses on the typologies for innovation policy instruments, and 
highlights the importance of having a variety of policy instruments for clean energy 
technology deployment. Rothwell and Zegveld (1981, 1984) first classified innovation 
policy into supply, demand and environmental policy tools (Rothwell & Zegveld, 1981, 
1984). Norberg-Bohm applied the framework to the environmentally friendly 
technological innovation, and categorized government interventions into “demand-pull” 
and “technology-push” policies (Norberg-Bohm, 1999). Demand-pull policies are those 
that raise the payoffs for successful innovations including tax credits, rebates, 
government procurement, technology mandates, regulatory standard, etc. Technology-
push policies reduce the cost to firms of producing innovation and affect the price of the 
innovation, i.e. government sponsored R&D, support for education and training, and 
demonstration projects. It is often recognized that both supply-push and demand-pull 
policies are needed to promote the commercialization of clean energy technologies 
(Norberg-Bohm, 2000). Empirical studies demonstrated that countries may emphasize the 
two types of policies differently when developing their smart grid technologies, such as 
in the case of China and the U.S. (Lin, Yang, & Shyua, 2013) 
Another group of studies argues that it is necessary to have a policy mix designed and 
adopted to accelerate clean technology innovations. The concept of a “policy mix” for 
clean technological change is more than a simple combination of policy instruments 
(Rogge & Reichardt, 2013). It consists of elements (policy strategies), processes of policy 
making and implementation, and dimensions (i.e. policy field, governance level, 
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geography, sector, technology, innovation, actor and time) (Rogge & Reichardt, 2013). A 
policy mix should be designed and adapted to address the specific problems in the 
innovation systems, meanwhile the possible complementary or contrasting effects 
between policy instruments shall be taken into consideration (Borrás & Edquist, 2013). 
The details of policy design, including the credibility and consistency of the policies, and 
the compatibility with other policy instruments, are highly important (Veugelers, 2012). 
While there is no one-fits-all policy, this thesis aims to understand energy governance, 
and specifically how public policies can be leveraged to promote clean energy 
innovations, using empirical examples of smart grid and renewable energy technologies. 
These two groups of technologies are selected because they experience rapid deployment 
in the recent decade, and have shown great climate mitigation potential. In particular, 
smart grid and smart metering technologies are critical components in the grid 
modernization process, and they provide an attractive carbon mitigation option by 
fostering energy efficiency and distributed renewable energy (Brown, 2014). The carbon 
reduction potential of renewable energy highly depends on its penetration rates. The 
IPCC special report on renewable energy concludes that global cumulative CO2 savings 
from renewable energy between 2010 and 2050 can range from 220 to 560 Gt CO2 (IPCC, 
2011). Below, I discuss smart grid technologies in detail.  
1.3. Smart Grid and Smart Metering Technologies  
The electric grid in most industrialized countries was designed to deliver electricity from 
large power plants via a high voltage network to local electric distribution systems that 
serve individual consumers. Both electricity and information flow predominantly in one 
direction, from generation and transmission to distribution systems and consumers. One 
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of the original rationales for this vertically integrated system design was the assumption 
that electricity production and supply is a natural monopoly, where a single firm can 
produce the total market output at a lower cost than a collection of competing firms.  
At the transmission stage, the case for natural monopoly and continued regulation 
remains relatively strong, but the natural monopoly rationale for electricity generation 
and distribution has been weakened by the introduction of distributed electricity 
resources and small-scale electricity producers. The vertically integrated power systems 
have also become increasingly vulnerable to power outages and interruptions. Large-
scale blackouts caused by rising electricity peak demand, aging infrastructure, extreme 
weather conditions, and terrorist attacks produce significant economic and social costs. 
For the United States, weather-related power outages alone cost Americans between $25 
and $70 billion each year (Campbell, 2012; U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). With the 
advancement of technology, increasing demands of a digital society, growing threats to 
infrastructure security, and concern over global climate disruption, the current electricity 
infrastructure needs to evolve to respond to these challenges (GridWise Alliance, 2014). 
The result is a growing awareness of the need for a “smart grid”- an electricity network 
that uses “digital and other advanced technologies to monitor and manage the transport of 
electricity from all generation sources to meet the varying electricity demands of end-
users” (International Energy Agency, 2011). 
Smart grid architectures can integrate a diverse set of electricity resources, including 
large power plants as well as distributed renewable resources, electric energy storage, 
demand response, and electric vehicles. Figure 1.1 portrays a complex smart grid system 
with both central and regional controllers managing the two-way flow of electricity and 
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information between utilities and consumers. The actual mix of controls and technologies 
will depend upon a region’s transmission and distribution system, its electricity 
governance and business model, the nature of customers being served and other demand-
side issues. By implementing a smart grid, electric systems can operate at higher levels of 
power quality and system security (The European Smart Grid Task Force, 2010). The 
intelligent functions of smart grid not only improve the reliability and technical efficiency 
of power delivery through enhanced information flow and secure communication, but 
also empower and incorporate consumers by demand response and smart meters (Momoh, 
2009). Payment systems can be made more efficient with digital communications enabled 
by smart meters, which reduce non-technical losses that undermine grid economics in 
many developing countries. Without the development of a smart grid, managing and 
optimizing the grid system will become increasingly challenging, given the emergence of 
new technologies such as distributed solar photovoltaics (PV), electric cars and demand-
side management (GridWise Alliance, 2014). 
Smart metering technology is currently the most developed market segment in the smart 
grid value chain (Adrian Booth, Nuri Demirdoven, & Tai, 2010). There are two types of 
smart meters: automatic meter reading (AMR) and advanced metering infrastructure 
(AMI). AMR meters use one-way communication and read electricity consumption 
automatically (Alejandro et al., 2014), while AMI can measure and record energy usage 
data at hourly or more frequent intervals and provide usage data to consumers and energy 
companies (FERC, 2012). Deployment of smart meters brings many benefits, such as 
cost reduction associated with meter reading, grid monitoring and maintenance, and 
improvements in billing accuracy and outage management (EPRI, 2007). It also enables 
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other important components of smart grids, including demand response programs, time 




Figure 1.1  Smart Grid: A Vision for the Future (Brown & Zhou, 2013) 
 
 
1.4. Policy Innovations and Adoption  
Policy innovation refers to “ a program or policy which is new to the states adopting it, 
no matter how old the program may be or how many other states may have adopted it” 
(Walker, 1969). The question why governments adopt or not adopt certain policy has 
been extensively studied, especially at the state and local level in the federal system of 
the United States. Following the earlier works by Walker (1969) and Gray (1973), a vast 
body of literature has examined policy diffusion in a broad set of topics, ranging from 
local gun control policies in California (Godwin & Schroedel, 2000), innovation in 
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municipal governments (Godwin & Schroedel, 2000; Nelson & Svara, 2012), to state 
adoption of housing trust funds (Scally, 2012). This school of thought has the best-
developed theoretical basis and methodological approaches among all diffusion studies. 
Scholars often test internal determinants and external diffusion models. Internal 
determinants models assume social, political and economic characteristics that are 
internal to a jurisdiction have the most explanatory power for government’s decision in 
adopting new policies. In contrast to that, external diffusion model argues that diffusion 
of policy across jurisdictions is a contagious process: decision of policy adoption in one 
jurisdiction affects that of the others. Berry and Berry (1990) first proposed the 
integration of the two models to explain state lottery adoption using event history 
analysis (Berry & Berry, 1990). Since then, their approach has been widely applied to 
examine inter-state or cross-city environmental policy diffusion in the U.S., including 
renewable portfolio standards (Huang et al., 2007; Lyon & Yin, 2007; Matisoff, 2008), 
hazardous waste treatment policy (Daley & Garand, 2005), wind policy (Wiener & 
Koontz, 2010), and market-based instrument for air pollution reduction (Dolsak & 
Sampson, 2012). In general, results have demonstrated the compatibility of the two 
streams (Berry & Berry, 2007).  
In parallel with the development of inter-state policy diffusion literature, a group of 
comparative studies has begun to investigate policy convergence across countries over 
time, especially in the context of democratic diffusion (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; 
O'Loughlin et al., 1998), institutional evolution (Lee & Strang, 2006), and economic and 
financial liberalization (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012; Elkins & Simmons, 2004). Like the U.S. 
inter-state policy diffusion studies, there is a trend in this group of literature to use both 
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exogenous and endogenous factors to explain policy adoption (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012; 
Lee & Strang, 2006; Mukherjee & Singer, 2010). As Simmons et al. (2006) noted, the 
policy making process of national governments can be better understood as an 
interdependent process among countries, in which external diffusion forces often interact 
with national politics and economic status (Simmons, Dobbin, & Garrett, 2006).  
1.5. Dissertation Theme and Format  
This dissertation is motivated by the challenges and opportunities the energy sector faces 
as a result of climate change. Given the critical role of government interventions in clean 
energy technology deployment, it is important to understand the introduction of new and 
more effective policy innovations, the diffusion of policy adoption decisions, and the 
evaluation of the effects of these policy innovations in real life (Jordan & Huitema, 2014). 
This thesis examines how technology driven policies spread and work, and what kinds of 
policy innovations to aim for, drawing upon literature on technology diffusion, policy 
innovation and diffusion, polycentric governance, and policy implementation. The 
overarching research question is “how can public policy be leveraged to facilitate clean 
energy technology deployment?” The findings contribute to the design and 
implementation of effective policy practices for the scaling up of clean energy 
technologies. Figure 1.2 summarizes the conceptual framework of this dissertation, which 




Figure 1.2  Conceptual Framework 
 
  
Chapter 2 presents the first essay, which quantitatively evaluates policy impacts on AMI 
deployment in U.S. states. I estimate fixed effects models using a panel dataset of 50 U.S. 
states and D.C. over the years 2007-2012 to explain the variation in U.S. states’ AMI 
penetration rates. I find that the AMI diffusion pattern in the U.S. is mainly created by a 
polycentric governance system, where the interdependencies and interactions between 
different layers of government play a critical role. Although none of the policy actions 
analyzed in this research directly affect smart meter deployment, their impacts are 
dependent on interactions with other governance activities: increased federal funding and 
reduced PSC regulatory uncertainty more effectively drives smart meter installations 
when states have adopted more AMI promotion policies; the two types of state AMI 
policies tend to be jointly adopted and mutually supportive. Socio-economic factors are 
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surprisingly unimportant. Conditions of the electric grid system and pressures from 
energy consumers and environmental interest groups do not seem to exert any significant 
influence. This research provides an empirical analysis of how multiple-level governance 
works in the clean technology diffusion process, and demonstrates the importance of 
understanding the complex interdependencies between divided authorities in electricity 
system governance. The findings also highlight the importance of coordinating and 
aligning governance at different levels to induce the transitions to a sustainable energy 
infrastructure system.  
In the second essay (Chapter 3), I analyze policy mixes adopted by five European 
countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands), and their role in 
promoting smart meters. The goal is to further uncover the policy impacts on smart meter 
diffusion by answering the question: why domestic policy frameworks have proved 
capable or incapable of promoting smart meters in their country? The results show that 
policy frameworks designed to overcome institutional and financial barriers are the most 
effective in facilitating smart metering deployment. In particular, the adoption of 
mandatory smart meter roll-out plans or monthly meter reading targets set clear and 
consistent objectives to help overcome institutional barriers and drive smart meter 
deployment, while cost recovery ensured by financial regulations on distributed system 
operators encourages smart meter investments. It is also important for governments to 
address the privacy and data security concerns associated with smart meter installations, 
especially when there is a low level of social acceptance. However, the adoption and 
implementation of technology standards and privacy and data security policies may lead 
to a prolonged delay in smart meter deployment. This research builds on technology 
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diffusion and policy impact assessment literature and provides valuable insights on the 
design of effective policy tools to promote clean energy innovations.  
In Chapter 4, I take renewable energy policies as an empirical example to explore the 
dynamics and mechanisms of transnational clean energy technology policy diffusion. 
This chapter estimated logit event history analysis models and stratified Cox conditional 
gap time models to explain 30 European countries’ adoption of five types of renewable 
energy policies from 1990 to 2012. The findings suggest that initial spread of renewable 
energy policy is largely driven by competition pressure and policy learning from 
intergovernmental organizations, while the subsequent policy accommodation and 
changes are less likely to be triggered by external factors. The results also show that 
initial policy diffusion pattern differs greatly across policy instruments. This research 
contributes to the policy diffusion literature by examining the evolving of diffusion 
mechanisms over time, and by differentiating the impact of diffusion mechanisms across 
policy instruments. 
Chapter 5 presents the conclusion of this thesis. It first compares the smart metering 
diffusion and policy development processes in the U.S. and Europe, followed by a 
discussion about transnational environmental and energy policy diffusion. It then 
discusses theoretical contributions of this dissertation, and provides policy prescriptions 
to the design of policy instruments to encourage clean energy innovations. Chapter 6 




CHAPTER 2   ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE DEPLOYMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE IMPACT OF POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE 





Traditional power generation based on fossil-fuel use has contributed significantly to the 
historic increase of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere (IPCC, 2011). As a 
result, low-carbon energy technology is at the core of current climate discussions, and is 
often regarded as a key solution to climate change mitigation (Brown & Sovacool, 2011). 
A number of issues in this debate have attracted much attention. First, various 
explanations have been put forward to explain the observed regional heterogeneity in 
clean energy technology diffusion (Beise & Rennings, 2005; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). 
Second, public policies often play a critical role in accelerating clean energy technology 
deployment (Gallagher & Zhang, 2013; Horbach, Rammer, & Rennings, 2012; Lewis, 
2007; Norberg-Bohm, 2000; Ockwell et al., 2008). Previous studies on the impacts of 
policies on clean energy technology have focused on the policy types (Jacob et al., 2006; 
Taylor, 2008), political process (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006), and policy stringency 
(Beise & Rennings, 2005). They have largely failed to capture the complexity of the 
energy policy schemes that often involve divided authority across multiple types of actors. 
To address this gap in the literature, this study takes smart grid technology as an 
empirical example to understand how different layers of government influence clean 
technology diffusion.  
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The motivations for smart grids have been promoted through potential shortcomings of 
the traditional electric grid to handle increased renewable energy development, increased 
peak loads, and energy security concerns, etc. Calls for grid modernization promote the 
integration of telecommunication and information technologies with the electricity 
infrastructure to create an electricity network that can cost-effectively integrate different 
power generation sources, enable consumers to play an active role in managing energy 
demand, and operate at high levels of power quality and system security (The European 
Smart Grid Task Force, 2010). As the cornerstone of a smart grid, the advanced metering 
infrastructure (AMI or commonly known as smart meters) has experienced large-scale 
deployment worldwide (Leeds, 2009). AMI meters measure and record energy usage at 
hourly or more frequent intervals and provide usage data to consumers and energy 
companies (FERC, 2012). Deployment of AMI meters can bring many benefits, including 
cost reduction, improved billing accuracy and outage management, and the enabling of 
dynamic pricing, demand response, and distributed renewable generation (EPRI, 2007; 
Leeds, 2009). Advanced metering and demand response may have mixed impacts on 
energy saving and carbon emissions. A study by the Brattle Group estimated the potential 
peak load reduction from a national implementation of AMI and dynamic pricing in the 
U.S. to be as much as 11.5 percent (Hledik, 2009). However, for regions with a lower 
proportion of combined-cycle capacity and coal-fired power plants, the load shift to coal-
fired power plants caused by AMI and dynamic pricing can be as high as 80 percent, 
leading to higher carbon emissions (PNNL, 2010). 
An estimated cost between $338 and $476 billion is required to create a fully functioning 
smart grid in the United States (EPRI, 2011). Significant public funding and policy 
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efforts have been directed towards electric grid modernization. AMI penetration rate in 
the U.S. increased from 1.7 percent in 2007 to 28.2 percent in 2012, with a total number 
of 43 million AMI meters installed nationwide (EIA, 2013). However, AMI deployment 
patterns vary greatly across regions. In 2012, the AMI penetration rates were below 10 
percent in twenty states, but were above 40 percent in another twelve states and the 
District of Columbia (D.C.).  
The goal of this study is to use panel data of the fifty U.S. states and D.C. from 2007 to 
2012 to identify factors that cause states’ different performance in advanced metering 
deployment. The transition to smart grids introduces new regulatory schemes that often 
transcend jurisdictional boundaries and require increased coordination between different 
levels of government (SGIP, 2015). To better understand the influence of this complex 
policy scheme on smart meters, I draw upon governance, policy implementation and 
technology diffusion theories. In doing so, this study makes two important theoretical 
contributions. First, I conceptualize smart meter diffusion as an outcome of policy 
implementation, and quantitatively evaluate policy effectiveness in technology 
deployment through the lens of polycentric governance. Second, this study is one of the 
first to consider the complexity and the multi-tiered structure of energy governance when 
investigating determinants of clean technology diffusion. The results contribute to the 
field of energy and climate change polycentric governance and provide valuable policy 
implications for clean energy technology deployment.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review 
and presents hypotheses. Section 3 discusses data and econometric methodology. Section 
4 and 5 presents results and discussions. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
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2.2. Theory Development and Hypotheses  
Technology diffusion is the last stage in the Schumpeterian trilogy of “invention-
innovation-diffusion” (Schumpeter, 1961). The diffusion of new technology requires the 
product or process to become widely adopted by various parties in society (Schumpeter, 
1961). The existence of many barriers may hinder clean energy technology diffusion, 
such as information asymmetry, externalities, and heterogeneity among adopters (Hirst & 
Brown, 1990; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). Government interventions often play a critical role 
in overcoming these barriers and accelerating the adoption and diffusion of clean 
technologies (Jaffe et al., 2005; Jaffe & Stavins, 1994).  
Modernization efforts in the energy infrastructure system that spans across multiple and 
interconnected regulatory scales bring new challenges to policy making (Goldthau, 2014; 
Pasqualetti & Brown, 2014; Sovacool, 2011). Past studies postulated that polycentric 
governance provides more efficient overall solutions and facilitate the transition to a 
clean energy future (Brown & Sovacool, 2011; Goldthau, 2014; Pasqualetti & Brown, 
2014). However, there is very limited evidence on how multi-scale governance 
arrangements work in an empirical setting. Studies in this area mostly focus on the 
coexistence of policy instruments (Oikonomou, Flamos, & Grafakos, 2010; Oikonomou 
et al., 2008; Spyridaki & Flamos, 2014), or rely solely on qualitative approaches (i.e. 
multi-criteria analysis (Konidari & Mavrakis, 2007) and case studies (Smith, 2007; 
Sovacool, 2011)). Very few studies have quantified the interactions and consequences of 
government actions at multiple levels (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008). Smart meter 
deployment in the U.S. governed by a polycentric system offers an interesting test case to 
investigate this question (see Figure 2.1). To quantitatively measure the policy impact, I 
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break down the smart meter polycentric governance into a set of policy variables. Only 




Figure 2.1 Polycentric Governance of AMI Deployment in the U.S. 
 
 
The federal government has taken a series of actions to support smart grid and smart 
meters.  Section 1252 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT) directs utility 
regulators to consider demand response programs and requires utilities to provide each 
customer a time-based rate schedule and a time-based meter upon request ("Energy 
Policy Act of 2005," 2005). This policy is not mandatory and each state regulatory 
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authority is only required to issue a decision whether it is appropriate to implement 
Section 1252 in its jurisdiction. The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 
2007 directs the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), the States, and utilities to facilitate smart metering deployment 
("Energy Independence and Security Act ", 2007). EISA also directs the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and FERC to develop and implement smart 
grid technological standards. Since these two federal laws have similar legal effect for 
every state and their impacts have largely been reflected on state policy activities, which 
will be discussed in the next section, I do not test them in the model. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 appropriates $4.5 
billion matching fund for electricity delivery and energy reliability modernization efforts1. 
Applicants need to pass an initial eligibility review and a comprehensive merit evaluation. 
Evaluation focuses on the project plan, approach for addressing interoperability and cyber 
security, plan for data collection and cost benefit analysis, and how projects will enable 
smart grid functions (DOE, 2009). The final selection of applications also ensure a 
diverse group of projects is selected. Details about project evaluation criteria are 
presented in Appendix A. I expect that federal ARRA funding have a varying impact on 
states’ AMI deployment as the federal government and DOE have discretion on how the 
money is spent and which grant applications are selected. 
During 2009-2012, $2.69 billion was awarded to 61 AMI projects in 43 states 
(Smartgrid.gov, 2013). Over two-thirds of the total 15.5 million AMI meters were 
installed before October 2012 (FERC, 2012). The amount of stimulus money received by 
                                                 
1 Grant recipients receive federal financial assistance for up to 50 percent of their project 
costs.   
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states varies considerably, with projects focusing on different smart grid technologies. In 
this study, I use per capita amounts of ARRA funding allocated to AMI projects for each 
state in a year as an indicator of federal AMI policy activity. I expect that federal ARRA 
funding be an important factor that explains states’ AMI deployment status. 
ARRA funding data were obtained from Smartgrid.gov, a website maintained by U.S. 
DOE. I divided the total project award amount by project time span to get the annual 
ARRA award amount for each project, assuming that money is spent evenly across the 
project timeline. I then summed up the annual award amount for all projects in a state to 
get the annual total ARRA AMI funding for that state.  
Hypothesis 1: States receiving more federal funding are likely to have a higher AMI 
penetration rate. 
Second, I consider state energy policy making as an important layer of AMI governance. 
State governments take actions through legislative branches and public service 
commissions (PSCs), as AMI deployment often involves approval of utility infrastructure 
investments and provision of time-variant electricity prices, both of which are subject to 
state jurisdiction. Some states have adopted policies pursuant to federal legislation such 
as Section 1252 of the EPACT and the EISA. Others have taken their own smart meter 
policy initiatives. I expect states with more policy activities have higher AMI penetration 
rates, controlling for federal expenditures and other independent variables.  
Following recent research that shows a correlation between policy count and policy 
stringency (Matisoff, 2008; Schaffrin, Sewerin, & Seubert, 2015; Viscusi & Hamilton, 
1999), I use policy counts to measure state policy activities. Two policy types are 
considered. The first is AMI promotion policy, which directs utilities to consider smart 
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meter roll out, or requires utilities to file smart meter deployment plans with PSCs. The 
second policy addresses smart meter data security and privacy concerns. I only count 
state legislation, and PSCs’ orders and decisions. I exclude government reports, 
recommendations or policy analyses, as they do not go through the rule-making processes 
in the legislative branch or PSC. Policy data were extracted from state PSC and 
legislature websites, and several policy documents (Delurey & Pietsch, 2008; EIA, 2011; 
FERC, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013; Pietsch, 2011). A summary of state AMI 
policies is presented in Appendix B.  
Hypothesis 2: State-level legislative and regulatory actions are likely to drive a state’s 
AMI penetration rate. 
The way PSCs regulate cost recovery processes for utility investments represents another 
important jurisdiction for smart meter governance. In the U.S., smart meter deployment 
depends on investment decisions by utility companies. Utility regulators have legal 
obligations to balance the interests of electricity consumers and utility investors. They set 
electricity prices to allow utility firms to recover all prudently incurred investment costs, 
which are also just and reasonable for consumers. This rate-setting process may create 
uncertainty depending on how regulators interpret legal obligations to balance investor 
and consumer interests and allow cost recovery for prudent investments. Studies have 
found that regulatory uncertainty is one of the most important barriers to clean energy 
technology deployment (Brown & Chandler, 2008; Fuss et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2008). 
Regulatory uncertainty, and the prospect of regulators allowing predictable cost-recovery 
for investments can be an important factor for investors to consider when undertaking 
large costly investments in smart grid technologies.  
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Hypothesis 3: States with higher regulatory uncertainty have lower AMI penetration 
rates. 
I use SNL energy division regulatory research associates (RRA) ranking of PSCs to 
measure regulatory uncertainty for utility investments (see also (Jha, 2014)). SNL RRA 
ranking is a credit-style rating of state PSC and its willingness to return investment costs 
to investors. I also use this metric to capture how cost recovery rules are interpreted 
different by changing utility commissions. RRA ranking includes three principal rating 
categories: Above Average, Average, and Below Average. Within each category, there 
are three relative positions indicated by numbers 1, 2, and 3. I coded Above Average 1 as 
“1” and Below Average 3 as “9” (see Table 2.1). A lower score indicates a lower 
regulatory uncertainty for utility companies: PSC is more likely to pass input costs 
through to consumers, hence the regulatory environment is more stable and favorable to 
investors, representing more incentives for utilities to invest in new technologies.  
 
 
Table 2.1 Coding method for regulatory uncertainty. 
RRA ranking Uncertainty 
Above Average 1 1 
Above Average 2 2 
Above Average 3 3 
Average 1 4 
Average 2 5 
Average 3 6 
Below Average 1 7 
Below Average 2 





A polycentric perspective requires scholars to look beyond the performance of a 
government unit and consider the relationships among government actors at different 
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levels (Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom et al., 1961). Interactions 
between state and federal policy making in the U.S. can lead to problematic outcomes, 
such as in the cases of state and federal renewable electricity and clean energy standards, 
and motor-vehicle fuel efficiency standards (Goulder & Stavins, 2011). In some other 
cases, federal and state policies may have positive interactions. States may adopt policies 
to complement or augment federal policy (Lanahan & Feldman, 2015). States may also 
trigger the adoption of more stringent federal policy, or serve as laboratories for 
experimenting innovative policy approaches (Goulder & Stavins, 2011).  
The environmental federalism literature shows how each governmental unit acts may 
enhance or undermine the effectiveness of a policy adopted by the other layers of 
government with authority over the same area (Shobe & Burtraw, 2012). The federalism 
challenge in energy regulation has been well documented in a variety of areas such as 
energy efficiency (Vandenbergh & Rossi, 2013), interstate transmission of renewable 
energy (Klass & Wilson, 2012), and green building codes (Klass, 2010). The tension 
between federal and state energy regulation may have adverse impacts on smart grid 
deployment (Eisen, 2013). In this study, I posit that multilevel policy interactions are 
important factors that shape AMI implementation. By including interaction terms 
between state AMI promotion policies, PSC regulatory uncertainty and federal ARRA 
funding, I test whether the effects of regulatory uncertainty and federal funding differ 
depending on state efforts in promoting smart meters. I also include an interaction 
between the two types of state policies to test whether AMI data security and privacy 
policies could facilitate and reinforce AMI promotion policies.  
Hypothesis 4: The multilevel policy interactions are crucial determinants of states’ smart 
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meter penetration rates. 
It is important to consider the social context and stakeholders in the technology diffusion 
process, as particular groups and forces could shape technologies to their ends and lead to 
different outcomes (Cronberg, 1992; Devine-Wright, 2007; Wüstenhagen, Wolsink, & 
Bürer, 2007). New technology innovation gains faster deployment if social interests and 
groups are more supportive.  
Energy consumers represent a cornerstone in AMI deployment. Their potential rejection 
of smart meters could pose a significant threat to a successful rollout (Alabdulkarim, 
Lukszo, & Fens, 2012). While data on public perception of smart meters are currently not 
available, I use income level as a proxy to measure consumers’ attitude. Studies have 
demonstrated that people’s attitudes towards clean energy technology vary across income 
groups. On the one hand, environmental concern is often considered as a “luxury” 
(Hökby & Söderqvist, 2003). Wealthier people are more likely to place a higher value on 
environmental protection (Del Río González, 2009; Plassmann & Khanna, 2006), and 
they have the ability to invest more heavily in clean energy technologies (Batley et al., 
2001; Carley, 2009; Roe et al., 2001; Zarnikau, 2003). On the other hand, wealthier 
people may value privacy and safety more, hence oppose smart meters. Public perception 
of smart meters may also differ across income groups due to the different pricing 
schemes made possible by AMI (Faruqui, Sergici, & Palmer, 2010). I expect that real 
gross state product (GSP) per capita is correlated with smart meter penetration. GSP data 
were obtained from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Hypothesis 5: States’ AMI penetration rates are correlated with income level. 
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Pressure from interest groups may play a role in promoting smart metering deployment. 
In this study, I consider the impact of environmental groups and high-tech companies. 
Environmental groups may support the replacement of traditional meters by smart meters, 
due to the environmental benefits brought by AMI and smart grid. Environmental groups 
are likely to play a key role in educating the public about the new technology, as well as 
lobbying and advocating to advance the political and business interests in smart meters. 
Following a few studies (Daley, 2007; Daley & Garand, 2005; Matisoff & Edwards, 2014; 
Potoski & Prakash, 2005), I measure environmental interest group pressure using the 
number of Sierra Club members in one thousand people. Sierra Club is one of the largest 
environmental non-profit organizations (NGOs) in the U.S. Membership data were 
obtained directly from the Sierra Club.  
The high-tech industry is likely to affect AMI deployment, as the entire smart meter 
system consists of measuring, collecting, communicating and managing energy usage 
data, and it is highly dependent on computer hardware and software for data processing 
and analyzing (Henton et al., 2011). AMI provides huge potential for information, 
telecommunication and other high-tech companies to expand their activities to include 
products and services related to smart grid operations (Henton et al., 2011). To further 
their business interests, it is likely that high-tech companies support smart meter 
deployment through donation and lobbying efforts, such as in the case of German solar 
cell industry (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). I posit that states with a stronger and more 
vibrant high-tech sector are more supportive towards smart meter and smart grid 
deployment. I use the number of high-tech jobs in one thousand people as an indicator for 
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pressure from the high-tech sector. I following Hecker’s definition of the high-tech sector 
and obtained employment data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Hecker, 2005). 
Hypothesis 6: A state is more likely to have a higher AMI penetration rate if it receives 
more pressure from environmental interest groups and high-tech companies. 
Technological regimes also face “selection pressures” that emanate from the 
technological system itself (Smith, Stirling, & Berkhout, 2005). Grid modernization 
efforts may be affected by the levels of distributed renewable energy and energy 
efficiency, as states tend to invest in smart grids and smart meters to meet the challenges 
of integrating increasing amounts of intermittent renewables, and to advance energy 
efficiency through consumer engagement in demand response programs (PNNL, 2011).  
In this chapter, I use energy intensity and per capita distributed renewable energy 
consumption as two indicators for pressures from the electric grid system. Energy 
intensity is defined as total energy consumed per dollar of GSP in a state. I divided the 
total consumption of distributed solar photovoltaics, solar thermal and wind by state 
population to obtain the per capita distributed renewable consumption. I obtained energy 
intensity, solar and wind energy consumption data from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). Population data were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Including these two variables in this analysis presents a potential endogeneity problem, as 
smart meter technology and policy development may affect renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. One approach that is commonly employed to avoid the simultaneity bias is to 
replace the suspected endogenous variable with its lagged values (See (Bania, Gray, & 
Stone, 2007; Edwards, 1996)). In the model, I lag both variables by one year to isolate 
this casual arrow. 
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Hypothesis 7: A higher level of energy intensity or distributed renewable energy in the 
electric grid in the previous year is likely to drive AMI penetration rate in the following 
year. 
There are some other factors that might influence smart meter deployment, such as 
electricity prices, electric market structure and smart meter prices. In this study, I control 
for state electricity prices in the econometric model, with data obtained from the U.S. 
EIA. The electric industry restructuring status in U.S. states does not change much 
between the periods of study (2007- 2012): twenty-eight states have no active electricity 
restructuring activities at all; seven states have either suspended or have no restructuring 
since 2007; fifteen states and the District of Columbia have active electricity restructuring 
activity, however, all decisions for deregulation and retail choice were made before 2007 
(U.S. EIA, 2015). Therefore, here I consider the market structure as time invariant 
between the year 2007 and 2012. For robustness checks, I test the interaction term 
between market structure variables and time variant policy variables. The estimation did 
not produce significantly different results and the interaction term is insignificant. 
Technology price is another factor that may affect smart meter deployment. The cost of 
installing a smart meter includes device cost and costs of communications networks, 
hardware and systems that enable smart meter features and functionalities (Smatgrid.gov, 
2015).  The device price of a smart meter averaged $96 in the late 1990’s (FERC, 2006), 
dropped to around $76 by 2005/2006 (FERC, 2006), and increased to $167 after 2010 
(Smatgrid.gov, 2015). The total incurred cost for installing a smart meter in the U.S. was 
between $125 and $150 in the early 2000’s (FERC, 2006), and averaged $268 after 2010 
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(Smatgrid.gov, 2015). In this study, I use year dummy variables to control for secular 
technology change patterns and other large macroeconomic/political changes over time. 
 
2.3. Data and Methodology  
2.3.1 Data Sources and Description 
I analyze a panel dataset of American states’ AMI deployment between 2007 and 2012, 
with a total number of 305 observations. Table 2.2 provides the list of variables, their 
operationalization and data sources. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.3. I use 
2007 as the starting year for the analysis because it was the first year EIA began tracking 
the number of smart meters in the U.S. Sixteen out of the 51 jurisdictions had no smart 
meters installed at that time, and the average AMI penetration rate in the country was 1.3 
percent (see Appendix C and D). Moreover, all state smart metering policies were 
adopted after the year 2007, except one by Texas in 2005 and one by Illinois in 2006. At 
the time of this study, the most recent release of smart meter data was for the year 2012, 
when a majority of the ARRA AMI projects have been completed (Smartgrid.gov, 2013).  
The dependent variable is AMI penetration rate. I obtained utilities’ AMI meter counts 
and total electric meter counts data from File 8 and File 2 of Form EIA-861 (Annual 
Electric Power Industry Report) (EIA, 2013). I summed up the utility level AMI meter 
and electric meter counts, respectively, for all utilities in a state to obtain the cumulative 
numbers for that state in a given year. I then divided total AMI meter counts by total 
electric meter counts to obtain the AMI penetration rate.  
File 8 of Form EIA-861 includes information for two types of meters: automated meter 
reading (AMR) and AMI. This study only focuses on AMI meters. While AMI can be 
further categorized into meters based on Radio Frequency (RF) technology, meters based 
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on Power Line Carrier (PLC) technology, and other types that use a hybrid design, File 8 
of Form EIA-861 does not distinguish between technology differences of AMI: it only 
collects data on total AMI meter counts. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Variables, operationalization, and data sources. 
Variable Operationalization Data sources 





Federal ARRA funding Per capita ARRA funding 
allocated to AMI projects 
(2013 dollars) 
Smartgrid.gov website 
Number of state AMI 
promotion policies  
The total number of effective 
policies that promote or 
mandate smart metering 
deployment 
Primary data sources 
Number of state AMI data 
security and privacy 
policies 
The total number of effective 
policies that regulate smart 
meter data security and privacy 
concerns 
Primary data sources 
PSC regulatory uncertainty SNL energy division regulatory 
research associates (RRA) 
ranking of PSCs 
SNL Financial 
GSP per capita Real gross state product per 
capita (chained 2005 million 
dollars) 
U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Sierra memberships Number of Sierra Club 
members in a thousand people 
Sierra Club 
High-tech jobs The number of high-tech jobs 
in a thousand people 
U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
Energy intensity Total energy consumption per 
dollar of GSP (ten thousand 





energy consumption per 
capita 
Per capita distributed 
renewable energy consumption 





Census Bureau  







Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics of the panel data. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
AMI penetration rate 305 10.33 17.26 0 95.37 
Federal ARRA funding 305 1.76 4.57 0 27.53 
Number of state AMI promotion 
policies 
305 .49 .84 0 4 
Number of state AMI data security and 
privacy policies 
305 .072  .35 0 3 
PSC regulatory uncertainty 305 4.96 1.53 1 9 
GSP per capita 305 4.36 1.67 2.80 15.13 
Sierra memberships 305 2.01 1.11 0.43 6.44 
High-tech jobs 305 18.80 9.89 7.64 80.12 
Energy intensity [t-1] 305 .97 .55 .06 2.78 
Distributed renewable energy 
consumption per capita [t-1] 
305 1.94  4.21 0 33.43 




Penetration rate is a continuous and non-negative variable.  As shown in Table 2.3, the 
average AMI penetration rate is 10.3 percent, with a standard deviation of 17.3 percent. 
Thirty-eight out of the 305 observations have zero AMI penetration rate, accounting for 
12.5 percent of the total. Figure 2.2 presents AMI penetration rate for each state between 
the year 2007 and 2012. Large advanced metering deployments clustered in western 
states, such as California, Idaho, Oregon, Nevada, and Arizona. Some southern states, 
such as Florida and Georgia also have a penetration rate around or over 50 percent in 
2012. It is noteworthy that some states experienced decreasing AMI penetration rates (i.e. 
AL, CT, DE, and HI) in certain years, which may be caused by measurement errors or 









Based on the hypotheses, I formulate a regression model to analyze the conditions under 
which smart meters are likely to deploy. The model is written as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡             (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is AMI penetration rate for state i in year t, 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 … 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡  are independent 
variables, including a set of indicators for regulatory governance, social 
acceptance/stakeholder support, and technological pressure. The empirical analysis in this 
chapter tests two models: model (1) does not include policy interactions, while model (2) 
does.  𝛽1   … 𝛽k  are coefficients for independent variables to be estimated.  𝛼𝑖  is the 
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intercept for each state, which represents all factors that affect AMI penetration rate that 
do not change over time, such as geographical features; uit is the error term.  
For each state i, I average this equation over time: 
?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1?̅?1,𝑖 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘?̅?𝑘,𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖                   (2) 
where ?̅?𝑖, ?̅?1,𝑖, and ?̅?𝑘,𝑖 are the averages of 𝑌𝑖𝑡, 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡, and 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡.  
Subtracting (2) from (1), I obtain that 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌?̅? = 𝛽1(𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?1,𝑖) + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘(𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑘,𝑖) + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 -?̅?𝑖)             (3) 
After demeaning variables using within transformation, I obtain fixed effects estimators 
through estimating Equation (3) using the standard statistical package Stata. This fixed 
effects model controls for unobserved and time invariant heterogeneity across states.  
Wooldridge (2011) and Cameron and Trivedi (2009) suggest that clustering and 
obtaining robust standard errors produces asymptotically valid inference and works well 
to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity when a panel is short with a large 
cross sections (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; Wooldridge, 2011; Wooldridge, 2010). This 
paper follows this approach, and uses clustered robust standard errors in both models.  
2.4. Results 
Table 2.4 presents estimated coefficients for the two models. The F-test and Breusch-
Pagan test show that both fixed and random effects exist in the data. The Hausman test 
rejects the null hypothesis that random effects coefficients are the same as those 





Table 2.4. Estimated coefficients of the fixed effects models2. 
Variables (1) (2) 
Federal ARRA funding (a) 0.757*** 0.273 
 (0.187) (0.406) 
State AMI promotion policy (b1) 0.939 6.723 
 (2.209) (4.383) 
State AMI data security and privacy policy (b2) 4.178 -5.997 
 (6.184) (5.359) 
PSC regulatory uncertainty (c) -3.971** -2.722 
 (1.621) (1.810) 
GSP per capita -11.90 -10.45 
 (11.44) (10.88) 
Sierra memberships -3.578 -4.112 
 (6.157) (5.758) 
High-tech jobs -1.675 -2.282* 
 (1.599) (1.290) 
Energy intensity [t-1] 4.970 0.704 
 (10.16) (10.47) 
Distributed renewable consumption per capita [t-1] 1.306 1.108 
 (1.174) (1.196) 
Electricity price -2.229* -2.525** 
 (1.115) (1.160) 
ARRA funding*State AMI promotion policy (a*b1)  0.393** 
  (0.160) 
Uncertainty*State AMI promotion policy (b1*c)  -2.081** 
  (0.921) 
State AMI promotion policy*State AMI data 
security and privacy policy (b1*b2) 
 4.868*** 
  (1.358) 
Constant 127.5*** 136.0*** 
 (45.05) (44.95) 
   
Observations 305 305 
R-squared 0.505 0.551 
Number of states/jurisdictions 51 51 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
2 Time trend variables are included in the model. Due to page limit, the coefficients are 
not presented here. I have also tried a couple of different specifications using aggregated 
policy counts and policy counts excluding the privacy policies. Results are largely 
consistent with what I presented here. Details about other model specifications and 
results are available upon request. 
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In model (1), estimated coefficients for federal financial incentives and PSC regulatory 
uncertainty are both significant, with signs being positive and negative respectively. After 
including interaction terms in model (2), estimated coefficients for both variables become 
insignificant, with signs unchanged. The interaction of these two variables with state 
AMI promotion policies is significant in model (2). Results support hypothesis 1 and 2 
and demonstrate that more federal ARRA funding and reduced PSC regulatory 
uncertainty could promote smart meter deployment, however, these are indirect impacts 
and are dependent on state AMI promotion policies.  
Estimated coefficients for the two types of state AMI policies are insignificant in both 
models. Estimated coefficients for AMI promotion policy are positive, while those for 
AMI data and privacy policy are positive in model (1) and negative in model (2). The 
interaction between the two policies in model (2) is positive and significant. The results 
suggest the two types of state policies drive smart meter deployment through their 
positive interaction, and through interacting with other government actions. This supports 
hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4.  
Estimated coefficients for income and Sierra memberships are all negative and 
insignificant in both models, which are different from expected. Coefficients for high-
tech sector employment are negative in both models, but are insignificant in model (1) 
and significant in model (2). Therefore, I reject the null of hypothesis 5 and part of 
hypothesis 6, and conclude that energy consumers and environmental groups do not 
appear to exert significant influence on smart meter deployment. High-tech employment 
has a significant and negative impact on smart meter deployment after controlling for 
policy interactions. Model results provide no support for hypothesis 7. Although the signs 
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for energy intensity and distributed renewable energy are all positive, the estimated 
coefficients are all statistically insignificant, failing to find conclusive evidence in 
support of the impact of electric grid system conditions on smart meter deployment.  
2.5. Discussion and Policy Implications  
The federal government has not adopted a specific compliance target to ensure smart 
metering adoption; instead, financial incentives are provided to reduce the costs of smart 
meters and encourage utility investments. The results show that federal matching fund 
explains much of states’ smart meter deployment status, but this matching funding only 
works in conjunction with other policies. The effect of ARRA funding depends on state 
AMI promotion policy: federal funding more effectively drives AMI installations in 
states that have adopted more AMI promotion policies. Literature suggests that federal 
incentives could stimulate policy activities within and between states (Hofferbert, 1974; 
Strumpf, 2002; Welch & Thompson, 1980). In the case of AMI policies, it is unlikely that 
federal ARRA funding encouraged state smart metering policy adoption, because ARRA 
funding was put together quickly and in response to the financial crisis. It is possible that 
in states with more favorable policy contexts/signals for smart meters, utilities are more 
likely to be successful in ARRA grant application. While states may have anticipated the 
future availability of federal funds, future research may test the idea that the federal 
funding drove changes in the state policy environment.  
Our results support earlier studies’ findings that regulatory uncertainty inhibits clean 
energy investment (Fabrizio, 2012; Fuss et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2008). It also confirms 
PSCs can provide the certainty that is critical to clean energy technology deployment 
through approval of utility-owned projects and cost-recovery mechanisms (Monast & 
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Adair, 2013). The results of this chapter further demonstrate that regulatory risk becomes 
more relevant when states adopt more policies to direct utilities to consider AMI roll out 
or require utilities to file AMI deployment plans with PSCs. The number of AMI 
promotion policies adopted may represent a way for states to articulate their energy 
policy goals, which can greatly influence PSC approval of innovative energy technology 
deployment projects (Monast & Adair, 2013). This might also indicate a fear of change in 
state AMI policy environment. Investors may be left exposed when a state legislature that 
has adopted AMI promotion policy reverses its decisions.  
It is interesting to note that estimated coefficients for the two types of state AMI policies 
are statistically insignificant in both models. These two policies indirectly affect AMI 
penetration rate and their impacts are dependent on other government actions. State-level 
policy activities may represent one part of the policy signals that utilities need to consider 
when they make decisions for AMI investments. State legislatures and PSCs may be 
more likely to adopt policies to encourage utility proposals for smart meter demonstration 
projects or deployment plans when they know that utilities in the state are not actively 
investing in smart meters, and vice versa. For instance, Alabama decided not to adopt 
Section 1252 of the EPACT because Alabama Power Company already offers time-of-
use rates to all available customer classes and is deploying smart meters (Delurey & 
Pietsch, 2008). Including policy interactions shows the two types of state policy tend to 
be jointly adopted and mutually supportive. The impact of AMI promotion policy is 
stronger when states adopt more policies to regulate data and privacy issues. 
Model results show that energy consumers and environmental groups do not have a 
significant impact on smart meter deployment and their estimated coefficients are all 
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negative. The Sierra membership variable may represent the conflictual relationships 
between utilities and environmental groups in the process of energy infrastructure 
upgrades - local environmental groups often do not trust the information and intentions of 
investor owned utilities (Huijts, Midden, & Meijnders, 2007). It is also possible that local 
environmental groups and higher income people are more sensitive to privacy and (real 
or imagined) health concerns with smart meters, for instance, the San Francisco chapter 
of Sierra Club has taken a position against smart meter installations due to concerns of 
increased electromagnetic frequency radiation and potential impact on wildlife. The 
estimated coefficient for high-tech jobs is negative and significant after controlling for 
policy interactions, showing that state with a higher concentration of high-tech jobs are 
less likely to deploy smart meters. People working in high-tech sectors may be less 
trusting of the data generated by smart meters because of their knowledge and concern 
with cyber security and privacy issues (Hadley, Lu, & Deborah, 2010).  
Conditions of the electric grid system have negligible impacts: neither a higher level of 
distributed renewable energy consumption nor energy intensity in a state drives smart 
meter deployment. The weak influence of these factors may be because of two reasons. 
First, the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency in the U.S. is itself 
highly influenced by government policies. Without effective policy interventions, it 
might be difficult for the system to respond to these pressures and stimulate regime 
changes. Second, in the short term, competition may exist between different clean energy 
technological regimes: smart meters, renewable energy and energy efficiency. Resources 
may be dispersed in different technological regimes, and pressures may act incoherently, 
which lead to system responses in different directions (Smith et al., 2005).  
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The three socio-economic metrics (income, Sierra Club membership, and high-tech 
employment) represent my best attempts to capture social conflicts around smart meter 
deployment. I was unable to find a time and spatially variant metric that would more 
closely capture public perception towards smart meters or concerns over health, privacy 
and environmental impacts. This limitation of our study might be improved by 
integrating results of public perception surveys on smart meters in the future. It is also 
likely that differences in ideology, market structure, or other socio-economic factors 
could influence smart meter diffusion. I exclude these variables in my analysis because 
they are time invariant during the period of study (2007-2012), and hence are captured 
with the state fixed effect. This is a tradeoff of implementing a two-way fixed effect 
model that reduces concerns of excluded variable bias or endogeneity issues at the 
expense of not being able to capture temporally invariant spatial characteristics. 
The findings of this paper have two policy implications. First, as multiple regulatory 
authorities and stakeholders are involved in a polycentric governance system, more 
resources and attention can be devoted to solving a single problem, which may create a 
regulatory “safety net” and provide a higher probability to solve it (Brown & Sovacool, 
2011). In this case, while state legislative and regulatory actions alone are ineffective in 
driving smart meter installations, federal government and state PSCs could influence the 
technology diffusion by providing financial incentives and reducing long-term regulatory 
uncertainty for utilities. Policy making at different levels complements each other and 
works together to facilitate smart meter diffusion. Secondly, authority governing AMI 
deployment is dispersed among government agencies: none of the governance levels are 
solely responsible for AMI deployment, and not all three levels of government are 
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individually effective in promoting smart meters. The impact of AMI governance at one 
level is highly dependent on the other levels. State AMI promotion policy leverages 
federal ARRA spending on AMI, leading to positive interactions. Regulatory uncertainty 
inhibits smart meter installations, and state AMI promotion policy amplifies this negative 
effect. State AMI data security and privacy policy does not affect the impacts of federal 
funding or regulatory uncertainty, however, it positively interacts with state AMI 
promotion policy. While a mandatory smart meter rollout plan at the national level is not 
likely to be politically feasible in the U.S., successful smart meter deployment requires 
understanding of the complex interdependencies between divided authorities in electricity 
system governance as well as effective coordination between governance levels.  
2.6. Conclusion 
Decarbonization of the energy sector offers a cost-effective way to combat climate 
change. The energy infrastructure system transcends geographical and jurisdictional 
boundaries and is often governed by multiple layers of governments, with authorities and 
responsibilities divided across the regulatory structure. The transition to a low-carbon 
energy future introduces new regulatory considerations and requires more coordination 
among government actors. Smart meter deployment in the United States, with its unique 
governance system, offers a rich opportunity to evaluate the policy impacts of multiple 
institutional arrangements on clean technology diffusion. This study estimates two fixed 
effects models using panel data for the 50 U.S. states and Washington D.C from 2007 to 
2012. Results suggest that the smart meter diffusion pattern in the U.S. is mainly created 
by a polycentric governance system, where the interdependencies and interactions 
between different layers of government play a critical role. Although none of the policy 
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actions analyzed in this research directly affect smart meter deployment, their impacts are 
dependent on interactions with other governance activities: increased federal funding and 
reduced PSC regulatory uncertainty more effectively drives smart meter installations 
when states have adopted more AMI promotion policies; the two types of state AMI 
policies tend to be jointly adopted and mutually supportive. Socio-economic factors are 
surprisingly unimportant. Conditions of the electric grid system and pressures from 
energy consumers and environmental interest groups do not seem to exert any significant 
influence.  
This study highlights the need to reexamine policy effectiveness in clean energy 
technology diffusion through the lens of polycentric governance. This is particularly 
important for countries like the United States, where the federal-state tension has been 
demonstrated to exist in a variety of energy policy issues (Klass, 2010; Klass & Wilson, 
2012). While neither state, federal, nor PSC has authority over AMI deployment, 
government actions at multiple levels together form policy signals that utilities need to 
consider when making smart meter investment decisions.  The results reinforce the 
importance of coordinating and aligning multi-level policy efforts to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of energy and climate change policy instruments (Carley, 
2011; Schot & Geels, 2008).  
Like the U.S., smart grid technology deployment in the worldwide has largely been 
government-driven, with different policy instruments adopted to overcome barriers and 
leverage drivers (Brown & Zhou, 2013). In Europe, a total of 459 smart grid projects 
have been launched since 2002 in 28 EU member states, with 49 percent of the total 
€3.15 billion investment coming from government funding sources (Covrig et al., 2014). 
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Korea’s smart grid policies are government-led and export-oriented to encourage the 
government-industry-consumer collaboration for smart grid technological innovation 
(Ngar-yin Mah et al., 2012). The Chinese government’s strategies mainly focus on the 
supply-side, which drive R&D, technical knowledge, and manpower in eleven state-
owned power companies to foster the smart grid industry (Lin et al., 2013).  
Experience in Korea and the EU supports with my findings that regulation of electricity 
distribution and cost recovery rules are important in smart grid technology deployment in 
both regulated and liberalized electricity market (Cossent, Gómez, & Frías, 2009; Ngar-
yin Mah et al., 2012). The results are also consistent with case studies in the United 
States that demonstrate the critical role of state PSCs in implementing innovative energy 
technologies such as carbon capture and sequestration and offshore wind (Monast & 
Adair, 2013). The findings show that state-level AMI data security and privacy policies 
indirectly affect smart meter deployment in the U.S. through their positive interaction 
with state AMI promotion policies. Cyber security needs special attention and should be 
considered as an essential dimension of the smart grid policy framework, as has been 
demonstrated in Europe (Pearson, 2011). Although I do not find significant evidence for 
consumers’ impact on smart metering diffusion, case studies of Hong Kong and Korea 
have noted that demand-side measures to facilitate consumer engagement should be 
priorities for policy change in the future (Mah et al., 2012; Ngar-yin Mah et al., 2012).  
There are several avenues to expand on this work. First, more detailed case study analysis 
using interviews or survey results will provide valuable information to understand the 
multilevel regulatory processes and contextualize the findings. The second direction for 
future research is to examine the smart meter adoption decision at different decision-
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making units, such as utilities and public service commissions. It would be particularly 
interesting to explore how distribution utilities consider smart meter roll out in states with 
different electricity market restructuring activities, and how the design of wholesale 
market rules (i.e. auction-based forward capacity markets) affect demand for smart 
metering technology.  
 43 
 
CHAPTER 3   SMART METER LEAD MARKETS IN EUROPE: A 





3.1. Introduction  
There is a great consensus among scholars about the immense risks of global climate 
change and the urgent need to promote clean energy technologies to address this 
challenge (Brown & Sovacool, 2011; Mowery, Nelson, & Martin, 2010). Neoclassical 
economists think that markets alone are insufficient and government policies are required 
to internalize the knowledge and environmental externalities associated with the 
emergence and diffusion of sustainable innovations (Jaffe et al., 2005). However, 
government interventions may also result in policy failures that hinder the deployment of 
clean energy technologies (Brown & Chandler, 2008). How to design policy schemes that 
can effectively promote clean energy technology diffusion has become a central problem 
in climate change and energy policy discussions.  
This study takes the electric smart metering technology as an empirical example to 
investigate how the design of policy frameworks have led to the cross-national variation 
in smart meter penetration in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Smart meter in this chapter refers to the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). In 2009, 
the EU adopted the Electricity Directive (2009/72/EC), requiring its member countries to 
roll out smart meters based on economic assessments and to have at least 80% of 
consumers equipped with smart meters by 2020 (The European Parliament and The 
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Council of the European Union, 2009). Since then, member states have responded 
differently, with smart meter deployment status varying greatly across countries (See 
Appendix E). As of 2014, smart meter penetration rates of most EU member states are 
below 10%, including many wealthier countries such as the UK, France, Germany, and 
the Netherlands (European Commission, 2014a). However, Sweden, Italy and Finland 
have already achieved a penetration rate of at least 80% for electric smart meters, ranking 
the highest in the EU (European Commission, 2014a). 
This chapter aims to answer the question that arises in this context: why smart metering 
technology diffuses faster and to a greater extent in some pioneering countries than in 
others. I conduct in-depth case studies on five European countries: Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands, focusing on the impacts of domestic policy 
environments on smart meter deployment. This study is unique and important as it builds 
on the technology diffusion and policy evaluation literature by assessing the effectiveness 
of public policies in the clean technology diffusion process. Lessons learned from this 
study can provide valuable information for the future design of effective governance 
schemes to promote clean energy innovations. This paper is organized as follows: section 
2 presents a literature review and the research question, section 3 explains case selection 
and research methodology, section 4 answers research question with five case studies, 
section 5 discusses findings and policy implications, and section 6 offers conclusions. 
3.2. Literature Review 
According to Rogers (1962), diffusion is a process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system. 
There are often important differences between earlier and later adopters, in terms of 
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socioeconomic status, personality variables, and communication behaviors, etc. (Rogers, 
1962). The varying timing of innovation adoption in different regions has led to the 
coexistence of “lead” and “lag” markets (Beise, 2004). Lead markets refer to “countries 
that first adopt a globally dominant innovation design, lead the international diffusion of 
an innovation and set the global standard” (Beise & Rennings, 2005). Certain 
characteristics of a country are responsible for whether or not it becomes a lead market 
(Rennings & Smidt, 2008). For instance, Jänicke & Jacob (2004) found that lead markets 
are often characterized by high per-capita income, demanding buyers, high and 
internationally recognized quality standards, and flexible and innovation-friendly 
framework conditions for producers and users of technologies (Jänicke & Jacob, 2004). 
Beise (2004) argued that five country-specific factors can characterize a lead market, 
including price advantage, demand advantages, transfer advantages, export advantages, 
and market structure advantages (Beise, 2004).  
Price advantage can come from a relative price decrease of an innovation design, or an 
increasing factor cost when it induces factor saving innovations (Beise, 2004).  For clean 
technologies, such as fuel-efficient automobiles (Beise and Rennings, 2004) and clean 
coal (Horbach et al., 2014), higher fuel prices which increase the demand for these 
innovations reflect a country’s price advantage. Demand advantage refers to national 
characteristics that increase the demand for an innovation (Beise, 2004). Studies have 
concluded that the wealth of a nation could influence the speed and rate of technology 
diffusion (Horbach et al., 2014), and high per capita income is one of the key features for 
lead markets (Jacob et al., 2006). A country has a high transfer advantage if it has a 
strong capability to shape the preference of other countries (Beise, 2004). Investment in 
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research & development (R&D) by one country can reduce uncertainty, and increase the 
perceived benefit of adopting the innovation by another country (Horbach et al., 2014; 
Rennings & Smidt, 2008). Export advantage corresponds to market conditions that 
increase the likelihood of exporting innovation designs to other countries (Beise, 2004). 
Long-time export experience and performance of domestic companies is an important 
indicator for export advantage (Jacob et al., 2006). The market structure advantage refers 
to national characteristics that increase the degree of competition between domestic 
companies and reduce market entry barriers for new ones (Jacob et al., 2006). A lead 
market is often highly competitive (Beise, 2004).  
The diffusion of clean energy technologies can be very different from commercial goods, 
and public policy often plays an important role in the processes. Environmental 
economists use the term “induced diffusion” to indicate that policy interventions are often 
required to accelerate the speed and/or total level of clean technology diffusion (Diaz-
Rainey, 2009). From the socio-technical transition perspective, transitions from 
traditional energy technology regime to low-carbon clean energy technologies often face 
great resistance (Geels, 2014). Policymakers need to engage in policy reforms that 
deliberately destabilize the old technology regime and advocate for the sustainability 
transition (Turnheim & Geels, 2012).  
Clean energy technology deployment is often hindered by a variety of barriers (Brown, 
2001; Brown & Zhou, 2013; Eleftheriadis & Anagnostopoulou, 2015; Painuly, 2001). For 
smart meters, some barriers are particularly prominent. First of all, smart metering 
deployment can be hindered by institutional barriers, which refer to a lack of regulatory 
framework or interest/capacity in political institutions to promote the technology (Painuly, 
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2001). Second, financial barriers are often huge as meter replacement involves a large 
amount of capital investment, and there is often a lack of incentives for utility investment 
(Depuru, Wang, & Devabhaktuni, 2011). Third, technical risks associated with data 
management and storage, and interoperability of devices often exist (Depuru et al., 2011). 
Fourth, collection and transmission of energy consumption data by smart meters creates 
privacy and security risks, as these data may reveal information about the presence and 
activities of people at their residence (Depuru et al., 2011). Consumer acceptance of 
smart meters is dampened by fears regarding privacy violations, increased electricity bills 
and loss of control over the electricity usage (Krishnamurti et al., 2012). When there is 
little attention for the societal embedding of new technologies, protests from societal 
groups may slow the technology implementation (Verbong & Geels, 2007).   
A range of policy instruments has been used to address these barriers. Regulatory 
measures determine what can and can not be done by certain entities (Jacob et al., 2006). 
Fiscal incentives and economic instruments are commonly applied to overcome the 
financial barrier (Diaz-Rainey, 2009). Public R&D investment is a common type of fiscal 
incentive, and it has the largest potential for spurring clean innovations in the power 
sector (Aalbers, Shestalova, & Kocsis, 2013). Providing R&D funding is relatively easy 
to implement and effective in driving the deployment of a complete new innovation 
(Jacob et al., 2006). Dissemination of information through demonstration projects, 
campaigns, education, consulting, certification and labeling can reduce uncertainty and 
drive technology diffusion (Blackman, 1999; Sawin, 2006).  
A comprehensive and well-coordinated policy framework is often needed to promote 
clean innovations. Many have argued the importance of understanding the multi-faceted 
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policy interventions in the sustainability transition process, and the need to design and 
combine innovation policy instruments into mixes to facilitate clean innovations (Borrás 
& Edquist, 2013; Brown & Wang, 2015; Rogge & Reichardt, 2013). The concept of a 
policy mix for clean technological change consists of elements (policy strategies), 
processes of policy making and implementation, and dimensions (i.e. policy field, 
governance level, geography, sector, technology, innovation, actor and time) (Rogge & 
Reichardt, 2013). A policy mix should be designed and adapted to address specific 
problems in the innovation systems, meanwhile the possible complementary or 
contrasting effects between policy instruments shall be taken into consideration (Borrás 
& Edquist, 2013). Details of policy design, including credibility and consistency of the 
policies, and the compatibility with other policies, are highly important (Veugelers, 2012). 
For instance, Taylor (2008) found that California adopts a three-category policy scheme 
to facilitate solar energy deployment, which includes upstream financial investment in 
solar R&D, policies that help create solar market, and interface improvement policies that 
enhance knowledge-flow between actors (Taylor, 2008). This comprehensive policy 
framework has played an important role in shaping California’s leading position in solar 
energy deployment in the U.S. In the case of renewable energy deployment in Germany, 
a similar policy scheme combining government funded R&D programs and electricity 
feed-in law have played a critical role (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006).  
While there is no one-fits-all policy scheme, it is important to understand how policies or 
a policy mix can be designed to effectively facilitate clean technology deployment. In this 
chapter, I assess the effectiveness of countries’ policy frameworks by evaluating how 
they have addressed different barriers and leveraged drivers for smart metering 
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technology adoption. The results of this paper provide valuable prescriptions for policy 
makers in designing targeted technology policies to accelerate clean innovations.  
3.3. Methodology and Case Selection  
I use a multiple-case study to understand the role of public policy in the emergence of 
smart meter lead markets. Following Jänicke & Jacob (2004) and Beise (2004), I identify 
lead markets by looking at the technology’s market penetration rate. For case selection, I 
choose two countries with high penetration rates (Finland and Sweden), two countries 
with low penetration rates (the Netherlands and Germany), and one country in between 
(Denmark). Figure 3.1 shows the smart meter penetration rates in the five countries at the 
end of 2014. These countries vary a lot in both policy environments and smart meter 
penetration rates, but are similar in important socio-economic factors that might influence 
smart meter deployment, such as GDP, energy research, demonstration and development 
budget, global competitiveness and clean tech innovation (see Appendix F). After 
controlling for these variables, I can then evaluate the policy impacts on smart meter 
deployment without suffering the effects of omitted variable bias (King, Keohane, & 









This section explores five case studies to identify policy frameworks involved, and 
evaluate their contribution in promoting smart metering deployment. Smart metering 
policy developments are often based on the needs of domestic energy markets (see 
country energy statistics in Table 3.1). It is important to recognize the variation of energy 
sectors across countries when analyzing policy impacts.  
 
Table 3.1  Energy Statistics of the Five Countries 





Denmark Sweden Finland 
GDP (€ per inhabitant in 2013) 35,900 33,300 44,400 43,800 35,600 
Population (million person in 
2013) 
16.8 82.0 5.6 9.6 5.4 
Gross inland energy 
consumption in 2013 (Thousand 
tonnes of oil equivalent (TOE))  
81,171 324,27
2 
18,101 49,134 33,926 
Electricity use per capita in 
2011 (kWh) 
7,036 7,094 6,122 14,030 15,738 
Electricity price for domestic 
consumers (2014S1)(€/kWh) – 
including taxes and levies 
0.1821 0.2981 0.3042 0.1918 0.1563 
Electricity generated from 
renewable in 2012 (%) 
10.5 23.6 38.7 60.0 29.5 
Installed wind net capacity at 
the end of 2012 (MW) 
2,434 31,332 4,163 3,607 257 
Total connected and cumulated 
PV capacity at the end of 2012 
(MWp) 
365 32,698 399 24 11 
Total small hydraulic net 
capacity (<10 MW) in 2012 
(MW) 
- 1,780.0 9.0 953.0 315.0 
Gross electricity production 
from urban municipal waste in 
2012 (GWh) 
2235.0 4951.0 892.1 1662.0 333.8 
Renewable energy target by 
2020 (% of final energy) 
14%  18%  50 % of 
electricity 





3.4.1 Finland  
Finland has the lowest electricity price and highest per capita electricity consumption in 
the five countries. It has low energy self-sufficiency with almost all traditional fossil fuels 
imported (MEE, 2014b). Finland aims to have 38% of final energy from renewables by 
2020 (IRENA, 2013), and achieve an 80-95% reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 
level by 2050 (MEE, 2014b). With 80% of GHG emissions in Finland coming from 
energy production and consumption, decarbonizing the energy sector is in urgent need 
(MEE, 2014b). The Finnish government sees deployment of smart grids and smart meters 
as an important opportunity to encourage carbon reduction actions at all levels (i.e. 
households, commercial, industrial, etc.), and gain competitive advantages in the global 
clean technology market (MEE, 2014b). The objective for the development of smart grids 
and meters is to promote demand response and electricity storage by providing 
consumers with hourly electricity pricing information (MEE, 2014b).  
Figure 3.2 shows the policy milestones for smart meter deployment in Finland. After 
passing the Electricity Market Act (386/1995) in 1995, the electricity market in Finland 
was gradually opened to competition, and by late 1998, all consumers were able to 
choose their preferred electricity suppliers (MEE, 2014a). Distributed system operators 
(DSOs) are responsible for transmitting electricity, connecting customers to the grid, and 
operating the grid without discrimination and at reasonable prices (MEE, 2014b). In the 
early 2000’s, many DSOs initiated smart meter roll-out voluntarily, as they saw the 
benefits of remote reading and better control of the network (European Commission, 
2014a). In 2008, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE) of Finland carried 
out an economic analysis of the country’s demand side response potential, which 
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concluded a positive outcome based on the assumption of a national smart meter rollout 
(European Commission, 2016).  The Finnish government then adopted the Government 
Decree on Determination of Electricity Supply and Metering (66/2009) to launch a 
national rollout of smart meters capable of registering hourly metering and remote 
reading in 2009. It aimed to obtain a smart meter penetration rate of at least 80% and 
cover about 3.2 million energy consumers by the end of 2013 (Smartregions, 2013b). As 
of 2014, 98% of electricity consumption sites in Finland are equipped with smart meters 
that are capable of hourly metering (MEE, 2014b). 
The Decree (66/2009) sets detailed responsibilities related to metering for energy market 
participants (Finnish Energy Industries, 2010). DSOs are responsible for installing 
metering devices and data transmission connections at the electricity consumption and 
production sites (Finnish Energy Industries, 2010). They must arrange electric metering 
for balance settlement and billing, and for reading, verification, registration and reporting 
of metering data to electricity market participants (Finnish Energy Industries, 2010). 
DSOs are also responsible for data security and protection, however, customers and 
authorized third party are entitled to access metering data (Finnish Energy Industries, 
2010). DSOs should also facilitate the installation of in-home displays (directly or 
through a third party) if requested by customers (Finnish Energy Industries, 2010). 
The Decree (66/2009) defines minimum functional requirements for smart meters, and 
obligations for metering data transmission and storage (Finnish Energy Industries, 2010). 
Smart meters should be able to send hourly data to customers once a day and record over 
3 minutes’ distribution interruptions. They should also have remote reading, 
disconnection and reconnection facility, and at least six-year storage time for metering 
 53 
data and two-year for interruption time data. Moreover, data protection function and data 




Figure 3.2 Smart Meter Policy Milestones in Finland 
 
 
Since 2005, the power sector regulation in Finland has been a combination of the ex-ante 
revenue cap model and incentive based model (NordREG, 2011). Regulators set an 
allowed return on investment for DSOs, and calculate the realized adjusted profit by 
considering companies’ financial, accounting and regulatory performance. The surplus or 
deficit can be obtained by deducting the allowed return from the realized adjusted profit. 
Incentive to improve quality is provided when calculating the realized adjusted profit, the 
value of which may not exceed 20% of the reasonable return (NordREG, 2011). DSOs 
are allowed to adjust their price setting in the following regulatory period to compensate 
the surplus or deficit. Finnish regulators want to ensure a reasonable rate of return for 
DSOs, while at the same time encourage them to maintain good system performance. 
Under this regulatory model, the roll-out of smart meters, considered as network 
investment, is financed by a rise of electricity prices (Energy Market Authority, 2013). 
However, the influence on household electricity bill is considered as small (Energy 
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Market Authority, 2013). Smart meter deployment in Finland has generally benefited 
consumers by easing the supplier switching procedures and enabling customers to better 
control their energy usage (European Commission, 2014b). It has also encouraged the 
emergence of new services provided by suppliers, such as dynamic pricing and demand 
side management programs (European Commission, 2014b). Consumers are in general 
supportive of smart meter rollout in Finland (Smartregions, 2013b). Privacy and data 
security have not been a great concern to the general public, as the level of data security 
and experience in online services is considered very high in Finland, and consumers have 
a high level of trust on utilities and new technologies (Smartregions, 2013b). 
3.4.2 Sweden 
Sweden had 60% of its electricity generated from renewable sources in 2012, ranking the 
highest among the five countries (European Commission, 2015). It also has the second 
highest per capita energy consumption, which is more than twice the EU average 
(IRENA, 2013). Electricity market in Sweden has been deregulated since 1996 (ICER, 
2012). Electricity generation and supply that take place in a competitive environment 
were separated from electricity networks, which are operated by natural monopolies and 
their returns are regulated. According to the Swedish Electricity Law, DSOs are 
responsible for maintaining reasonable and fair network tariffs, keeping networks safe, 
reliable and efficient, and being able to transmit electricity in the long term; therefore, 
they are obligated to upgrade their networks to meet the challenges posed by increasing 
amount of electricity generated from renewable energy, increasing peak demand, and 
electrification of the transport sector (Energy Markets Inspectorate, 2011). Smart meter 
deployment is considered as network upgrading and is led by DSOs in Sweden. 
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Sweden is one of the first countries in Europe to carry out metering reform and large-
scale roll out of smart meters. The main goal is to increase consumer awareness and 
activity with more accurate electricity bills, simplified supplier switching processes and 
better information to customers about their actual consumption (Swedish Energy Agency, 
2012). Before the reform, electricity consumption data for small customers were read on 
a yearly basis and billing was estimated based on previous year’s consumption, instead of 
actual meter reading. This had been the major source of customer complaints (Mannikoff 
& Nilsson, 2009). Consumer needs for timely and correct billing were the main driver 
behind smart meter deployment in Sweden (Morch, Parsons, & Kester, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Smart Meter Policy Milestones in Sweden 
 
 
In May 2002, the Swedish Energy Agency conducted a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and 
concluded that monthly reading of electricity meters could reduce energy usage by 1 to 
2%, and lead to a net annual benefit for Sweden of around €60 million (KEMA, 2010). 
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The Swedish Parliament then passed Government Bill 2002/03:85, which mandates 
monthly meter reading for large customers (> 8000kWh) from July 1st 2006, and all 
other customers from July 1st, 2009 (see Figure 3.3 for the policy milestones). The bill 
also requires hourly metering for customers with larger than 63A fuse from July 1st, 2006.  
Although the law does not mandate the replacement of traditional meters, many DSOs 
decided to introduce meters that can be read remotely because manual meter readings 
every month are very costly and installing more advanced meters is the most cost 
effective way to comply with the legislation (World Energy Council, 2010). The Swedish 
government has not adopted regulations for the functionalities of the metering system, 
although it requested the Energy Market Inspectorate to investigate minimum functional 
requirements suitable for Sweden (Energy Markets Inspectorate, 2011). AMI systems are 
often selected by Swedish DSOs, as there is no need for future upgrades (World Energy 
Council, 2010). As a result, 95% of the meters in Sweden can collect hourly meter 
reading data, while about 80% are capable of two-way communication (Pyrko, 2011).  
Estimated cost for meter replacement in Sweden is €1.5 billion (Swedish Energy Agency, 
2012), which is borne by DSOs and ultimately by consumers (Energy Markets 
Inspectorate, 2011). Before 2012, there were no strong financial incentives for DSOs to 
invest in smart meters. An Amendment to the Electricity Law which became effective in 
2012 allows returns on investments as long as they are necessary to support the core 
activities of DSOs (i.e. electricity distribution and metering) (Energy Markets 
Inspectorate, 2011). According to the Amendment, revenue cap that covers reasonable 
operational costs and a reasonable return on capital will be decided for each DSO in 
advance for each regulatory period. This new regulation also provides quality incentives, 
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allowing DSOs to raise electricity prices if they modify their grids and provide more 
intelligent services to consumers (NordREG, 2011). Smart meter investments are 
encouraged, although well defined quality measures are still needed to avoid excessive 
investments in conventional metering technologies (Energy Markets Inspectorate, 2011). 
In order to further increase customer awareness and activity in the retail market, the 
Swedish government adopted the bill “Hourly Metering for Active Electricity Consumers” 
in 2012, which requires the enforcement of hourly metering at no extra cost for customers 
who subscribe to hourly-based electricity supply contracts3 (Swedenergy, 2013).  
Although there are also no rules regulating functionalities, data usage, or interoperability 
of smart meter systems in Sweden (KEMA, 2010), there had been not much public 
opposition to smart meter roll out (Widegren, 2013). Concerns about data accuracy, data 
usage and customer privacy has generated little discussion (Widegren, 2013). 
3.4.3 Denmark 
Among the five countries, Denmark has the highest electricity price for domestic 
consumers and the lowest per capita electricity consumption. It is the first-mover in both 
onshore and offshore wind in the world, with 33.2% wind power in the electricity system 
in 2013 (Danish Wind Industry Association, 2015). Denmark aims to have 50% 
electricity consumption from wind power by 2020, and 100% of total energy 
consumption covered by renewables by 2050 (IRENA, 2013). The large-scale 
deployment of renewable energy and electric vehicles will place great challenges to the 
Danish power system in the coming decades, which becomes an important motivation for 
smart grid development (Energinet.dk & Danish Energy Association, 2009). Findings 
                                                 
3The hourly-based electricity contract represents dynamic electricity pricing that varies from hour 
to hour, with the goal to give customers more information to make informed decisions about their 
energy consumption.  
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from a CBA show that a future power system using smart grids can generate a net social 
benefit of DKK 6.1 billion (Energinet.dk & Danish Energy Association, 2009). Therefore, 
a smart grid is considered as the most effective strategy for transforming the power 
system to accommodate the significant changes in electricity consumption and production 
in Denmark in the coming years, and to achieve Danish government’s ambitious climate 
and energy targets (Energinet.dk & Danish Energy Association, 2009).  
Danish energy market has been fully liberalized since January 2003, when all electricity 
customers can choose their suppliers freely (Figure 3.4). Denmark mandated hourly 
electric meter-reading for customers with an annual consumption larger than 200,000 
kWh from January1st 2003, and 100,000 kWh from January 1st, 2005 (Morch et al., 2007). 
Although there had been no legal plan to provide smart meters to smaller consumers till 
2013, the Danish government had adopted several policies to promote smart meter 
deployment (see Figure 3.4). In April 2009, the Danish minister of Climate, Energy and 
Building asked the Danish Transmission Systems Operator to establish the Datahub, 
which provides consumers with easier access to their own energy data and makes it easier 
to change electricity suppliers (KEBMIN, 2013). In 2010, the Danish Ministry for 
Climate, Energy and Building set up the Smart Grid Network, involving representatives 
from the entire energy sector. The task of this Network is to prepare recommendations for 
how the electricity sector and the authorities could promote smart grid deployment. 
An economic analysis conducted in March 2013 showed that a full smart meter roll out 
would generate a net annual benefit of DKK 10 million for Denmark (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2013b). The Danish Parliament then adopted Act No.642 in June 2013, 
mandating the introduction of smart meters for all customers by 2020. In December 2013, 
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the Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and Building adopted an executive order (BEK 
nr 1358 af 03/12/2013) that sets out a framework for smart meter rollout (Danish Energy 
Agency, 2013a). The Order also sets minimum functional requirements for smart meters: 
it should be able to record energy consumption data every 15 minutes or at shorter 
intervals; be able to store and transmit metering data; have remote control settings for 
meter frequency; and be able to adjust intervals for data transmission to the grid company 
to adapt to its settlement and billing routines (Danish Energy Agency, 2013a). Before this 
Order, a lack of standardization and common rules for managing energy data had been a 
major barrier to smart meter deployment, where different DSOs often operate on different 
technical platforms (AlAbdulkarim & Lukszo, 2009). 
 
Figure 3.4 Smart Meter Policy Milestones in Denmark 
 
 
DSOs in Denmark are responsible for smart meter deployment, which is financed via 
increased network tariffs (European Commission, 2014b). As of 2014, DSOs in Denmark 
have conducted smart meter trials, and replaced the nation’s 50% meters with smart 
meters (European Commission, 2014a). Regulation on DSOs was changed from an ex-
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post rate-of-return policy to the combination of a revenue cap and a maximum rate of 
return in 2005 (NordREG, 2011). DSOs are free to set distribution tariffs as long as they 
do not violate revenue caps and the maximum rate of return on network assets. The 
allowed revenues will be lowered for companies that have poor quality of supply. 
Financial regulations on DSOs assume that all costs and investments are driven by 
traditional grid components, and smart meter investment do not result in a corresponding 
expansion of DSOs’ revenue caps, which automatically put an economic disadvantage on 
the company (Energinet.dk & Danish Energy Association, 2009, 2012). However, some 
DSOs found it profitable to invest in smart meters under the incentives of demand 
response programs. Danish policy makers are planning to adopt regulations to encourage 
time variant pricing in the future (Energinet.dk & Danish Energy Association, 2012).  
3.4.4 Germany  
Germany leads the development of wind, solar photovoltaics, and hydropower in Europe. 
In 2012, it was the largest wind and solar energy producers, and ranked the 4th in small 
hydraulic net capacity in Europe (EuroObserv'ER, 2013). Germany plans to have 18% of 
final energy and 35% electricity generation from renewables by 2020 (IRENA, 2013). 
The smart grid deployment in Germany was accelerated by the decision to end German 
dependence on nuclear power after the Fukushima event in 2011 (Smartregions, 2013a). 
The German government envisions that smart meter roll out can play an important role in 
integrating renewable energy and enabling consumers to take an active part in the energy 
market, when data protection and security is strictly guaranteed (BMWi, 2015b).  
Germany’s electricity market was fully liberalized in 1998. Before 2011, there was no 
government-led smart meter rollout and most smart metering deployment activities were 
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demonstration and pilot projects (Hierzinger et al., 2012). Regulations have been 
expanded in recent years (see Figure 3.5). The adoption of the 2011 amendment of the 
German Energy Act (‘EnWG’) was a major step. Section 21c of EnWG requires smart 
meters to be installed for new buildings and buildings with major renovations, final 
consumers with consumption over 6000 kWh/year, and newly installed renewable energy 
production larger than 7kW (BMJV, 2005). Smart meters might also be installed in other 
cases, if technically and economically acceptable. Section 21d of EnWG authorizes 
government to adopt minimum technical requirements for smart meter data protection 
and security(BMJV, 2005). Section 21e of EnWG requires smart meters to be certified 
and fulfill certain requirements to ensure data protection, security and interoperability. 
However, certification criteria and standards have not been adopted till recently 4 . 
Following a CBA in July 2013, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy 




Figure 3.5 Smart Meter Policy Milestones in Germany 
 
                                                 
4 After several years’ discussion and preparation, the Measurement and Verification Act finally 
became effective on January 1st, 2015, which sets detailed minimum technical requirements for 
smart meters and their operation (BMWi, 2015a). 
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The metering sector was completely liberalized in Germany. DSOs are responsible for 
smart meter installation and ownership, however consumers are entitled to choose a third 
party as their preferred metering point operator (MPO) (European Commission, 2014b). 
Currently, German regulators set an authorized revenue cap for each DSO, which 
considers three types of costs: inefficient, efficient, and non-influenceable costs 
(Ernst&Young, 2013). The revenue cap is determined by benchmarking operators sharing 
the same characteristics against each other (Ernst&Young, 2013; NordREG, 2011). The 
goal is to encourage cost reduction – both at individual company level and across the 
whole group. New investments are taken into account by adjusting the authorized 
revenue through an expansion factor that is dependent on the number of new connections 
to the grid for DSOs and the size of its service area. While DSOs’ costs are decoupled 
from revenues, there is often a delay of three to seven years between new investments 
and the integration of the resulting capital expenditures within the revenue cap 
(Eurelectric, 2011). Therefore, the achievable rate of return for German DSOs is often 
significant lower than the expected regulatory rate of return, resulting in a strong barrier 
to smart meter investment (Eurelectric, 2011). As of 2014, smart meter penetration rate in 
Germany is less than 4% (European Commission, 2014b). 
Survey responses from German energy users have shown deep public concerns about 
privacy and retention of personal data and patterns of energy use (Alejandro et al., 2014). 
German regulators plan to establish a reliable legal framework to ensure the secure use of 
smart metering systems in Germany (BMWi, 2015c). The legal framework will include 
protection profiles and technical guidelines developed by the Federal Office for 
Information Security. It will impose maximum cost thresholds for the installation and 
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operation of smart meters to ensure that consumers’ costs do not exceed the expected 
amount in each area of usage. In addition, the legal framework will allow DSOs to pass 
the metering service on to the market through the tendering process.  
3.4.5 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands lags behind other four countries in renewable energy development, with 
only 10.5% of electricity produced from renewables in 2012 (European Commission, 
2015). It aims to have 14% of final energy from renewables by 2020. The liberalization 
of the Dutch retail electricity market started in 1998 and ended in 2004 (Damme, 2005). 
Metering system and assets belong to DSOs, which are still regulated by the government; 
while metering data that belong to electricity suppliers and consumers are in the 
liberalized electricity market (AlAbdulkarim & Lukszo, 2009). A CBA conducted in 
2005 concluded a positive business case for smart metering rollout of about €1.3 billion 
(SenterNovem, 2005). Based on this, the Dutch government first envisioned a smart 
meter roll out in the country in 2006, with the goal to ensure the smooth operation of the 
retail energy market (Dutch Parliament, 2006). 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs regulates smart meter deployment. It commissioned 
the Netherlands Normalization Institute (NEN) to formulate standardized minimum 
functional requirements for smart meters. The Netherlands Technical Agreement (NTA) 
8130 “Minimum Set of Functions for Metering of Electricity, Gas and Thermal Energy 
for Domestic Customers” was finalized in April 2007 (KEMA Consulting, 2008). 
According to NTA 8130, DSOs are responsible for the installation, operation and 
management of smart meters, as well as the implementation of security measures to 
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ensure system safety, while energy suppliers could access and manage smart metering 
data through central access servers (Netherlands Normalization Institute, 2007). 
In 2008, two bills that aimed for mandatory introduction of smart meters in every Dutch 
household were submitted to the House of Parliament (Dutch Parliament, 2008a, 2008b). 
According to the bills, consumers refusing to install a smart meter can be sanctioned with 
a fine of up to €17,000 or imprisoned for a maximum of 6 months. The two bills also set 
a high technical standard for smart meters: it should be able to record and forward energy 
consumption data to DSOs at quarter-hourly interval periods, and to energy suppliers to 
help them provide diverse energy services to consumers; it should enable DSOs to detect 
power quality remotely and to remotely switch energy capacity on and off in order to deal 
with fraud or disasters; it should also enable additional supportive functions that may be 
required by future regulations. 
The Dutch Data Protection Authority argued that the bills have violated the Dutch Data 
Protection Act, and there was a lack of consent regarding data access (Dutch Data 
Protection Authority, 2008). The Ministry of Economic Affairs then amended the 
proposal, and in July 2008, both bills were passed in the House of Parliament (Dutch 
Parliament, 2008c). In October 2008, the Dutch Consumer Association assessed the two 
bills against the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and found potential 
invasions of privacy by smart meters (Cuijpers & Koops, 2008). Since then, the privacy 
concern of smart meters had triggered a wide public debate in the Netherlands. Along 
with objections from the public and campaigns of civil society organizations, the Senate 
declined to approve both bills in April 2009 (Dutch parliament, 2009).  
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The Ministry of Economic Affairs revised the bills again, adding changes to improve 
privacy protection and data security. The amendment proposal finally passed the Dutch 
House of Parliament in November 2010 (Dutch Parliament, 2010b), and the Senate in 
February 2011(Dutch Parliament, 2011) (see Figure 3.6). This Dutch Electricity Act 
requires DSOs to offer all households and small businesses an electric smart meter from 
2012, and achieve a penetration rate of at least 80% by 2020. The Order in Council 
(“Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur” or “AMvB”) which came into effect on January 1st, 
2012, determines the functionalities and standards of smart meters (IEADSM, 2012).  
The Dutch Electricity Act provides great flexibility for customers: customers can refuse 
smart meters; customers can install a smart meter, but opt out of sending meter data 
automatically (“administrative off”) or have a limited set of automatic meter reading 
capabilities (“standard meter readings”); customers can also have a smart meter installed 
with explicit consent given to more data measurement and reading than the standard 
meter reading regime (“detailed meter readings”) (Dutch Parliament, 2010a). DSOs are 
responsible for smart meter installations and granting third-party access to metering data 
(European Commission, 2014b). DSOs may only transfer data to energy suppliers that are 
necessary in view of suppliers’ tasks (Cuijpers & Koops, 2013).  
In the Netherlands, DSOs are regulated by a system of yardstick competition: the allowed 
revenue of a DSO is adjusted annually while taking into account the consumer price 
index, a quality factor, and the efficiency incentive (Energiekamer, 2011). An objective 
(or a yardstick) in the final year of a 3 to 5 year regulatory period is determined ahead of 
time and is equal for all DSOs (Energiekamer, 2011). The system of yardstick 
competition provides incentives to increase productivity, however, DSOs may invest less 
 66 
than the socially optimal level in order to reduce costs and increase profits (Energiekamer, 
2011). In order to maintain the quality of the grid, Dutch regulators introduced the quality 




Figure 3.6  Smart Meter Policy Milestones in the Netherlands 
 
 
3.5. Discussion and Policy Implications  
Driving forces and barriers behind smart meter deployment are different across countries 
(see Figure 3.7). Consumers’ pushing for timely and accurate electric billing was the 
main driver in Sweden, which implies less public opposition to the technology. Literature 
had demonstrated that existing or expected demand from customers is one of the most 
important factors driving firm-level clean innovation adoption (Veugelers, 2012). 
Swedish government has leveraged this power by adopting regulatory instruments that 
cater to consumer expectation. This may be the reason why the Swedish mandatory 
monthly meter-reading target has effectively motivated smart metering adoption. Finland, 
Denmark and Germany treat smart meters as a useful technology for carbon emissions 
reduction through the enabling of renewable energy, electric vehicles, and energy 
efficiency. Smart meters in Finland were deployed to promote demand response and 
electricity storage, and to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic clean energy sector. 
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Finnish regulators have translated these goals into mandates, which successfully drove 
smart meter deployment. Although Denmark did not have any mandatory smart metering 
policy before 2013, the Danish government’s ambitious goals in carbon emissions 
reduction and renewable energy development have placed great pressure on the power 
grid system, which accelerated the implementation of smart grids and smart meters. 
Germany has clear motivations in smart meters, however it has not undertaken much 
policy effort so far to push for smart meter rollout. In the Netherlands, smart meter 
deployment has mainly been driven by the need to ensure smooth operation of the retail 
energy market. The Dutch government had a high expectation for the technology, but 
there was a large gap between policy objectives and social acceptance, resulting in slow 




Figure 3.7 Driving Forces, Barriers and Policies for Smart Meter Deployment 
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3.5.1 Institutional barriers and regulatory measures 
Institutional barriers may arise from a lack of regulatory framework, institutional inertia, 
and a lack of interests and capacity in clean energy deployment (Painuly, 2001). Research 
has demonstrated that complying with regulations is one of the most important 
motivations for firms to adopt eco-innovations (Arundel, Kemp, & Machiba, 2010). The 
case studies in this Chapter also confirm the positive role of regulations: countries with 
regulatory instruments tend to have more smart meters deployed. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Smart Meter Roll-out CBA Assumptions and Results  
 
























Finland 3.3  692 NA NA 15-25 15 1-2% 2% 
Sweden 5.2 15005 1677 NA 10 NA 1-3% NA 





















15.2 3340 4108 5.5% 15 50  3.2% 2.8% 
Sources: (European Commission, 2014a, 2014b) 
 
 
In all five cases, the adoption of regulatory instruments is based on CBA outcomes to 
ensure that benefits of smart meters outweigh costs to consumers. CBA outcomes differ 
substantially across the five countries, due to different local conditions, smart meters 
                                                 
5 Only capital expenditures are included. 
6 Joint rollout of electric and gas meters. 
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functionalities, and methodologies used. Table 3.2 and 3.3 presents CBA assumptions 
and results for each country. Energy savings account for 33% of the total smart meter 
benefits in Germany, which are the highest among all countries. However, the expected 
energy savings from German smart meter rollout are 1.2%, which are much lower than 
those in Denmark and the Netherlands. The negative CBA results in the German case 
may be due to its assumptions of main benefits and expected energy savings.  
 
 
Table 3.3 Cost and Benefit Assumptions in CBA 
 
 Main Benefits 
(% of total benefits) 
Main Costs 
(% of total costs) 
Finland Demand side management; 
DSO cost reduction (due to 
remote reading); 
Electricity trade and new services 
Meters costs (40-55%); 
Accessories for the meters (relays, 
switching gears, etc.) (5-25%); 
Installation and maintenance (10-
25%); 
Communication costs (5-40%) 
Sweden N/A N/A 
Denmark Saved metering investment 
(29%); 
Increased competition (21%); 
Energy savings (16%) 
Capital expenditure (67%); 
Tax distortion loss (8%); 
Operational expenditure (4%) 
Germany Energy Savings (33%); 
Load shifting (15%); 
Avoided investments in the 
distribution grid (13%) 
Smart metering systems (30%); 
Communication costs (20%); 
IT costs (8%) 
Netherlands Energy savings (15%); 
Savings on call center costs 
(15%); 
Savings due to increased number 
of supplier switches (8%) 
Smart electricity meters and 
installation costs (25%); 








Figure 3.8 shows that only Germany had a negative NPV, which resulted in the absence 
of a smart meter rollout mandate in the country. The other four countries have all adopted 




Figure 3.8 Regulatory Measures for Smart Meter Deployment 
 
 
Two types of regulatory measures are particularly effective in overcoming regulative 
barriers and driving smart meter deployment. The first one is mandatory rollout target 
that requires full-scale smart meter rollout within a specified time horizon, such as 
Finland’s 66/2009 Decree. The second type is related to policy goals that are difficult to 
meet without smart meters, such as meter reading frequencies, customer switching, and 
support for renewable energy and energy efficiency improvement, etc. A typical example 
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is Sweden’s mandatory regulation on monthly meter reading for all customers, which has 
indirectly but successfully driven the implementation of smart meters in the country. The 
great effectiveness of these policies might be because that they are compulsory and stable, 
and the policy objectives have been consistent and clear. They also set clear time frames 
for policy implementation, which have been demonstrated to be consistently associated 
with more positive policy outcomes as they stabilize expectations and reduce risks for 
regulated actors (Auld et al., 2014). These policies send out clear messages about the 
need for the new technology, and reduce uncertainties faced by DSOs about future grid 
investment. This is consistent with Veugelers (2012)’s finding that policy interventions 
will have greater influence on the adoption of new clean technologies when designed to 
be credible and consistent over time. 
3.5.2 Financial barriers and cost recovery mechanisms  
Diffusion of clean energy technology needs to be justified on economic grounds. While 
the benefits of smart meters might be shared among different stakeholders in society, the 
investment burden solely on the shoulders of DSOs can become a barrier to smart meter 
deployment. Financial regulations are needed to ensure that DSOs are incentivized to 
make long-term investments.  
Table 3.4 shows that only Sweden and Finland have provided financial incentives for 
DSOs’ smart meter investments. The two countries’ regulations allow DSOs to gradually 
recover costs of smart meters through increased distribution network tariffs. Existing 
regulation in Denmark does not support DSOs’ smart meter deployment, as only 
traditional grid components are included in grid companies’ revenue caps. Current 
financial regulations for DSOs in Germany and the Netherlands encourage cost reduction 
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rather than social optimal investment; hence they do not sufficiently encourage smart 
meter deployment.  
 
 
Table 3.4  Financial Regulations of DSOs 




Quality incentives allow DSOs to set tariffs to fund grid investments that maintain high-
quality deliveries to consumers. Facing main challenges of increased loads and 
distributed generation, DSOs often choose to invest in smart meter and smart grid 
technologies to ensure the quality of grid operation and services. Therefore, taking into 






Finland Ex post rate-of-return 
regulation (before 2005); 
A combination of ex-ante 
revenue cap model and 
incentive based model 
(after 2005) 
4 years Allowed 
investment based 
on the realized 
adjusted profit 
Yes 
Sweden Ex post rate-of-return 
regulation (before 2012); 
Ex-ante revenue cap and a 
reasonable rate of return on 
assets (after 2012) 
4 years Companies are 





Denmark Ex post rate-of-return 
regulation (before 2005); 
Ex-ante revenue cap and a 
maximum rate of return 
(after 2005) 
1 year Investments in 
smart meters do 






Germany Benchmarking model 
based on costs (after 2009) 
5 years N/A.  No 
Netherlands National yardstick 
competition with a price 
cap (after 2011) 
3 years N/A. Yes 
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account the “quality” factor in the revenue cap encourages smart meter deployment. 
Currently, all countries provide quality incentives, except Germany. 
The metering sector in Germany is competitive. Although DSOs are the owners and 
responsible party for smart meter installations, they are allowed to pass the metering 
service to the market through the tendering process. In that case, smart meters are 
financed by fees for the operation of the metering stations and metering, for which 
maximum cost thresholds have been set by the government (BMWi, 2015c). German 
regulators expect the competition between metering service providers to drive down 
metering costs and encourage smart meter deployment, however, this has not proved 
effective in Germany. 
3.5.3 Technical risks and Minimum functional requirements 
One main challenge for DSOs is to choose a technical solution that is cost-effective, but 
will also meet future market and legislative requirements (Morch et al., 2007). DSOs 
often need to balance between multi-functional meters that increase potential benefits, 
and limited capital dedicated to smart metering investment. Without a clear regulation on 
minimum functional requirements, different meter manufacturers and utilities may use 
different communication solutions and protocols, and utilities might be locked into 
suboptimal technologies and limited economies of scale in sourcing (Giglioli, Panzacchi, 
& Senni, 2010). DSOs may also postpone their investment in order to get cheaper and 
more advanced meters in the future.  
As of 2014, Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands have adopted smart meter minimum 
functional requirements (see Figure 3.9). The 2011 amendment of German Energy Act 
(‘EnWG’) requires the government to adopt minimum functional requirements for smart 
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meters; however, there has been no progress by the end of 2014. Due to the fact that 
several on-going EU projects are working on the functional requirements and standards 
for smart meters, Sweden chooses to wait for the final results of these projects before 
considering the adoption of national standards (Energy Markets Inspectorate, 2011). 
Although literature suggests the importance of technical standards in ensuring long-term 
technological development (Cavoukian, Polonetsky, & Wolf, 2010; McHenry, 2013), this 
chapter show that countries with high smart meter penetration rates do not necessarily 
adopt minimum functional requirements.  
 




3.5.4. Social acceptance  
Successful clean energy technology deployment depends on the widespread adoption by 
a diverse range of individuals and sectors. The introduction of new technology to the 
society may face opposition due to traditional norms and values. Social acceptance is 
particularly important for technologies that may be harmful to human beings or 
environment, such as wind (Wüstenhagen et al., 2007) and carbon capture and 
sequestration (Huijts et al., 2007; Van Alphen et al., 2010). It has been proven critical in 
the case of the Netherlands, where resistance from public and consumer groups delayed 
smart meter policy adoption and technology deployment. Policies are needed to change 
public perception of the new technology and build public trust. Two types of policies are 
prominent from the case studies. 
Privacy protection and data security policies: Public concern with smart meter 
technology is mostly associated with privacy and data security issues. The Dutch case 
shows that this needs to be carefully addressed. The proposed Dutch laws in 2008 set a 
very high technical standard for smart meters, requiring a high frequency of two-way 
communication between the meter and the grid, and the transferring of data among 
multiple stakeholders. This imposed a high risk of privacy infringements, triggered 
widespread public opposition and led to slow implementation of smart meters (Cuijpers 
& Koops, 2013). Moreover, the Ministry of Economic Affairs often dominates the energy 
policy making process in the Netherlands (van Rooijen & van Wees, 2006). The smart 
meter draft bills were exclusively prepared within the Ministry, and other stakeholders 
had not been consulted until the very late stage. To deal with public opposition, the 
adopted smart meter roll out legislation in the Netherlands allows great flexibility for 
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consumers, including the smart meter opt-out option and the option to use smart meters 
as conventional meters. This flexibility reduces compliance costs for consumers, but has 
slowed technology deployment, as it may come with complex administrative challenges 
for governments. This result confirms previous findings that flexibility mechanisms do 
not assure success (Auld et al., 2014). 
German regulators pursue smart meter deployment with great caution in data security and 
privacy protection. The 2011 EnWG requires smart meters to meet certain security 
requirements. However, it took several years for the German government to adopt the 
Measurement and Verification Act (2015) that provides detailed protection profiles and 
technical guidelines for smart meters. This might have slowed smart meter deployment in 
Germany. The Danish regulators aim to ensure privacy protection and data security 
without limiting the use of smart meter data for energy efficiency (Energinet.dk & Danish 
Energy Association, 2012). However, no regulation has been adopted so far. In Sweden, 
there has been little discussion about potential privacy infringement of smart meters 
(KEMA, 2010). This might be due to the fact that only monthly readings of electricity 
consumption is compulsory, while smart meter deployment is not (KEMA, 2010). In 
Finland, the Government Decree (66/2009) has set data security requirements for smart 
meters. Privacy and data security is not a common concern for the general public.  
Clear regulation regarding smart meter ownership and liability: Research has shown 
that clear legislation about ownership and liability is crucial to gain public trust for 
carbon capture and sequestration (Van Alphen et al., 2010). For smart meters, all the 
countries have designated meter ownership and liability except Germany, which has 
liberalized its metering market. In the four countries, ownership of smart meters lies with 
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the DSOs. The German government allows consumers to choose their preferred metering 
point operator (MPO) or measuring service provider (MSP). The different potential 
owners of meters may hinder investment in smart meters. On the one hand, the unclear 
separation between regulated DSOs and independent metering operators (MPO or MSP) 
has led to inefficiencies and inertias in smart metering deployment in the country 
(Bergaentzlé, 2012). On the other hand, the interoperability and metering data access 
issues are even more critical and urgent for regulators to consider in order to ensure a 
well functioning competitive metering market (i.e. reducing technical barriers for 
consumer switching) (Vasconcelos, 2008). This might be the reason why German policy 
makers have been long focusing on setting minimum technical standards. 
Policies that realize the benefits of smart meters:  Consumers may be more likely to 
accept smart meters if they think they are useful for society and the environment (Broman 
Toft, Schuitema, & Thøgersen, 2014). Rules that encourage the usage of smart meter 
functions or services enabled by smart meters might be helpful. Regulators can enhance 
consumer acceptance by providing products and services that maximize the benefits of 
smart meters. For instance, Sweden’s new law mandates the provision of hourly 
electricity pricing at no extra costs to customers who subscribe to hourly-based electricity 
supply contracts. Finnish legislation requires DSOs to provide consumers with in-home 
displays when requested, which can provide potential energy saving benefits. The 
DataHub established by the Danish regulators allows easier access to energy 
consumption information and more transparency for supplier switching. These rules all 
allow consumers to benefit from smart meters, and improve the social acceptance level.  
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3.5.5 Smart Meter Manufacturers 
Compared to the other four countries, Germany has a great advantage in smart meter 
manufacturing capabilities. Major smart meter producers, including Sensus, Landis+Gyr, 
GE Energy and Elster, all have manufacturing facilities in Germany (see Table 3.5). 
Elster is headquartered in Germany. However, Germany’s forerunner position in smart 
meter manufacturing has not had a significant impact on domestic smart meter 
deployment. There is no policy scheme designed to encourage domestic smart meter 
manufacturers to develop the customer base in Germany.  This confirms with previous 
findings that top deployers of renewable energy may not always be the same as the top 
exporters of the technologies (Jha, 2009). It is likely that factors driving the deployment 
of clean energy technology in the exporting countries are unrelated to those that 
determine their domestic manufacturing capacity and exports. 
 
 
Table 3.5 Locations of Smart Meter Manufacturing Facilities  
 Sensus Landis+Gyr Itron GE Energy7 Elster 
Finland - Jyskä - - - 
Sweden - - - - - 
Denmark - - - - - 
Germany Laatzen;  
Ludwigs
hafen 






Netherlands - - - Rheden; Haaksbergen - 




                                                 
7 Locations of GE Energy manufacturing facilities are for energy services in general. GE’s 
Energy Services provides cleaner, smarter and more efficient solutions to address climate change 
and energy security challenges, including smart grid products and technologies. 
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Table 3.6 shows that countries that have adopted policies to address multiple barriers tend 
to have higher smart meter penetration rates. In particular, the Finnish and Swedish 
governments have taken actions to overcome institutional and financial barriers, and 
increase social acceptance levels by maximizing consumer benefits from using smart 
meters. Countries failed to address these barriers tend to be laggards in smart meter 
deployment, such as Germany and the Netherlands.  
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Policies that address smart meter technical risks are not a required condition for a leading 
position. Technical standards are more important for liberalized metering market (i.e. 
Germany) to ensure interoperability. In regulated metering market, metering service is a 
monopoly business carried out by DSOs. It is more likely for DSOs to go for more 
advanced metering types, as they need to weigh different technology types carefully 
before making investment decisions, and advanced metering infrastructure is often cost-
effective in the long-term and attractive in meeting possible future regulatory 
requirements (NERA, 2008).  
A clear regulatory push can lead to an accelerating deployment of smart meters. 
Countries with a mandatory regulatory framework are in an advanced position, such as 
Finland and Sweden. Countries with partial or conditional smart metering roll out 
policies tend to progress more slowly, as in the cases of Germany and the Netherlands. 
Although Denmark currently only has a 50% smart meter penetration rate, its adoption of 
the mandatory roll out target in 2013 will likely drive its smart meter deployment in the 
future.  
Data security and privacy remain top concerns in smart meter deployment. Low levels of 
social acceptance hinder technology deployment and need to be properly addressed by 
regulators. Effective policy measures include opt-out options, data protection rules, 
polices for meter ownership and liability, and policies encouraging consumer 
involvement. Financial regulations on DSOs affect smart meter deployment. DSOs have 
incentives to roll out smart meters when costs of smart meters are considered as new 
investments in the pre-determined revenue caps. It is also more likely for DSOs to invest 
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in grid modernization activities when quality of service is taken into account in the ex-
ante revenue cap.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Clean energy technology is a key solution to address climate change and energy security 
challenges. Large-scale penetration of clean technologies often requires government 
interventions. This chapter conducts comparative case studies on Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Germany and Netherlands to identify policy mixes used and evaluate their 
effectiveness on smart metering deployment. It found that countries’ smart meter rollouts 
are motivated by different driving factors, and a successful policy scheme includes a 
combination of policy measures that address multiple barriers to smart meters. In 
particular, it is important to have policies designed and adopted to overcome institutional 
and financial barriers, while policies addressing technical risks and social acceptance are 
not decisive for obtaining a leading position in smart meter rollout, depending on 
domestic energy market structures and social environments. 
Finland and Sweden are frontrunners in smart meters and their rollouts were mainly 
driven by mandates, financial regulations on DSOs, and policies enhancing social 
acceptance of the technology. Smart meter deployment in Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands has long been market driven. Although Denmark did not adopt any 
mandatory smart meter rollout plan until 2013, Danish DSOs have been actively pursuing 
smart meter trials and pilot programs in order to meet the government’s ambitious carbon 
mitigation and renewable energy development targets. The Dutch government had 
envisioned smart meter deployment in the early 2000s and proposed mandatory smart 
meter roll out plans with strict technical standards. However, the process of technology 
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diffusion has triggered public opposition in the country due to concerns with privacy 
infringement and data security. The low social acceptance in the Netherlands has greatly 
hindered smart meter deployment till the adoption of a mandatory smart meter roll out 
plan with opt-out options for customers in 2011. Germany has been lagging behind in 
smart meter deployment. A lack of regulatory push, government and public concern on 
data and privacy issues, and a lack of financial incentives for DSOs have all contributed 
to its lagging position. Germany is the only country that does not have any legal 
requirement for a mandatory rollout. It strictly follows the CBA results to ensure that 
only customers who will receive positive net benefits are required to install smart meters. 
There is also a lack of protection profiles and technical standards for smart meters to 
ensure interoperability and standardization in its liberalized metering market. The 
German regulations on DSOs also prevent them from charging for new meter 
installations and operations.  
This paper shows that smart meter lead markets are mostly created by government 
interventions. Countries can achieve high penetration rates by adopting a portfolio of 
policy measures, including regulatory mandates, financial regulations, and policies that 
enhance the social acceptance of the technology. The five case studies also shed light on 
lead market advantages. On the one hand, smart meters do not necessarily diffuse more 
rapidly in countries with a more robust manufacturing capability, such as in the case of 
Germany where its export advantage has not translated itself into a smart meter lead 
market. On the other hand, countries that have successfully adopted smart meters have 
not developed into large exporters. This might be due to the high labor cost and the 
decrease of jobs in the Nordic manufacturing sectors in the periods of 2008-2013 (Iris 
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Group, 2015). Future research is needed to investigate and compare the five countries’ 
domestic adoption of smart meters and their exporting activities. It will also be interesting 
to investigate how domestic regulations have affected the development of smart meter 
and smart grid industry. 
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CHAPTER 4   HOW DIFFUSION MECHANISMS WORK ACROSS POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 





Diffusion of policy innovations has attracted great attention among social scientists in 
response to the wave of economic liberalization and democracy in the late twentieth 
century. Several contending theories of policy diffusion have been developed (see a 
review by Dobbin et al. (2007)). Coercive power from foreign actors, governments or 
institutions may affect domestic policy adoption due to power asymmetry and incentive 
manipulation. Emulation theorists argue that copying from the peers is often the low-cost 
approach to policy making, mimicking what may happen from common characteristics or 
geographic proximity. Competition effect exists when government adopts policies to 
attract global investment and keep exports competitive, especially when their competitors 
have done so. Learning points to the role of new information and ideas, which lead to 
changes in policy makers’ beliefs and create momentum for policy innovations. 
A growing number of empirical studies have tested these policy diffusion theories. For 
instance, Matisoff and Edwards (2014) found that American states imitate from their 
peers in Walker regions for energy and climate change policy adoption. Some studies 
point to the importance of trade competition for cross-national environmental policy 
diffusion (Cao & Prakash, 2012). Although these studies have certainly improved our 
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understanding about the different forces affecting policy diffusion, one shortcoming with 
this literature is their exclusive focus on a single mechanism to explain policy diffusion, 
and few have developed specific models to test all appropriate theories side by side.  
For those that have considered competing diffusion theories in their models, most 
predominantly focus on the adoption of a particular policy or policies of the same class 
(see a summary of the literature in Appendix G).  For example, Biesenbender & Tosun 
(2014) focused on nitrogen oxide emission standards for large combustion plants, 
Saikawa (2013) on automobile emission standards, and Shipan & Volden (2008) on 
antismoking regulations (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014; Saikawa, 2013; Shipan & Volden, 
2008). This might lead to biased results as the adoption of a single policy (or policy 
instrument) may not represent a jurisdiction’s overall commitment on a given policy issue. 
In many cases, policy makers tend to employ multiple instruments to address a single 
issue, especially in the environmental, energy and climate change area. Surprisingly, 
despite the rapid development of policy diffusion theory, there is limited understanding 
about what type of diffusion mechanisms work under what circumstances and how the 
impacts of diffusion mechanisms differ in conjunction with what policy characteristics.  
This research is inspired by a number of research questions raised in this context, such as 
why countries choose to adopt certain policy instruments over others, and how the 
diffusion theory can be used to explain countries’ policy choices over time. Empirically, 
this paper focuses on renewable energy policy diffusion in 30 European countries, 
including EU-28, Norway and Iceland. EU is one of the world’s largest renewable energy 
producers, with renewables accounting 24.3% of its total primary energy production and 
totaling 192 million tonnes of oil equivalent (toe) in 2013 (Eurostat, 2016). The European 
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renewable energy policy context is one of the most ambitious and active policy domains 
in the world, which is of great importance from a global climate and energy policy 
perspective. While renewable energy policy adoption has been extensively studied in the 
U.S. (Carley, Nicholson-Crotty, & Miller, 2016; Matisoff, 2008; Matisoff & Edwards, 
2014), whether the policy adoption mechanisms are the same in Europe is still 
questionable, given their differences in political institutions and international 
commitment to reduce carbon emissions. The unique geopolitical situation in Europe 
makes it particularly interesting to examine how the EU energy policy and EU member 
states’ peer pressure affect countries’ renewable energy policy making.  
In this research, I apply event history analysis to investigate determinants for the adoption 
of five classes of renewable energy policies by 30 European countries between 1990 and 
2012, using policy data from the IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and Measures database. The 
five renewable energy policy classes examined in this study include information and 
education policies, feed-in tariffs, research development and demonstration policies, 
supportive policy schemes, and regulatory instruments. These policies have been widely 
adopted by European countries to promote renewable energy. I argue that it is useful for 
diffusion studies to analyze a broad spectrum of policies in a particular field, as countries 
may have similar policy goals but different preferences on policy instruments.  This study 
thus provides a more comprehensive picture about the changing patterns of policy 
instrument usage over time, and sheds light into the innovation and diffusion of policy 
instruments.  
In addition, this study differentiates between initial policy spread and subsequent policy 
changes to better understand how the impact of diffusion mechanisms evolves over time. 
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While state policy diffusion studies have increasingly focused on the modeling of 
repeated policy events over time (Boehmke, 2009; Jones & Branton, 2005) or 
differentiated across policy adoption, reinvention and amendment (Carley et al., 2016), 
similar attempts have rarely been made to understand international environmental and 
energy policy making. Most international policy diffusion studies focus on first-time 
policy adoption event, failing to capture information about policy accommodation or 
cumulative policy adoptions (i.e. Saiwaka (2013) and Stadelmann and Castro (2014)). To 
address this gap, I estimated logit event history analysis models for first time policy 
adoptions and cox conditional gap time models for cumulative policy adoptions. The 
results show that initial renewable energy policy spread across countries can be well 
explained by the learning and competition mechanisms, while the four diffusion theories 
have largely failed to explain subsequent policy modifications and changes. This 
indicates a potential limitation of diffusion theories to explain the evolution of policy 
innovations in domestic policy context, which are likely to occur as policies mature in 
penetration and as the social goods they seek to promote gain standing in the marketplace  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review and presents 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses data and methodology. Section 4 presents model results 
and discussion. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
4.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
An emerging group of studies has investigated causal mechanisms for global policy 
diffusion. Dobbin et al. (2007) categorized international policy diffusion theories into 
four groups: coercion, social construction/emulation, competition and learning (Dobbin, 
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Simmons, & Garrett, 2007). Below I discuss these four diffusion mechanisms in the 
renewable energy policy context and postulate hypotheses to be tested. 
4.2.1 Coercion 
Coercive diffusion involves power asymmetries between entities, and the imposing of 
policy preferences on one entity by others. Powerful countries and international 
organizations can influence weaker countries’ policy adoption (Dobbin et al., 2007; 
Simmons et al., 2006). Here, I am interested in the coercion from the EU, and whether 
the diffusion of renewable energy policies varies across EU and non-EU countries. 
EU has a great degree of coercive power to enforce its policy decisions due to the 
supremacy of EU legislation over member states’ laws (Richardson, 1996). EU 
regulations and decisions become automatically binding throughout the member states on 
the date they take effect, and directives are required to be incorporated into national law 
(Commission, 2016). The Commission monitors and assesses policy activities of member 
states. Non-compliance with EU rules is taken to the European Court of Justice, and 
financial penalties can be imposed. For countries aspiring to become EU member states, 
there are strict conditions for membership to ensure that they are admitted only when they 
comply with all EU rules and policies.  
In the energy and climate change policy arena, EU member countries not only have to 
comply with binding GHGs emission reduction targets set in EU legislation (e.g. 
Decision No 406/2009/EC sets a 20% GHG emissions reduction target for the EU by 
2020 compared to 1990), but also need to follow a series of Commission directives and 
mandates that promote renewable energy generation (see Table 4.1). The EU has set 
binding targets for renewable energy since early 1990s. For instance, EU’s Renewable 
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Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) requires the EU to have at least 20% final energy 
consumption from renewable sources by 2020. This EU-wide target was translated into 
individual mandatory targets for each Member State. The Directive (2009/28/EC) also 
required each Member State to adopt national renewable energy action plans to show 
what policy actions they intend to take to achieve the national target, although it does not 
have specific requirements on the choice of policy instruments (see also Council Decision 
of 13 September 1993 and Directive 2001/77/EC). Following this reasoning, I expect that 
EU member countries are more likely to adopt renewable energy policies than non-EU 
member countries.  
EU renewable energy rules have generally emphasized the importance of target setting, 
information and training, research development and demonstration projects, and the 
provision of financial incentives (see Table 4.1). However, several Commission staff 
working documents (e.g. SEC/2008/57final and SWD/2013/438/final) have evaluated and 
compared the effectiveness of FITs and other policy instruments, and concluded that FITs 
generally achieve greater RE penetration at lower costs for consumers (European 
Commission, 2005, 2008). One of them notes that “well-adapted feed-in tariff regimes 
are generally the most efficient and effective support schemes for promoting renewable 
electricity” (European Commission, 2008). Considering EU’s favorable attitude toward 
FITs, I posit that EU coercive power drives the diffusion of FITs.  
Hypothesis 1: The diffusion of renewable energy policies in Europe is positively 
influenced by EU coercive power. 
 Hypothesis 1.1. The coercion effect is a statistically significant driver for the 
adoption of feed-in tariffs by European countries. 
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Table 4.1 EU Renewable Energy Policy Portfolio 
EU Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Target Rules/recommendations for member states 
Council 
Recommendation 
of 9 June 1988 
- It recommends member states to  
- “ introduce…legislation and/or 
administrative procedures which would 
help to overcome, on a non-
discriminatory basis, obstacles to the 
exploitation of renewable energy 
sources” ; 
- “facilitate the exchange of information”; 
- “pursue R&D programmes”. 
Council Decision 
of 13 September 
1993 
8% of total 
energy demand 
from renewable 
energy in 2005 
“Member States shall endeavor to contribute 
in their energy policies to the limitation of 
carbon dioxide emissions by taking account of 
the Community's indicative objectives relating 
to the renewable energy sources which are set 
out in Annex I.” 
1997 White Paper 12% of renewable 
energy sources by 
2010 
It requires that “cooperation between the 





RES for the EU-





Member States’ Accession Treaty sets 
national indicative targets for the proportion 
of electricity produced from RES (RES-E). 
Member States must adopt and publish, 
initially every five years, a report setting the 
indicative Member State targets for future 
RES-E consumption for the following ten 
years and showing what measures have or are 
to be taken to meet those targets. 
Resolution of 25 
September 2007 
on the Road Map 
for Renewable 
Energy in Europe 
- It highlights the importance of setting targets 
for the shares of energy from renewable 




20% final energy 
consumption 
from renewable 
energy sources by 
2020 
“(25) The achievement of the objectives of 
this Directive requires that the Community 
and Member States dedicate a significant 
amount of financial resources to R&D in 
relation to renewable energy technologies.” 
“(49) Information and training gaps…should 
be removed in order to encourage the 
deployment of energy from renewable 
sources.” 
“Article 14 Information and training”. 
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4.2.2 Normative emulation   
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) developed the idea of normative emulation - norms are 
first established in some countries, and then spread to others. They argued that 
international policy diffusion is similar to the diffusion of norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 
1998). Governments emulate the behavior of their peers, regardless whether or not this is 
in their best interest (Simmons et al., 2006). It is largely based on the theory of social 
construction, which indicates that diffusion is a type of communication between actors, 
leading them to exchange information, to take the view of the other, and to converge in 
their perceptions (Rogers, 1962). Countries that see themselves as members of a group 
based on common characteristics or geography may copy one another’s policies because 
they infer that what works for a peer will work for them (Dobbin et al., 2007). 
Scholars use several ways to define peers. Some emphasize the importance of shared 
cultural values, beliefs and similar historical legacies, as it is easier for countries to attend 
to those with similar background characteristics (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012). Others refer 
peers as those in the same geographic region and treat policy diffusion as geographic 
clustering (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014). Empirically, emulating from neighboring 
states is a commonly found explanatory mechanism for environmental and energy policy 
diffusion across U.S. states (Daley, 2007; Daley & Garand, 2005; Matisoff, 2008). In this 
study, I expect the diffusion of renewable energy policies in Europe to be influenced by 
normative emulation. I assume that countries adopt renewable energy policies, in part, to 
search for social acceptance in the geographic region and to demonstrate conformity with 
the policy behaviors of nearby countries. It is more likely for countries to attend to their 
neighbors due to similar climate and renewable energy potentials. To measure the 
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normative pressure, I divided the total number of policies adopted by all other countries 
in the same geographic region by the number of countries in that region. Countries 
analyzed in this study are grouped into four geographic regions based on UN Statistics 
Division’s definition (see Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2 Geographic region and composition 
Geographic Regions Country 
Eastern Europe Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
Southern Europe Croatia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain 
Western Europe Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
Northern Europe Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Sweden, UK 
 
 
Policy salience plays an importance role in policy learning and diffusion (Dobbin et al., 
2007; Emmert & Traut, 2003). A highly salient policy is the one that affects a large 
number of people in a significant way (Gormley Jr, 1986), or that applies to a broad set of 
target groups (Koski, 2010). The five policy instruments can be categorized into two 
groups based on their salience in the renewable energy policy context. RD&D policies, 
FITs and regulatory instruments are highly salient as they affect a broad range of interest 
groups (i.e. research organizations, budget agencies, utility companies, manufacturers, 
etc.), and they often involve the approval of financial and mandatory targets by the 
governments which requires more alignment among government agencies. In contrast to 
that, information and education policies primarily target on renewable energy installers 
and builders. Supportive policy schemes provide roadmaps, visions and policy goals for 
renewable energy development in the country, the adoption of which often targets a 
narrow audience (i.e. newly created institutions and government agencies) and has 
limited impact on the actions of the lay public. Therefore, I consider information and 
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education policies and supportive policy schemes as low-salience policies. Here I expect 
that the emulation effect is particularly important for the more salient policy instruments, 
including FITs, RD&D policies and regulatory instruments.  
Hypothesis 2: The diffusion of renewable energy policies in Europe is positively 
influenced by normative emulation. 
 Hypothesis 2.1: The normative emulation mechanism is a statistically significant 
driver for the adoption of feed-in tariffs, RD&D policies and regulatory instruments. 
4.2.3 Competition 
Competition for resources is another driving factor for policy diffusion across countries. 
Domestic policies that affect the comparative advantage of a country’s industries can 
alter financial capital and markets that are accessible to other countries, which in turn 
change the policy adoption behavior of those countries (Brander & Spencer, 1985; 
Dobbin et al., 2007).  
In the environmental policy arena, scholars argue that firms relocate to countries with lax 
regulations in order to reduce costs for pollution emission and waste treatment (Porter, 
1999). It is also possible that countries adopt more stringent emission standards to 
enhance the competitiveness of domestic industries (Saikawa, 2013). Previous studies 
often measure the competition mechanism with economic openness and inward foreign 
investment . For instance, Biesenbender &Tosun (2014) postulated that the more open an 
economy is or the more heavily an economy relies on foreign inward investment, the less 
likely it adopts and tightens NOx emission standards (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014). 
Holzinger et al. (2008) measured the vulnerability of a country to regulatory competition 
using the level of trade flows and openness of economies (Holzinger, Knill, & Sommerer, 
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2008). However, Dobbin et al. (2007) argue that a better measure for the competition 
mechanism is whether a country’s actual competitors have adopted the policy in question 
(Dobbin et al., 2007). Gilardi (2016) also notes that the key for the operationalization of 
the competition mechanism is to identify which jurisdictions a given jurisdiction is 
competing with (Gilardi, 2016). The literature points to two arenas of competition: the 
export market for goods and services, and the capital market (Simmons & Elkins, 2004). 
Competitors are often defined as countries of similar status in the global technology 
and/or capital market (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012).  
Countries may adopt policies to obtain “early mover” advantages in renewable energy 
technology development, such as the German government’s adoption of FITs (Jacobsson 
& Lauber, 2006). Policies creating domestic markets for renewable energy can help 
expand and strengthen domestic renewable technology industries (i.e. improved 
competitiveness through economies of scale), which may eventually lead to increased 
exports to global markets (Lund, 2009). Policies such as public financed R&D programs 
may also generate new export possibilities for renewable energy technologies to other 
countries (Lund, 2009). In this study, I assume that countries are more likely to adopt 
renewable energy policies to strengthen the competitiveness of their clean energy sector, 
when their competitors have already done so. I measure this competition effect with 
policy behaviors of a country’s competitors in the global market.   
I use the global competitiveness index (GCI) developed by the World Economic Forum 
as a basis to select a country’s competitors in this context. The GCI is an indicator for the 
rates of return obtained by investments in an economy. It measures twelve components, 
including institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary 
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education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market 
efficiency, financial market development, technological readiness, market size, business 
sophistication, and technology innovation (World Economic Forum, 2011). GCI contains 
a great deal of information regarding countries' attractiveness to investors, and 
comparative advantage of the technology sectors (R&D investment and innovation 
capacity). I assume that countries with close GCI values compete in the same foreign 
renewable technology markets (they have similarly developed clean tech sectors), and 
they are also close substitutes from an investor’s point of view (they compete for the 
same pool of international capital due to similar level of attractiveness to investors). For 
each country, five competing countries that have the closest GCI8 values were identified. 
The average number of renewable energy policies adopted by five competing countries is 
calculated to measure the competition effect for a given country.  
I expect that regulatory instruments, feed-in tariffs and RD&D policies are the three 
policy types most likely to be driven by competition effect as they greatly affect the 
renewable energy market. First, regulatory instruments and feed-in tariffs are market 
deployment policies, which affect domestic RE industries (Lund, 2009). In particular, 
mandates and targets create clear demand for renewable energy, whereas feed-in tariffs 
bring down the costs of renewable energy technologies and goods, which likely provide 
comparative advantages for domestic industries (Jha, 2009). Second, RD&D policies 
focus on technology development, deployment and diffusion, which are critical for RE 
industrial success in the global market (Lund, 2009). Therefore, countries aiming to 
increase their renewable energy technology exports may pay special attention to these 
three types of policies adopted by their competitors. 
                                                 
8 I use the 2011-2012 GCI value. 
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Hypothesis 3: Policy behaviors of its major competitors create competitive pressure for a 
country to adopt renewable energy policies. 
 Hypothesis 3.1: Diffusion of renewable energy regulatory instruments, feed-in 
tariffs and RD&D policies are most likely to be driven by the competition effect.  
4.2.4 Learning 
Levy (1994) defined learning as “a change of beliefs or the development of new beliefs, 
skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience” (Levy, 
1994). Policy decisions in one country can change the information base that other 
countries use for their policy making (Elkins & Simmons, 2004). Countries tend to learn 
from success stories of others, from network and communication links established by 
both intergovernmental organizations and private sectors, and from analogous cases of 
their cultural reference groups (Simmons et al., 2006). Learning is different from 
normative emulation, as it requires policy makers to draw lessons from experiences of 
other countries (usually best practices) and learn to pursue effective policies. The 
learning effect can be measured by the level of exposure to the ideas, policies, and 
pressures of a pivotal international institution (Brooks & Kurtz, 2012).  
International organizations often play an important role in facilitating information flows 
and the exchange of policy information across national borders (Dobbin et al., 2007; 
Holzinger et al., 2008). They encourage learning and lesson-drawing, through their 
policies and loan conditions (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), information dissemination and 
experience sharing at conferences and through reports (Simmons et al., 2006), and the 
influence of international organizations on a country’s agenda setting and policy 
implementation process (Jakobi, 2009). I expect countries that hold more memberships in 
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environmental and energy intergovernmental organizations (EE-IGOs) have more 
information about renewable energy technology and policy development, which help 
enhance the probability of renewable energy policy adoption. Following Saikawa (2013), 
I construct a variable named EE-IGOs membership to measure the learning effect. This 
variable counts the total number of EE-IGOs in which a country holds a membership in a 
given year. Eighteen IGOs that have operations in the areas of energy, environment, 
climate change, and sustainability are considered (see Appendix H). The date of 
membership data was collected directly from IGOs’ websites. The number of IGOs 
participated by a country is a good proxy for the learning mechanism as it is highly 
related to the exposure of policy information: as member countries meet and 
communicate on a regular basis within international organizations, they learn from other 
countries’ and IGOs’ solutions to climate change and energy security. 
Hypothesis 4: Learning through the participation in environmental and energy 
international organizations drives the diffusion of renewable energy policies across 
European countries. 
4.2.5 Control variables 
Following Berry and Berry (1990), the transnational renewable energy policy diffusion 
process is tested as a function of both external diffusion mechanisms and internal 
determinants. The literature on policy diffusion suggests three groups of internal factors, 
including problem severity, economic resources, and political ideology (Daley & Garand, 
2005; Matisoff, 2008). I controls for these in my models. 
Problem severity creates pressure for government to adopt policies to solve the problem. 
It is likely that countries with more pressure to cut carbon and air pollutants emissions are 
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more likely to adopt renewable energy policies. I use carbon intensity and sulfur oxides 
emission from energy production and distribution9 as two proxies for problem severity.  
National economic resource may influence renewable energy policy adoption, as its 
implementation is often capital intensive. I use GDP per capita10 to measure national 
economic resources, which is a proxy widely used in the literature (Daley, 2007; Daley & 
Garand, 2005; Huang et al., 2007; Vachon & Menz, 2006).  
Political culture is an important explanatory factor for energy and climate policy adoption 
at the U.S. state level (Deitchman, 2014; Matisoff, 2008; Matisoff & Edwards, 2014). At 
the national level, political and institutional capacities of a country affect its demand for 
and the feasibility of policy innovations (Kern 2001a). Following Brooks and Kurtz 
(2012), I use the partisan stripe of governments as an indicator for political ideology.  
Besides the factors discussed above, I also control for energy dependence, population and 
geographic region in the models. European countries are divided into four groups based 
on the United Nations Statistics Division geo-scheme: Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, 
Western Europe and Northern Europe. Data for the other three variables were all 
collected from Eurostat. 
4.3. Data and Methodology  
The unit of analysis of this study is 30 European countries, including twenty-eight EU 
member countries, Norway and Iceland. I focus on renewable energy policies adopted 
between 1990 and 2012, as most policy efforts in promoting renewable energy 
                                                 
9 The two datasets were both collected from Eurostat. 
10 This dataset was collected from Eurostat. 
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deployment started from the early 1990s. Both dependent and independent variables are 
measured for each year during the study time period for each country.  
4.3.1 Data Sources and Description 
Table 4.3 provides a summary for variable operationalization and data sources. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4.4. Note that the emulation and competition 
variables are measured for each policy types, which explain the subdivisions of emulation 
and competition in Table 4.4.  
The dependent variable of this research is whether or not a country adopts a renewable 
energy policy in a given year. 629 renewable energy policies were collected from 
IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database. These policies 
were adopted at the national level by 30 European countries (EU-28, Norway and Iceland) 
to encourage the uptake of renewable energy, including bioenergy, geothermal, 
hydropower, ocean energy, solar photovotaics, solar thermal and wind. The year for the 
passage of the policy act is recorded. Actions taken by provincial or regional government 
are not included.  
Based on the definition provided by the IEA/IRENA database, I categorize these policies 
into five types: information and education policies, feed-in-tariffs (FITs), research, 
development and deployment (RD&D) policies, supportive policy schemes, and 
regulatory instruments. Definition of each policy type is provided in Table 4.5. Note that 
some legislation may contain multiple components; hence the total number of policies 





Table 4.3  Variables, Operationalization and Data Sources 
Variables Operationalized Variables          Data Sources 
Renewable energy 
policy adoption  
Whether or not a country adopts a 
renewable energy policy in that year 
IEA/IRENA Joint 
Policies and Measures 
database  
Coercion  Whether or not a country is a EU 
member state in a given year 
EU website  
Emulation Average number of policies adopted by 
all the other countries in the same 
geographic region in a given year 
Primary data sources 
Competition  Average number of policies adopted by 
five competitors in a given year  
Primary data sources  
Learning  Total number of environmental and 
energy IGOs to which a country holds 
membership in a given year 
Primary data sources 
Carbon intensity Metric tonne of carbon emission per 
1000 $ GDP 
European 
Environmental 
Agency; World Bank 





GDP per capita at market prices (ten 
thousand $ per inhabitant) 
World Bank 
Political ideology Party orientation11 World Bank’s 




The extent to which an economy relies 
upon imports in order to meet its energy 
needs (net imports divided by the sum 
of gross inland energy consumption plus 
bunkers) 
Eurostat 
Population Total population on 1 January (hundred 
million) 
Eurostat 
Geographic region Countries are assigned to the four 
regions: Eastern Europe (1), Southern 
Europe (2), Western Europe (3) and 
Northern Europe (4). 




                                                 
11 It uses a three-point measure that codes right governments as 1 (for parties that are defined as 
conservative, Christian democratic, or right-wing), centrist governments as 2, and left 




Table 4.4  Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Information and Education Policies 690 0.059 0.237 0 1 
Feed-in-tariffs 690 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Research, Development and 
Demonstration Policy 
690 0.0928 0.290 0 1 
Supportive Policy Schemes 690 0.241 0.428 0 1 
Regulatory Instruments 690 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Coercion 690 0.626 0.484 0 1 





690 0.0659 0.117 0 0.556 




690 0.111 0.164 0 0.778 
Supportive Policy 
Schemes 
690 0.313 0.337 0 1.8 





690 0.0693 0149 0 1.2 




690 0.121 0.214 0 1 
Supportive Policy 
Schemes 
690 0.333 0.380 0 2 
Regulatory Instruments 690 0.254 0.338 0 2 
Carbon intensity 664 0.976 1.278 0.104 7.952 
Sulfur oxide (SOx) 664 3.924 11.547 0 120.27
9 
GDPPC 663 2.417 1.892 0.110 11.468 
Politics 593 1.916 0.921 1 3 
Energy dependence 690 0.313 1.287 -
8.031 
1.125 
Population 689 0.164 0.215 0.002
54 
0.825 





Table 4.5  Five Types of Renewable Energy Policy  










UK’s the Electricity (Guarantees of Origin 
of Electricity Produced from Renewable 
Energy Sources) Regulations 2003 (2003 
No. 2563): the Renewable Energy 
Guarantee of Origin (REGOs) electronic 
certificate system enables producers of 
renewable-sourced electricity that is 
eligible under the EU Renewables 
Directive to be issued with evidence 









Austria’s Ökostromverordnung 2009 (2009 
feed-in tariffs for green electricity): feed-in 
tariffs were provided for electricity 
produced from wind biomass, biogas, 
landfill and sewage gas, geothermal, solar, 












France’s Green Innovation Funding: the 
French Programme of Investments for the 
Future (2010): it supported testing in real 
conditions and demonstration plants for 
renewable energy and green chemistry, low 
carbon vehicle, smart grid and circular 
economy projects. It aims at brining 





Denmark’s National Renewable Energy 
Action Plan (NREAP 2010): it outlined 
pathway that will allow Denmark to meet 
its 2020 renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and GHG reduction targets. 
Regulatory 
Instruments 




Belgium’s Law of Obligation for the 
Incorporation of Biofuels in Fossil Fuels 
(2009): from 2009, all registered fossil fuel 
companies in Belgium must incorporate 
4% of biofuels in fossil fuels which are 
made available in the Belgian market. 
Penalties are applied where the quantity of 





Event history Analysis (EHA) is an approach to analyzing duration data, which records 
the length of time until some event occurs. It is also known as survival analysis or hazard 
rate model. Berry and Berry (1990) first used EHA to analyze state lottery adoption 
incorporating internal and regional diffusion influences (Berry & Berry, 1990). They 
argue that EHA is suitable for testing factors that determine the probability of policy 
adoptions, which are often rare and spread over a long time period. Since then, EHA has 
been widely used in policy diffusion studies (Berry & Berry, 1999; Daley & Garand, 
2005; Mooney, 2001).  
Below I discuss two event history modeling methods used in this study. Logistic 
regression models are used to estimate to understand drivers for first time policy adoption. 
Cox conditional gap time models are estimated in two cases: 1) considering all policy 
adoption events 2) considering only subsequent policy changes and accommodations 
(excluding first time policy adoption). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year to 
isolate the casual arrows. All models are estimated with clustered robust standard errors 
at the country level using standard statistical package STATA. 
In this study, the time period of analysis is divided into a set of distinct time units, 
namely years. The failure event is renewable energy policy adoption. There are two types 
of observations in the sample: either we see a country experience the failure event in a 
certain year, or we don’t see that. They are coded as 1 and 0 respectively, meaning that 
the values of dependent variable in this study are strictly nonnegative and binary. The 
risk set of this study, which refers to the set of individuals in the sample that are “at risk” 
of experiencing the event at a particular time, is the thirty countries.  
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The variable of interest here is called the hazard rate h(t), and is defined as the 
instantaneous risk of experiencing the event at time t, conditional on survival to that time 
(Equation (1)). Based on literature review in section 2, the hazard rate for each 
observation i is assumed to be determined by external diffusion mechanisms and control 
variables. Equation (2) specifies how this hazard rate depends on time and the 
explanatory variables.  
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = Pr[𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡| 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡, 𝒙𝒊𝒕]               (1) 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝜷
′𝒙𝒊𝒕)                (2) 
4.3.2.1 Single-Event Models 
In single-event models, only first-time policy adoptions are examined. The assumption is 
that first event is representative of all events. The data are conditional: to experience the 
event at some time t, one country must necessarily have not experienced the event till the 
time t-1. The single-event EHA models exclude a country from the dataset after the first 
adoption, even though it may repeatedly adopts the policy or remain at risk of doing so 
throughout the study period.  
When the baseline hazard function (ℎ0(𝑡)) is assumed to be constant, expressed by e𝛽0, 
Equation (2) can be written in logit form as shown in Equation (3). This means the 
probability of a country adopting a policy is invariant to time. The logistic regression 
function is one of the most popular choices (Allison, 1982) and has been widely applied 
in policy diffusion literature (Berry & Berry, 1999; Matisoff, 2008; Yi & Feiock, 2012). 
In this study, I estimate single-event logit EHA models and use a time variable to account 
for duration dependency as well as additional temporal heteroskedasticity (see also 
(Matisoff, 2008)).  
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log [ℎ𝑖(𝑡)/(1 − ℎ𝑖(𝑡))] = 𝛽0 + 𝜷
′𝒙𝒊𝒕              (3) 
4.3.2.2 Repeated-Events Models 
In repeated event models, I take into account of both initial policy adoption and 
subsequent modifications. In the real life setting, countries can adopt a policy multiple 
times to promote renewable energy development. After a country adopted its 1st policy, it 
is still at risk of adopting the 2nd … and the kth policy, leading to the repeated failures 
interpretation. Cox conditional gap time model provides a way to model repeatable policy 
adoptions (Jones & Branton, 2005). This model assumes that baseline hazard may vary 
substantially over the different ordered policy events.  
In this study, multiple policy adoptions in the same year are counted as a single failure 
event, as observations are at country-year level. Although stratified Cox models can be 
used for continuous time analysis, smaller-scale (i.e. monthly) time series data for policy 
adoption and other social-economic variables are unavailable. I note this as a limitation of 
this study. Another limitation is associated with the policy heterogeneity for the 
subsequent policy changes. The data only model the occurrence and time of policy 
change, but not the extent or direction of policy change.  
4.4. Results and Discussion  
Table 4.6 presents results for single-event logit EHA models. The findings do not support 
Hypothesis 1 or 1.1 (EU coercive power drives renewable energy policy adoption, 
especially FITs), as estimated coefficients for coercion are statistically insignificant for 
all policy classes. Coercive power from the EU, measured by EU membership, does not 
seem to exert any influence on renewable energy policy diffusion. This might be because 
that European Commission’s supportive and favorable attitude toward FITs is non-
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coercive and does not effectively transfer to member state’s policy making. Although EU 
sets binding renewable energy targets for member states and requires them to incorporate 
EU renewable energy directives into national laws, the binding targets may not be 
aggressive enough or are not substantially different from countries’ domestic renewable 
energy policy plans. In that case, EU membership does not necessarily drive countries to 
move beyond their policy commitment in old times.  
Estimated coefficients for emulation are insignificant for all policy instruments. The 
findings provide no evidence for Hypothesis 2 or 2.1 (countries emulate from their 
geographic neighbors for renewable energy policy adoption, especially for FITs, RD&D 
and regulatory instruments). This contrasts with the work by Biesenbender & Tosun 
(2014) which shows that geographical proximity drives both the adoption and tightening 
of NOx emissions standards in the EU (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014). However, 
Matisoff and Edwards (2014) found that American states are more likely to learn from a 
particular group of states in the country, instead of emulating from neighboring states 
(Matisoff & Edwards, 2014). It is possible European countries emulate from leaders in 
renewable energy deployment (e.g. Germany and Denmark), regardless of their 
geographical proximity. This may deserve future research attention. 
Competition effect is positive and significant for FITs and regulatory instruments, which 
confirms Hypothesis 3 and part of 3.1. This indicates that a country is more likely to 
follow its competitors to adopt policies that have relatively large impact on the renewable 
energy market (i.e. FITs and regulatory instruments), but not those that focus on 
technology innovation and development (i.e. RD&D policies). Measurements for 
competition mechanism in this study are different across the five policy types, containing 
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information about policy behaviors of competitors.  This measure offers new insight to 
the analysis of the competition mechanism, as previous studies often use fixed 
measurement for competition in different policy contexts (e.g. economic openness and 
foreign indirect investment (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014; Holzinger et al., 2008)).  
Results of this study provide much evidence to support Hypothesis 4 and demonstrate the 
importance of learning through environmental and energy IGOs in renewable energy 
policy diffusion: coefficients for learning are positive and significant for all policy types, 
except FITs and supportive policy schemes. This indicates that participating in more 
environmental and energy IGOs increase a country’s probability of adopting these three 
policy instruments. The reason might be that IGOs often serve as knowledge base for 
member countries through publishing renewable energy policy reviews and best practices 
(e.g. IEA’s R&D policy reviews (IEA, 2007)). International organizations also invest 
significant financial and technical resources on their member countries’ capacity building 
and experience sharing through trainings, expert group meetings, provision of technical 
assistance and establishment of learning platform (see for instance IRENA’s Capacity 
Building Strategic Framework (IRENA, 2012)). These activities may all facilitate 
member countries’ learning and policy adoption. 
It is noteworthy that the proxy I use only represents one way of learning through the 
information channel and platform provided by international organizations. As 
communication technologies advance and globalization proceeds, it is increasingly easy 
for governments to exchange ideas and knowledge (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Future 
research may focus on the total amount of information available to policy makers and its 
impact on policy diffusion. 
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Table 4.6 Logit Event History Analyses of First Time Policy Adoptions 
 

















      
Coercion -2.471 1.177 1.563 -0.775 -0.530 
 (1.702) (1.126) (1.127) (0.643) (1.011) 
Emulation 0.541 -0.271 3.466 0.285 -0.420 
 (4.022) (1.315) (2.259) (1.567) (1.325) 
Competition 2.015 1.850* -1.130 -0.220 1.935** 
 (2.299) (1.067) (1.423) (1.161) (0.849) 
Learning 0.858*** -0.0726 0.386* 0.287 0.327* 
 (0.287) (0.243) (0.230) (0.188) (0.178) 
Carbon 
intensity 
-1.609 0.414* -1.638 0.293 0.209 
 (0.979) (0.252) (1.833) (0.357) (0.199) 
SOx 0.109* -0.141 -0.0305 -0.0665 -0.101 
 (0.0568) (0.134) (0.271) (0.0527) (0.0652) 
GDPPC -0.0492 0.501 0.0258 -0.0955 0.0794 
 (0.205) (0.362) (0.469) (0.430) (0.287) 
Politics -0.155 0.670 0.00342 0.0941 0.595** 
 (0.341) (0.416) (0.269) (0.247) (0.295) 
Energy 
dependence 
-0.0938 2.577** 0.00261 0.118 0.224* 
 (0.226) (1.259) (0.138) (0.155) (0.127) 
Geographic 
region 
0.0503 -0.576 0.137 0.501 -0.254 
 (0.466) (0.527) (0.282) (0.457) (0.326) 
Population 5.045*** -0.222 -0.640 1.249 3.041* 
 (1.538) (1.587) (0.850) (1.028) (1.796) 
Time -0.0111 0.0807 -0.0833 0.158** 0.0957 
 (0.0924) (0.0991) (0.0804) (0.0768) (0.0959) 
Constant -9.735*** -6.483*** -6.268*** -7.076*** -7.021*** 
 (2.600) (2.252) (1.492) (2.134) (1.995) 
      
Observations 392 346 338 235 245 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4.7 Cox Conditional Gap Time Models for All Policy Adoptions 
 



















      
Coercion 2.861** 1.446 1.615 0.444 0.321 
 (1.221) (0.952) (1.084) (0.544) (0.643) 
Emulation -0.701 0.368 -0.478 -0.167 -0.899*** 
 (1.576) (0.561) (1.184) (0.375) (0.343) 
Competition 0.181 -0.413 -0.119 0.128 -0.606* 
 (0.981) (0.483) (0.371) (0.260) (0.350) 
Learning -0.466** -0.128 -0.0732 0.00621 -0.0387 
 (0.194) (0.111) (0.108) (0.0900) (0.103) 
Carbon intensity -0.737 0.115 -1.299 0.172 0.146 
 (1.080) (0.786) (1.333) (0.372) (0.468) 
Sox 0.0695 -0.0869 0.0931 -0.0117 -0.124 
 (0.0703) (0.246) (0.101) (0.0302) (0.116) 
GDPPC -0.229 -0.0645 -0.200** -0.0208 0.0791 
 (0.221) (0.0958) (0.100) (0.0531) (0.0692) 
Politics 0.184 0.291 0.284* 0.140 0.364** 
 (0.279) (0.179) (0.148) (0.131) (0.147) 
Energy dependence -0.454*** 0.101 -0.415*** -0.204*** 0.00690 
 (0.157) (0.292) (0.160) (0.0715) (0.110) 
Geographic region 0.124 0.145 0.809*** 0.0625 -0.182 
 (0.284) (0.247) (0.297) (0.154) (0.174) 
Population 0.361 0.977 2.809*** 1.065** 1.295** 
 (0.997) (0.753) (0.528) (0.514) (0.557) 
      
Observations 554 554 554 554 554 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows results of stratified Cox conditional gap time models that take into 
account of all policy adoption events. The results are substantially different from those of 
the single-event logit EHA models. Estimated coefficient for coercion effect is only 
positive and significant for information and education policy, indicating that the repeated 
adoption of information and education policies is heavily influenced by EU coercive 
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power. This supports Hypothesis 1 but not 1.1: EU coercion drives the repeated adoption 
of renewable information and education policies but not others. Besides, there is little 
support for all other hypotheses. Estimated coefficients for learning and emulation are 
significant for information and education policy and regulatory instruments, but both are 
with a negative sign. The reason for the negative emulation effect may be that for these 
two policies, leader countries dominate the policy adoption activities in the region by 
initiating innovative policy action, but laggard countries are reluctant to follow the 
leaders. Estimated coefficients for competition are all insignificant, except for regulatory 
instruments, which has a negative sign.  
To disentangle the diffusion mechanisms for initial policy adoptions and their subsequent 
policy changes, stratified Cox models were estimated to include data for only subsequent 
policy adoptions (2nd…kth policy adoptions). Results presented in Table 4.8 show that 
policy changes and accommodations are less likely to be triggered by external factors. 
Only learning and emulation are significant for information and education policies and 
regulatory instruments respectively, but with negative signs. This indicates that as 
countries join more IGOs, it is less likely for them to revise their renewable information 
and education policies, while countries also are less likely to follow their competitors to 
modify regulatory policies.  
The findings of this paper suggest that the initial spread of renewable energy policy and 
the subsequent policy accommodation and changes are driven by different diffusion 
mechanisms. It is possible that the process leading up to the first time policy adoption 
requires greater momentum (e.g. value and belief changes, and vision of the future) to 
breach into the old energy governance structure. Without much experience, countries 
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tend to seek information and learn about policy choices and effectiveness from the 
international arena (e.g. intergovernmental organizations and competing countries in the 
global renewable energy technology market). As European countries have gained 
experience with renewable energy policy instruments, they may rely less heavily on 
information from outside of their national boundaries. Thus, subsequent policy changes 
may be more influenced over time by an increased level of social acceptance to 
renewable technology, strengthened advocacy coalitions and accumulated policy 
experiences. As demonstrated by Jacobsson and Lauber (2006)’s case study of German 
renewable energy development, the initial renewable energy RD&D policy and FITs 
adopted by the government formed the constituency for renewable technology and a 
knowledge base about RE policy making, both of which played an important role in 
subsequent policy making phases (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). It is also likely that policy 
shifts due to changes in the supply chain of the renewable energy industries: policy 
makers often need to consider domestic energy industrial activities to position and 
identify industrial strengths, and to design optimal energy policy measures (Lund, 2009). 
A country may develop its policies over time to reflect the ability of its domestic 
renewable technology industries. For example, an RD&D intensive policy portfolio might 
be more effective and preferred by policy makers during the technology take off phase; 
while commercialization may require more shift towards market pull policy measures (i.e. 
feed-in tariffs). This points to a promising avenue for future research that explores how 





Table 4.8 Cox Conditional Gap Time Models for Subsequent Policy Adoptions 
 



















      
Coercion 0.743 37.68 1.322 0.764 -1.210 
 (4.731) (0) (4.256) (0.538) (1.291) 
Emulation -0.0821 0.883 0.352 0.0180 -0.982** 
 (1.635) (0.594) (1.376) (0.309) (0.423) 
Competition -1.295 -0.527 -0.314 0.186 -0.546 
 (0.907) (0.699) (0.559) (0.302) (0.415) 
Learning -0.896*** -0.0291 0.0203 0.0259 -0.0254 
 (0.327) (0.123) (0.207) (0.0891) (0.112) 
Carbon intensity 0.261 -0.00452 -2.222 -0.0612 -1.364 
 (5.047) (2.414) (3.933) (0.480) (0.977) 
SOx -1.187 0.121 0.572 0.181** 0.0744 
 (1.313) (0.404) (0.517) (0.0711) (0.265) 
GDPPC -0.584 0.0800 -0.353* -0.0108 0.000164 
 (0.684) (0.275) (0.195) (0.0522) (0.0767) 
Politics 0.0737 0.251 0.260 0.172 0.241 
 (0.397) (0.223) (0.159) (0.145) (0.155) 
Energy dependence 0.0168 -1.638 -0.569 -0.260*** 0.131 
 (0.686) (1.050) (0.581) (0.0739) (0.223) 
Geographic region 0.545 -0.0522 1.134** -0.0176 -0.123 
 (0.578) (0.659) (0.460) (0.173) (0.228) 
Population -1.680 1.669 3.939*** 0.972 0.863 
 (1.742) (1.350) (0.734) (0.636) (0.588) 
      
Observations 162 208 216 319 309 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




This paper estimates logit event history analysis models and stratified Cox conditional 
gap time models to examine the diffusion of five renewable energy policy instruments 
across 30 European countries between 1990 and 2012. The results show that the impact 
of four external diffusion mechanisms on renewable energy policy adoption varies 
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greatly depending on the type of policy instruments and how the policy adoption process 
is modeled.  
First-time policy adoptions of all five-policy instruments are affected by both external 
diffusion mechanisms and internal factors, except supportive policy schemes. In 
particular, the initial spread of renewable energy policy (except FITs and supportive 
policy schemes) is found to be the consequence of policy learning through the 
participation of international organizations. This finding provides important policy 
implications for renewable energy policy advocates and entrepreneurs: intergovernmental 
organizations can serve as an important focal point for policy learning in the clean energy   
domain, and they may want to promote their policy ideas using the information channel 
established among members of intergovernmental organizations. Competition effect 
appears to exist for the diffusion of FITs and regulatory instruments. This indicates that 
governments follow their direct competitors’ policy activities selective: FITs and 
regulatory instruments are regarded as market-friendly policies that can effectively 
strengthen domestic renewable energy technology industries. There is no evidence for 
significant impact of EU coercive power or emulation from geographic neighbors on 
first-time renewable energy policy adoption.  
The results of repeated policy adoption models present a very different story: external 
forces do not appear to drive policy changes and modifications. The subsequent 
adoptions of information and education policy and regulatory policies are even negatively 
affected by memberships of IGOs and competitors’ policy behaviors respectively. This 
indicates a completely different pattern for subsequent policy changes exists after the 
initial policy spread. 
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This paper makes several theoretical contributions. First, the policy diffusion literature 
often tests the adoption of a specific policy or class of policies. This study contributes to 
the literature by considering a broad portfolio of policy innovations with regard to 
different policy instruments in the renewable energy policy arena. The results 
demonstrate that external diffusion mechanisms have varying impacts across the 
subgroups of renewable energy policy.  
Second, this study uses a more nuanced measurement of the competition mechanism, 
which is based on the similarity of country attractiveness in the global market as well as 
technology innovation. The results support the assumption that countries pay attention to 
their competitors’ policy activities (FITs and regulatory policies) when making their own 
renewable energy policy adoption decision. This offers a starting point for future research 
to develop more advanced operationalization. For example, analysts could profit from 
using factor analysis to determine competing countries in renewable sector based on 
export profiles.  
Three, the four diffusion mechanisms well explain initial policy diffusion; however, they 
have largely failed to explain the process of repeated policy adoption. This study 
disentangles the diffusion mechanisms for subsequent policy changes, and finds that they 
are rarely affected by external factors. It is possible that policy changes and modifications 
are more likely to be affected by domestic interest groups and knowledge accumulated in 
initial policy adoption, perhaps associated with the evolution of supply chains. 
Correlating the role of the four diffusion mechanisms with a closer examination of 
domestic supply chains might offer a productive line of inquiry to address this gap. 
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This study also points to one potential weakness of the repeated policy adoption approach 
and stratified cox models: the incompetence to explain variability across the same class 
of policies. Despite the advantages of repeated policy adoption approaches, including the 
incorporation of greater information) (Jones & Branton, 2005), this research suggests the 
need to seek methodological development that account for policy heterogeneity in  








As energy demand continues to rise and climate mitigation becomes increasingly 
challenging, a massive clean technological push is required (IPCC, 2014a). The benefits 
of clean energy technology provide attractive solutions to stabilize the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases to a safe level to prevent catastrophic climate change. 
Due to the public good nature of these environmental benefits, government actions are 
often needed to facilitate clean energy technology deployment. Many advocate the need 
for new and more innovative forms of governance, such as polycentric governance 
system (Brown & Wang, 2015; Ostrom, 2009; Pasqualetti & Brown, 2014), transnational 
policy schemes (Hale & Roger, 2014) and even governance dominated by non-state 
actors (Auld et al., 2014); however, little is known about how the policy innovations 
spread and whether they are successful in addressing climate and energy challenges 
(Jordan & Huitema, 2014). 
This dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature in climate and energy 
governance and clean technological diffusion. The research presented in this thesis is 
unique in the sense that it treats the diffusion of policy and technology as intertwined 
events.  Clean technology deployment is embedded in a larger socio-technical regime, in 
which policy innovations are invented and diffused to transform this regime into more 
sustainable configurations. To better address this process, it is critical to understand how 
policies are adopted, what the landscape of the governance is, how it works, and whether 
it is effective. The chapters of this dissertation are designed to solve these myths.  
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The overarching research question of this dissertation is how public policy can be 
leveraged in different stages of policy processes (i.e. policy adoption and implementation) 
to facilitate clean technology diffusion. In particular, Chapter 2 conceptualizes smart 
metering deployment as an outcome of policy implementation, and examines the impacts 
of a multi-tiered governance system on the innovation of the energy infrastructure system 
in the U.S. Chapter 3 examines the role of policy environments in shaping the 
development of smart meter lead markets by conducting a comparative case study on five 
European countries. Chapter 4 focuses on European countries and investigates why some 
governments are more likely to adopt renewable energy policies than others, and how the 
diffusion patterns evolve over time and differ across policy types. Collectively, the 
research findings of this thesis answer how different configurations of energy governance 
system affect clean energy technology deployment, and how energy policy innovations 
diffuse across countries over time. 
5.1 Smart Meter Deployment in the EU and the U.S. 
The findings of Chapter 2 and 3 show that smart meter deployment in both the EU and 
the U.S. is largely driven by government policies. The governance structures are similar 
in the two entities as both of them are experiencing struggles between central and 
regional authorities regarding energy and climate change. The European Commission and 
the U.S. federal government adopt binding forms of policy instruments, while member 
countries of EU and American states have different degrees of freedom in designing 
policies for compliance. The discretion in policy design and implementation at the 
regional level has been the source of variation in smart meter penetration rates in the five 
EU countries examined in Chapter 3. Research has argued that the central power to 
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regulate environmental issues is weakened by this transposition of policy measures from 
higher to lower level legislation (Kimber, 1995). However, findings of Chapter 2 in this 
dissertation show that positive interaction between federal and state policy actions exist 
in the case of smart meter deployment. Federal financial incentives provided under the 
ARRA drive smart meter penetration only when a state has adopted smart metering 
promotion policies. This indicates that favorable policy signals at the state level leverage 
the power of federal policy measure. 
The policy environments in the two regions are different in a number of ways. Smart 
meter deployment in the U.S. is mainly affected by government interventions and 
interactions between policy actions at different levels, with authority divided among 
federal and state government agencies. In particular, the federal government provides 
substantial financial incentives to qualified utilities to encourage smart meter installations. 
Two pieces of national legislation - Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 address smart meter deployment, which are 
transposed into state regulations and indirectly explain the state-level variation in smart 
meter penetration rates. State public service commissions influence smart meter diffusion 
by shaping the regulatory environment for utility investment. Higher regulatory 
uncertainty inhibits smart metering deployment, however this impact is only significant 
when state smart meter promotion policies exist. The two types of policies adopted by 
state governments – smart meter promotion policies and smart meter data security and 
privacy policies are also positively interacted. The polycentric governance system in the 
U.S. creates a coherent policy framework that largely explains the smart meter 
penetration rates of American states.  
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EU member countries are required to adopt policies to achieve smart meter deployment 
targets set by the European Commission if the rollouts are demonstrated to be cost 
effective. The comparative case studies in Chapter 3 allow me to examine in more depth 
the variation in policy design and selection across five EU countries, which are mostly 
due to country specifics of the energy governance systems. It shows that regulatory 
instruments often effectively drive smart meter penetration especially when the social 
acceptance level of smart meters is high. Financial regulations of the DSOs in the five EU 
countries differ in terms of the incentives provided for DSOs’ clean technology 
investment. DSOs are likely to invest more in smart meters when allowed to recover 
technology costs through increased tariffs. They are also motivated when regulators 
encourage and reward DSOs for higher quality of electricity services that can be achieved 
by the implementation of smart grid and smart meter technologies. 
Social acceptance plays different roles in smart meter deployment in the EU and the U.S. 
Public concerns over privacy and data security has slowed the smart meter roll out 
process in the Netherlands and Germany. It often takes much longer for countries with a 
low social acceptance level to roll out smart meters. Policy actions that address this 
barrier include technology standards, privacy and data security regulations, and smart 
meter opt-out options. In Sweden, Finland and Denmark, regulators have adopted policies 
that allow consumers to benefit more from smart meters, such as demand response and 
real-time electricity pricing programs. These policies help consumers understand the 
tangible benefits of smart meter technologies to them personally, therefore encourage 
consumer participation and interaction with the smart grid systems. In the case of U.S. 
where I use the Sierra Club membership, size of high-tech sector and income level as 
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proxies for social acceptance, none of the variables seems to have a significant impact on 
smart meter penetration in U.S. states. Variation in these social groups does not affect 
smart meter penetration rates among U.S. states. Future research may use a better 
geographical and time-variant proxy that represents the public perception and acceptance 
level of smart metering technology. 
5.2 An Effective Policy Framework for Clean Energy Deployment 
A variety of barriers exist that impede clean energy technology deployment. The design 
of an effective policy framework requires the understanding of barriers specific to the 
technology. Some policies have been shown to be successful in driving clean technology 
deployment. For instance, the matching fund appropriated under ARRA in the U.S. has 
been demonstrated to be effective in driving smart meter penetration rates in American 
states. The Finnish and Swedish experience show that regulatory instruments, such as 
mandatory smart meter roll out targets and mandatory monthly meter reading targets have 
successfully pushed the smart meter rollout in the two countries. 
However, there is no one-size-fits-all policy. Experience in both the U.S. and Europe 
show that an effective policy framework requires a combination of policy instruments to 
address barriers and coordination between multiple governance levels. For instance, 
regulatory instruments, together with financial regulations that encourage DSOs’ clean 
investments and policies that realize the benefits of smart meters, form an effective policy 
framework for Finland and Sweden. In the case of the U.S., a combination of high 
regulatory certainty by public service commission, favorable state policy environment 
and federal financial incentive has been demonstrated effective in driving smart meter 
penetration rates.  
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Moreover, policies in the real life setting are adopted and implemented at multiple 
governance levels. It is important to consider the interaction between local, 
state/provincial, and national policy actions. Some policies may have positive interaction, 
which complement each other and augment the individual policy effects, such as the 
relationship between federal ARRA funding and state smart metering policies. This thesis 
investigates the multi-tiered energy governance at the policy implementation stage. In the 
future, researchers may investigate policy interaction at the earlier stage of the policy 
cycle by considering how policy makers draw ideas and lessons for their agenda setting 
and policy adoption in a multi-level energy governance system.  
The findings of this thesis also demonstrate the importance of policy certainty and social 
acceptance. Regulatory instruments, such as mandatory roll out targets can reduce policy 
uncertainty by setting up clear and long-term goals for technology deployment. Policy 
makers can also reduce uncertainty for investors through the electricity rate setting 
process. Technical standards are beneficial for the scale-up of technology deployment 
and interoperability of technology systems. They also ensure data security and privacy; 
therefore enhance the social acceptance level. It is noteworthy that enhancing social 
acceptance often involves a higher degree of flexibility in policy implementation, and 
higher requirements on standards and criteria, both of which may lead to a prolonged 
delay in technology deployment. 
In sum, a favorable and enabling policy environment for clean energy technologies can 
be created by understanding the possible interactions of policies at different levels, by 
reducing policy uncertainties, by enabling returns from clean investments, and by 
improving social acceptance of the technology. 
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5.3 Transnational Clean Energy Policy Diffusion  
Transnational clean energy policy diffusion has not been extensively studied. Both the 
model construction and theoretical framework are far less advanced compared to the state 
policy diffusion literature. Chapter 4 investigates determinants for the adoption of five 
renewable energy policies in 30 EU countries from 1990 to 2012. The results show that 
the impact of four external diffusion mechanisms on renewable energy policy adoption 
varies greatly depending on the type of policy instruments and how the policy adoption 
process is modeled.  
First-time adoptions of all five-policy instruments are affected by both external diffusion 
mechanisms and internal factors, except supportive policy schemes. Competition effect 
exists for the diffusion of FITs and regulatory instruments, while policy learning through 
the participation in environmental and energy intergovernmental organizations enhances 
the probability of adopting information and education policies, RD&D policies and 
regulatory instruments. Moreover, the coercion and normative emulation hypotheses are 
rejected: neither EU membership nor policy activities of geographic neighboring 
countries affects renewable energy policy adoption by European countries.  
The results of repeated policy adoption models present a very different story: external 
forces do usually not drive policy changes and modifications. The subsequent adoptions 
of information and education policy and regulatory policies are even negatively affected 
by memberships of IGOs and competitors’ policy behaviors respectively. 
Findings suggest the adoption of different types of renewable energy policies is path 
dependent. Mechanisms of policy diffusion vary depending on the policy type. The 
diffusion of information and education policies, feed-in-tariffs, and regulatory 
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instruments is characterized by both internal factors and external influences, RD&D 
policy adoption is only affected by external policy learning, while none of the factors 
examined in this study is a significant driver for the adoption of supportive policy 
schemes. This study highlights the importance of distinguishing between policy types 
when examining the policy diffusion process. 
5.4 Theoretical Contribution 
Chapter 2 shows that polycentric decision-making that creates a coherent policy 
environment is the essential element to advance smart metering technology. It provides 
an empirical analysis of how multiple-level governance works in a clean technology 
diffusion process, and demonstrates the importance of understanding the complex 
interdependencies between divided authorities in electricity system governance. The 
findings also highlight the importance of coordinating and aligning governance at 
different levels to induce the transitions to a sustainable energy infrastructure system. 
Like renewable energy (Shrimali & Kniefel, 2011), public policy plays a critical role in 
accelerating the penetration of smart meters in the U.S. This chapter also adds to the 
growing body of literature in clean energy technology diffusion, and sheds light on the 
debate surrounding the effectiveness of policy in deploying clean energy innovations 
(Shrimali & Kniefel, 2011). Moreover, this chapter provides a broad and more systematic 
perspective to examine the consequences of energy policy innovations. As in the stage of 
policy implementation, the relevant issue is not just how an individual policy is doing, 
but how the aggregate effects of interacting policies across scales and jurisdictions 
perform to address the clean energy challenge (Auld et al., 2014). The unique focus of 
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attention of this chapter improves the understanding of how and whether energy policy 
innovations align with each other to produce collective consequences. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the lead market literature by exploring the role of government in 
the creation of lead markets of clean energy innovations. Current literature on lead 
markets often focuses on commercial goods and the impacts of socio-economic and 
market factors on their market penetration. The findings of Chapter 3 demonstrate that for 
privately owned goods that provide public benefits, such as smart metering technology, 
government interventions are highly required to achieve wide deployment. I also extend 
previous research on policy impacts assessment by examining how portfolios of policies 
have been designed and adopted to accelerate smart meter diffusion. While the literature 
often focuses on the impacts of a single policy instrument or tries to identify policy 
measures that work the best, Chapter 3 takes a holistic view of the policy frameworks 
adopted in the five countries, and compares their policy effectiveness by evaluating how 
they have addressed the multiple barriers to smart meter deployment. 
Chapter 2 and 3 both contribute to the induced diffusion literature by examining how 
policy instruments can incentivize the diffusion of smart grid technology innovations in 
the energy system. The two chapters build on technology diffusion and policy impact 
assessment literature and provide valuable insights on the design of effective policy tools 
to promote clean energy innovations. They also provide evidence on the evaluation of the 
performance of existing policies, which inform the evidence-based policy making in 
energy and climate policy arena. 
Chapter 4 examines renewable energy policy adoption in the cross-national setting. It 
represents the first attempt to compare the impact of diffusion mechanisms on first-time 
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and cumulative renewable energy policy adoptions. The results reveal that initial policy 
spread and subsequent policy changes are driven by different mechanisms. It points to the 
need to understand the evolving policy diffusion mechanisms over time. This research is 
also one of the few that test policy diffusion mechanisms for a range of policy 
instruments in the renewable energy policy domain. It improves the understanding of the 
rationales for renewable energy policy making, and how government’s choice of policy 
instruments are affected differently by external factors.   
5.5 Generalization of the Findings 
The findings of this study can be generalized to the group of clean energy technologies. 
First of all, these technologies are often highly influenced by government mandates and 
subsidies, including renewable energy, energy efficiency, and other environmental 
technologies. Secondly, their implementation is pushed through regulatory intermediaries, 
such as state public service commission. Thirdly, these technologies often generate 
positive externalities, such as carbon emissions abatement and air pollutants reduction 
benefits; therefore, their adoption is not solely consumer-level decision. It often requires 
a high-level of involvement by government agencies or third-party organizations.  
The theoretical contribution of this dissertation could also provide extra generalizability 
to technologies that are highly affected by policy changes. By integrating technology 
diffusion theory with policy implementation literature, this research provides a unique 
perspective to look at technology diffusion as an outcome of policy implementation. This 
is particularly useful for sustainable energy innovations, because public policies often 
coexist at multiple governance levels. Understanding how the multi-tiered policies are 
implemented in the social context could help promote the transformation of the energy 
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infrastructure sustainability, as most energy systems have broad geographic dimensions 
(Pasqualetti & Brown, 2014) . In addition, this research is one of the first few that 
provide empirical evidence on how policy interventions at different levels could be better 
aligned to promote sustainable energy innovations. This polycentric approach offers a 
promising lens to rethink and analyze the governance of energy infrastructure with a goal 
to facilitate a low carbon future (Goldthau, 2014). It also provides a useful way to 
conduct policy impact assessment when authorities are divided among governance levels, 
and policy actions are intertwined to generate policy outcomes. 
5.6 Policy Implications 
This thesis provides an empirical example that quantitatively evaluates the effects of 
different levels of governance on clean technology deployment. It points to the 
importance of coordination and alignment within a multi-tiered governance system. 
Energy policy makers do not only need to have a holistic view of the governance system, 
but also a great understand of possible interactions between/among policy actions. This 
helps policy makers augment the impact of regulatory efforts by other government 
agencies in the system. 
A combination of policy instruments that over financial, regulatory and social barriers is 
critical for successful clean energy policy deployment. Policy makers can influence clean 
technology roll-out by encouraging DSOs to provide high-quality electric service, 
allowing cost recovery for clean investment, maximizing technology benefits received by 
the lay public, providing more flexibility for technology implementation, and setting up 
technical standards and criteria to ensure safety and data security, etc. Policy makers need 
to design and adopt policy measures to target the specific barriers in their country. 
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While financial and regulatory instruments are identified as effective in clean energy 
technology deployment in Chapter 2 and 3, the adoption of these two types of policies are 
most likely to be driven by pressure from competitors. Information channel provided by 
environmental and energy IGOs serve as another driver for the diffusion of renewable 
energy policies. Policy advocates may work through these two mechanisms to facilitate 
the cross-national spread of energy policies. Results of Chapter 4 also highlight the need 
to differentiate between first-time policy adoption and subsequent policy changes. It is 
useful for policy makers and interest groups to understand how policy innovations have 
been gradually incorporated into domestic political system.  
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6.1 Case Studies on Smart Meter Deployment in Selected U.S. States 
Chapter 2 provides useful insights on energy policy interaction and interdependences and 
their impacts on smart metering technology deployment using quantitative analysis 
approach. However, we still have little knowledge regarding the real world policy 
processes, particularly how the tension between state and federal energy policymaking 
plays out in clean energy technology deployment. The relationship between Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and state public service commissions may have 
both localized and trans-state impacts on smart metering diffusion. It will be interesting 
to examine the overlapping authority in the smart metering governance and identify cases 
where effective coordination of energy policy making occurs in the country. It would be 
useful to ground truth some of the findings of Chapter 2 with interviews with key actors 
in a sample of jurisdictions. Questions of great importance may include: 1) how do utility 
companies view the smart meter policy environments? which level of energy governance 
is the most important for their smart meter investment decisions? 2) whether cross 
jurisdictional dialogue exists? Has that improved policy effectiveness? To answer these 
questions, some more detailed jurisdictional case studies around smart meter deployment 
might be a logical next step in future research. 
6.2 Indirect Impact of ARRA Funding on Smart Grid Deployment 
Matching fund from the ARRA is one of the most significant drivers for smart grid 
technology deployment in the U.S. in the 21st century. While it directly helps overcome 
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financial barriers and subsidizes utility investment in smart grid, whether it has a lasting 
impact on the country’s smart grid technology adoption remains a big question. Future 
research may be conducted to understand the long-term effect of ARRA funding. 
Questions of great interests include: 1) how ARRA funding offered on a short-term basis 
motivates smart grid investment from utilities and the private sector in the long term; 2) 
to what extent the ARRA funded smart grid infrastructure has enabled distributed 
renewable energy generation and demand response programs. It will also be interesting to 
look at the relationship between federal ARRA funding and state-level smart grid policies. 
Hypothesis about whether ARRA funding has driven state smart grid policy adoption can 
be tested. 
6.3 Smart Metering Technology Adoption at Different Decision Units  
Utility companies/distribution system operators (DSOs) are important players in the 
smart metering diffusion process as they often own the meters and are responsible for 
meter installation and maintenance. They may be motivated or resistant to deploy smart 
meters given their different characteristics. Future research can analyze American utilities’ 
smart metering technology adoption decisions in response to the Smart Grid Investment 
Grant (SGIG) program under the American Recovery and Investment Act (ARRA) of 
2009. It will identify characteristics of individual utility firms that motivate their 
application for SGIG, and factors that influence the probability of success in obtaining 
the grants. It is also interesting to explore the indirect and non-subsidized effect of federal 
investment on smart meter market penetration by comparing utilities’ pre-ARRA and 
post-ARRA smart meter performance.   
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6.4 Realizing the Benefits of Smart Meters 
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is an enabling technology for many important 
functions of a smart grid system, such as demand response and distributed renewable 
energy. Although AMI is the first smart grid technology that has achieved worldwide 
adoption, the impact of its rollout on the energy sector is largely unknown. The full 
benefits of AMI are highly contingent on how the metering infrastructure is coupled with 
other smart grid technologies, and to what extent various stakeholders extract benefits 
from these technologies (McHenry, 2013). Further inquiry may focus on the ways to 
realize benefits of smart meters. Empirical analysis can be carried out using utility-level 
data from the EIA Form 861 to understand how smart meter deployment affects customer 
engagement in demand response programs and the integration of distributed renewable 
generation. Building on studies that evaluate the effects of real time price information on 
electricity consumption (i.e. (Schleich et al., 2011)),  research can further assess the 
carbon emission reduction potential of advanced metering infrastructure. It is also useful 
to understand what regulatory setting is likely to provide incentives for utilities to realize 
benefits of smart meters. 
6.5 Impacts of Capacity Market Design on Demand Response and Smart Meter 
Deployment  
Capacity market, where energy supply resources can be bought or sold in advance of 
electricity being delivered, is a critical element in electricity market restructuring to 
mitigate the risks to future electricity supply. Smart meter technology would have a 
critical role to play in the demand side of the capacity market by providing real time 
information of energy usage. In this context, two lines of research are worth pursuing: 1) 
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using market data from major regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and 
independent system operators (ISOs), I will analyze how capacity market designs 
influence the monetization of benefits associated with consumer demand response in the 
wholesale markets. I will focus on a range of market design elements, including the 
length and duration of the forward and commitment period, performance requirements for 
capacity resources, and definition of demand side resource product. 2) My other proposed 
research is to compare smart meter deployment between states that have demand 
response as an eligible resource in the capacity markets and those that do not. The goal is 
to evaluate the subsidization effect of residential demand capacity payments on the 
implementation of smart meters. 
6.6 Clean Energy Policy Diffusion and Policy Outcomes 
This thesis examines the processes of energy policy adoption and implementation 
separately. It focuses on explaining what causes policy adoption and how policies have 
affected clean energy technology deployment. An interesting avenue to pursue in the 
future is to investigate the relationship between the two policy stages. For governments 
that actively search for a solution to climate change and energy security, it is important to 
understand whether policy adoption has successfully led to expected policy outcomes (i.e. 
clean energy deployment) and under what circumstances a successful policy adoption is 
more likely to occur. For instance, is policy adoption driven by emulation more 
successful than those driven by competition? What are the roles of stakeholders in the 
process? Does an involvement of a broader stakeholder group (i.e. politician, bureaucrats, 
policy experts, interest groups, etc.) facilitate the adoption and implementation of 
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successful energy policy? Answering the above questions will improve our understanding 
of the relationship between different stages in the complex energy policy cycle. 
6.7 Interaction between Carbon and Technology Policies 
One weakness of this dissertation is that both Chapter 2 and 3 fail to take into account the 
carbon policies when trying to evaluate the policy impact on smart metering deployment. 
The two chapters focus exclusively on the technology promotion policies. However, it is 
likely that carbon policies (i.e. carbon tax or carbon cap and trade) interact with 
technology policies. Although literature suggests that only a relatively high and stable 
price on carbon may stimulate innovation in low carbon energy technologies (Pérez-
Arriaga, 2009), it is largely unknown how carbon regulations influence investments in 
smart grid and smart metering infrastructure. Future research endeavors are needed to 
investigate the policy design that helps transfer economic rents from carbon markets to 
fund innovation and diffusion efforts in the clean energy sector. 
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Initial Review Criteria: 
(1) The applicant is eligible for an award;  
(2) The information required by the funding opportunity announcement has been 
submitted;  
(3) All mandatory requirements are satisfied; 
(4) The proposed project is responsive to the objectives of the funding opportunity 
announcement. 
Merit Review Criteria12:  
(1) Adequacy of the Technical Approach for Enabling Smart Grid Functions (40%) 
Applications will be evaluated for the extent to which they will enable smart grid 
functions through the deployment and operation of smart grid technologies, tools, and 
techniques. The following will be considered: 
•  The project clearly involves smart grid technologies, tools, or techniques that meet the 
conditions of “qualifying investments”. 
•  The project installs the qualified smart grid technologies, tools, or techniques and 
connects them to the electric system, building, or piece of equipment. 
•  The project includes a plan for operating the smart grid technologies, tools, or 
techniques in a manner that clearly causes smart grid functions to actually occur. 
                                                 
12 The relative importance of the four criteria is provided in percentages in parentheses. 
 134 
•  The project includes a plan for expanding installation and operation of the qualified 
smart grid technologies, tools, or techniques to a broader set of locations and applications 
after the project is complete (e.g., company-wide, city-wide, state-wide, system-wide, 
region-wide, interconnection-wide, nation-wide). 
•  The project includes a plan for assessing the operational performance of the smart grid 
technologies, tools, and techniques and using the results of that assessment to optimize 
the way electricity is generated, delivered, or used. 
(2) Adequacy of the Plan for Project Tasks, Schedule, Management, Qualifications, 
and Risks (25%) 
Applications will be evaluated for the adequacy of the Project Plan in describing the tasks, 
schedules, management, qualifications of the organizations and individuals, and level of 
organizational commitment. The following will be considered: 
•  The relevance of the project’s objectives and scope of activities to the purpose and 
goals of the SGIG. 
• The effectiveness of the plan in organizing the tasks, activities, organizations, and 
personnel to accomplish project objectives in a timely and cost-effective manner and 
produce top quality deliverables, products, and services, and to define the respective roles 
and responsibilities of the project manager, supporting personnel, lead organization (e.g., 
“prime” contractor), and supporting organizations (e.g., “lower-tier” subcontractors). 
• The effectiveness of the project schedule in describing the key tasks and their 
interrelationships, major milestones and deliverables, and a project time period of three 
years or less. 
• The relevance and significance of the qualifications of the organizations and personnel 
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for achieving the project objectives and contributing to the overall purpose and goals of 
the SGIG. 
• The level of organizational commitment to the project as demonstrated by the inclusion 
of letters of support or other materials from senior executives in the lead and supporting 
organizations, key vendors, and key stakeholders. 
• The effectiveness of the project strategies to address technical, financial, regulatory, or 
institutional risks. 
(3) Adequacy of the Technical Approach for Addressing Interoperability and Cyber 
Security (20%) 
The Project Plan’s technical approach for interoperability will be evaluated as to how 
clearly it provides a description of the automation component interfaces (devices and 
systems), how integration is supported to achieve interoperability, and how 
interoperability concerns will be addressed throughout all phases of the engineering 
lifecycle, including design, acquisition, implementation, integration, test, deployment, 
operations, maintenance, and upgrade. 
The Project Plan’s technical approach for cyber security protections will be evaluated as 
to how clearly and concisely it provides a description of how cyber security concerns will 
be addressed throughout the project. Of particular concern in the evaluation will be the 
integration of the new smart grid application into the existing environment, and how any 
new cyber security vulnerabilities will be mitigated through technology or other measures. 
Although sensitive cyber security details that would jeopardize system security if they 
were exposed should not be revealed in the application, sufficient detail should be 
included to judge the project on its cyber security merits. 
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(4) Adequacy of the Plan for Data Collection and Analysis of Project Costs and 
Benefits (15%) 
The evaluation will consider the thoroughness of the discussion of data requirements 
(including what types of data and their availability) and how that data will be provided to 
DOE so that project costs and benefits can be properly analyzed. The evaluation will also 
consider the applicant’s estimates of project benefits. In addition, the evaluation will 
consider the comprehensiveness of the plan for determining the baseline against which 
the costs and benefits will be assessed. 
Program Policy Factors: 
After the technical merit review process is complete, DOE may choose to apply program 
and policy factors in the selection of grant recipients. The goal is to ensure that the 
selection process results in an efficacious portfolio of SGIG projects and provides for an 
appropriate mix of methods, approaches, concepts, and strategies.  
 
Source: Department of Energy  
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Alabama    
Alaska    
Arizona 2007 The adoption of a 
modified version of 
PURPA Standard 14 
 “Each electric distribution utility 
shall investigate the feasibility and 
cost-effectiveness of implementing 
advanced metering infrastructure for 
its service territory and shall begin 
implementing the technology if 
feasible and cost-effective.” 




It initiates a docket for the 
consideration of smart grid, AMI and 
related demand response 
technologies.  





It includes an entire chapter 
promoting demand response and 
smart metering in conjunction with 
efficiency, conservation, and 
distributed generation. 





 “(e) Deployment of cost-effective 
smart technologies, including real 
time, automated, interactive 
technologies that optimize the 
physical operation of appliances and 
consumer devices for metering, 
communications concerning grid 
operations and status, and distribution 
automation.” 
2009  Decision 09-12-046: 
Decision adopting 
policies and findings 
pursuant to the 
Smart Grid policies 
established by the 
Energy Information 
and Security Act of 
This order requires that utilities shall 
provide an authorized third party with 
access to the customer’s usage 
information that is collected by the 
utility by the end of 2010 should the 
customer desire that information, and 
utilities shall provide to their 
customers with a smart meter access 
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2007 to usage data on a real-time or near 
real-time basis no later than the end 
of 2011. 





pursuant to Senate 
Bill 17. 
This order requires utilities to file an 
application submitting its smart grid 
deployment plan, which shall include 
grid security and cyber security 
strategies, a baseline assessment of 
privacy and security issues, and plans 
for adopting and developing 
interoperable architecture designed to 
protect the privacy of customer data. 
2010  
(D&P)13 





“This bill would prohibit an electrical 
corporation or gas corporation from 
sharing, disclosing, or otherwise 
making accessible to any 3rd party a 
customer’s electrical or gas 
consumption data, as defined, except 
as specified, and would require those 
utilities to use reasonable security 
procedures and practices to protect a 
customer’s unencrypted electrical and 
gas consumption data from 
unauthorized access, destruction, use, 
modification, or disclosure. 
The bill would prohibit an electrical 
corporation or gas corporation from 
selling a customer’s electrical or gas 
consumption data or any other 
personally identifiable information 
for any purpose.” 
2011 
(D&P) 




It requires that an electrical 
corporation shall not share, disclose, 
or otherwise make accessible to any 
third-party a customer’s electrical 
consumption meter data without the 





Rules to protect the privacy and 
security of customer data and policy 
                                                 
13 Policies marked as “D&P” regulate smart meter data security and privacy issues. Otherwise it 
is categorized as smart meter promotion policy. There is one policy (Order (September 11,2012), 
Case No. U-17000) adopted by Michigan containing both elements of the two policy types, and it 





to govern access to customer usage 
data by customers and by authorized 





HB 1191 “Utility 
Resource Usage 
Data Sharing” 
It requiring the Public Utility 
Commission to certify independent 
data aggregators in sharing 
aggregated customer data with the 
requirement that a customer’s 








Grid Data Privacy 






Recommended decision to revise the 
current rules applicable to smart 
meter data privacy and disclosure 
rules. Includes clarification of what 
constitutes customer data, data 
collection, cost of access to standard 
customer data associated with base 
rates, and rules regarding the sharing 
of customer data directly to a third-
party by the utility in compliance 
with a customer’s request. 
Connecticu
t 
2007 Public Act 07-242, 
Energy Efficiency 
Act of 2007 
It mandates that every electric 
distribution company submit an AMI 
plan to the PUC. 
2011 Senate Bill 1243 “Sec. 105: The Department of Energy 
and Environmental Protection shall 
require each electric distribution 
company to notify its customers on 
an ongoing basis regarding the 
availability of time-of-use meters, if 
applicable.” 
Delaware    
Florida    
Georgia 2007 Docket No. 24505-
U: Georgia Power’s 
2007 Integrated 





the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies 
Act Standards in the 
Energy Policy Act of 
2005  
“In response to the Commission’s 
directive, Georgia Power addressed 
the following five PURPA ‘must 
consider’ requirements in Section 14 
of its main filing: net metering, fuel 
sources, fossil fuel generation 
efficiency, smart metering, 
interconnection for distributed 
resources”.  
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Hawaii    
Idaho    
Illinois 2006 
 





107): Amendment to 
The Illinois 
Customer Choice 
and Rate Relief Law 
of 1997 
It requires each utility with 100,000 
customers or more to provide 
customers with smart meters capable 
of recording hourly intervals. 
 
 




“It is the policy of this State that 
significant investments must be made 
in the State’s electric grid over the 
next decade to modernize and 
upgrade transmission and distribution 
facilities in the State. These 
investments will ensure that...the 
State’s electric utilities will be able to 
continue to provide quality electric 
service to their customers, 
including…smart meters ”. 
“Each participating utility shall file a 
Smart Grid Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure Deployment Plan 
("AMI Plan") with the Commission 
within 180 days after the effective 
date of this amendatory Act.” 
This act also directs utilities to invest 
in cyber secure data communication 
network associated with smart 
meters. 
Indiana    
Iowa    
Kansas    






This rule defines the terms and 
conditions under which electric 
and/or combined electric and gas 
utilities can seek the recovery of costs 
associated with the implementation of 
new advanced metering and demand 
response programs. It also addresses 
the use of customer data: “the utility 
is prohibited from transferring any 
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customer-specific information from 
any AMS outside the customer-utility 
working relationship without prior 
Commission approval.” 
Maine 2010 HP 1079 LD 1535: 
An Act To Create a 
Smart Grid Policy in 
the State 
 
It is the policy of the State to 
promote, in a manner consistent with 
applicable industry standards for 
reliability, safety and security, a rapid 
increase in the availability and use of 
smart grid functions through: -
 deployment of smart grid 
technologies, including real-time, 
automated, interactive technologies 
that optimize the physical operation 
of energy-consuming appliances and 
devices, for purposes of metering, 
communications concerning grid 
operation and status and distribution 
system operations. 
2011 HP 0563, LD 756: 
An Act to Limit the 
Use of Smart Meters 
It requires the Maine Public Utility 
Commission address regulatory gaps 
between federal and state law 
regarding smart meters, customer 
data, and cyber security. It also 
allows a customer to decline the 
installation of the wireless smart 
meter or have a wired smart meter 
installed as an alternative to the 
wireless smart meter. 
“It is the policy of the State to 
promote the development, 
implementation, availability and use 
of smart grid functions in accordance 
with this subsection in a manner that 
is consistent with applicable 
standards for reliability, safety, 
security and privacy and that takes 
into account the implementation of 
smart grid functions in other 
jurisdictions.” 
2011 S.P.20, LD 620: 




Installation of Smart 
A transmission and distribution utility 
may not install a smart electric meter 
until one year after the effective date 
of the legislation. At customer 
request, a utility shall remove a smart 




premises and replace it with an 
electric meter similar to the type 
installed previously for a fee not 
exceeding $30. The PUC shall study 
the safety of smart electric meters, 
including, but not limited to, health 
risks to customers posed by smart 
meters. 
Maryland 2008 SB 205/HB 374  
EmPOWER 
Maryland Energy 
Efficiency Act of 
2008 
“The Public Service Commission 
shall evaluate whether advance meter 
technology, commonly known as 
‘smart meters’, and digital 
automation of the components of the 
entire power supply system, 
commonly known as ‘smart grid’, are 
cost–effective in reducing 
consumption and peak demand of 
electricity in Maryland. If smart 
meter or smart grid technology are 
found to be cost–effective, the 
Commission may require, by 
regulation or order, each electric 
company to implement as appropriate 
smart meter or smart grid technology 




2008 SB 2768 – the Green 
Communities Act 
 
Section 85: each electric distribution 
company shall file a proposed plan 
with the department of public utilities 
to establish a smart grid pilot 
program, which should include, but 
not be limited to advanced meters. 
Michigan 2012 Order (January 12, 
2012), Case No. U-
17000. 
 
The Commission directed all 
regulated electric utilities to submit 
information in this docket regarding 
AMI deployment plans, costs, and 
sources of funding; estimates of 
monetary savings and other benefits 
expected to be achieved by the 
deployment of AMI; scientific 
information concerning the safety of 
smart meters; an explanation of the 
type of information that will be 
gathered through the use of AMI; the 
steps that the electric utility intends to 
take to safeguard the privacy of the 
customer information; and whether 
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the electric utility intends to allow 
customers to “opt out” of having a 
smart meter and if so, how the 
electric utility intends to recover the 




11,2012), Case No. 
U-17000. 
 
This order accept the Commission 
Staff’s report on Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure and Smart Grid, which 
recommends policies to be taken to 
deal with customer data collection, 
privacy and cyber security (i.e. each 
utility should adopt an annual 
independent security audit of the 
mechanisms of customer access, third 
party access and internal cyber risk-
management practices). It also 
requires utilities to provide an opt-out 
option or an explanation for why an 
opt-out is unnecessary or cost-
prohibitive. 
Minnesota    
Mississippi 2011 Senate Concurrent 
Resolution No. 665 
It urges all state agencies to define 
the smart grid for the purposes of 
creating jobs and encouraging 
customer energy savings in the state. 
It states that “Smart grid is an 
emergent form of energy demand and 
operational control that utilizes smart 
meters, transformers, one-and two-
way consumer/provider 
communications networks, and other 
methods to facilitate more efficient 
uses of electricity and more dynamic 
grid operations”, and “all appropriate 
public and private sector entities 
should work together to develop a 
Smart Grid standard for the state that 
includes in its scope advanced 
metering, self-restorative networks, 
and the role of renewables and other 
alternative energy sources. 
Missouri    
Montana    
Nebraska 2009 LB436 
 
 “A local distribution utility shall 
provide at no additional cost to any 
customer-generator with a qualified 
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facility a metering system that is 
capable of measuring the flow of 
electricity in both directions and may 
be accomplished through use of a 
single, bidirectional electric revenue 
meter that has only a single register 
for billing purposes, a smart metering 
system, or another meter 
configuration that can easily be read 
by the customer-generator.” 
Nevada    
New 
Hampshire 
   
New Jersey    
New 
Mexico 
   
New York 2009 Case 09-M-0074,  
In the Matter of 








Initiating an Inquiry 
Into Benefit-Cost 
Methodologies  
This order adopts AMI system 
requirements and directs future 
rulemaking for a proper benefit-cost 
analysis methodology. 
2011 Case 10-E-0285 – 
Proceeding on 




Smart Grid Systems 
and the 
Modernization of the 
Electric Grid: Smart 
Grid Policy 
Statement 
It supports the utilities’ smart grid 
technology implementation, and 
provides policy guidelines to advance 




   
North 
Dakota 
   
Ohio 2007 Case No. 05-1500- The Finding and Order adopts the 
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EL-COI: finding and 
order 
Staff’s recommendations regarding 
PURPA Standard 14 (“Time-Based 
Metering and Communications”) as 
enacted in EPACT 2005. It states that 
all EDUs should offer tariffs to all 
customer classes, which are, at a 
minimum, differentiated according to 
on and off -peak wholesale periods. 
TOU meters should be made 
available to customers subscribing to 
the on and off -peak tariffs. Staff 
should analyze the cost benefit of 
AMI deployment strategies and hold 
a series of technical conferences to 
discuss further associated issues. 
2008 SB 221 “It is the policy of this state to … 
encourage innovation and market 
access for cost-effective supply- and 
demand-side retail electric service 
including, but not limited to, demand-
side management, time-differentiated 
pricing, and implementation of 
advanced metering infrastructure.” 
Oklahoma 2011 
(D&P) 
House Bill 1079: 
Electric Usage Data 
Protection Act 
It allows electric utilities to utilize 
customer-identifiable usage data for 
certain internal business purposes 
without customer consent. 
Oregon 2012 Docket No: UM 
1460 Development 
of Smart Grid 
Objectives and 
Action Items for 
2010-2014 – Order 
12-158 
It adopts Commission policy goals 
and objectives, reporting 
requirements, elements of annual 
reports, and general Commission 
guidelines for considering and 




2008 Pennsylvania’s Act 
129 
“Within nine moths after the effective 
date of this paragraph, electric 
distribution companies shall file a 
smart meter technology procurement 
and installation plan with the 
commission for approval.” 
2009 
(D&P) 






“For security reasons we determine 
that a distinction should be made 
between access to the physical meter 
and access to the meter information, 
and we will not require EDCs to 
allow customers and their designated 
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Order  agent to tamper or physically access 
the meter itself.  However, this 
directive is not intended to preclude 
third-parties, with customer consent, 
from obtaining raw meter data 
through meter pulse leads, a secure 
web-portal or other secure means 
reasonably available to the customer 
or designated third-party... 
Additionally, we will require EDCs 
to provide all customers and their 
designated third-parties access to the 
following: validated, bill quality 
consumption data within 48 hours of 
the meter read; written detailed 
disclosure of data definitions and 
characteristics; and written update 
notices of changes in data 




2009 S485/H 5461  “The electric and gas distribution 
company shall also be authorized to 
propose and implement smart 
metering and smart grid 
demonstration projects in Rhode 
Island, subject to the review and 
approval of the commission.” 
South 
Carolina 
   
South 
Dakota 
2009 SB 60 “The commission may implement 
and comply with the provisions of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
of 1978, as amended to January 1, 
2009, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
and the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 and may 
promulgate rules pursuant to chapter 
1-26 consistent with these acts. The 
commission may implement policies 
or promulgate rules to establish… 
standards or policies requiring prior 
to investing in non-advanced grid 
technologies, that a public utility 
consider investing in a smart grid 
system.” 
Tennessee    
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Texas 2005 HB 2129 “An entity to which this section 
applies shall consider establishing 
customer-option programs that 
encourage the reduction of air 
contaminant emissions, such as: a 
program that encourages the 
deployment of advanced electricity 
meters.” 
2007 HB 3693  “It is the intent of the legislature that 
net metering and advanced meter 
information networks be deployed as 
rapidly as possible to allow 
customers to better manage energy 
use and control costs, and to facilitate 
demand response initiatives.” 
 2007 Project No.31418 – 
Order Adopting 
New §25.130 And 
Amendments to 
§§25.121, 25.123, 
25.311, And 25.346 
As Approved At The 
May 10, 2007 Open 
Meeting 
 
“The new rule and amendments will 
implement HB 2129, relating to 
advanced metering and address: 1) 
the importance of balancing the 
interests of customers, Retail Electric 
Providers  
(REPs), and electric utilities with 
respect to advanced metering; 2) the 
minimum functionality for electric 
utility advanced meter systems to 
qualify for the cost recovery 
surcharge; 3) the process for an 
electric utility to notify the 
commission and REPs of the 
deployment of advanced metering; 
and 4) the cost recovery surcharge for 
advanced metering. ” 
Utah    
Vermont 
 




It directs Vermont’s Public Service 
Board to “investigate opportunities 
for Vermont electric utilities cost 
effectively to install advanced ‘smart’ 
metering equipment capable of 
sending two way signals and 
sufficient to support advanced time of 
use pricing during periods of critical 
peaks or hourly differentiated time of 
use pricing.” After its investigation, 
the Board is to require each utility to 
file plans for deploying smart meters 
and TOU pricing, provided that the 
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utility serves a territory where such a 
deployment is “appropriate and cost-
effective.” 
2009 HB 313 (Act 54) It requires the pursuit of ARRA 
funding opportunities to implement 
smart grid technologies. 
2011 SB 78 (Act 53) It establishes policies and programs 
designed to facilitate statewide 
cellular, smart grid, and broadband 
deployment by the end of 2013.  
Virginia    
Washingto
n 
2007 House Bill 
Amendment to 
Senate Bill 6001: 
6001-S AMS PRID 
S2716.2 
It directs the Commission to adopt 
policies allowing an additional return 
on investments to encourage the 
deployment of smart grid technology, 
smart meters and demand response 
technologies. 
2009 HB 2289 It expands the state’s energy freedom 
program to include smart meters. 
West 
Virginia 
2010 SB 350 It categorizes the implementation of 
smart meter and other smart grid 
technologies as energy efficiency or 
demand-side energy initiative project 
that is eligible for alternative and 
renewable energy resource credits. 
Wisconsin    









emergency act of 
2009  
Authorization of Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure implementation (Smart 
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State 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alabama 88,231 85,177 96,024 108,179 - 216,201 
Alaska 4 2,753 3,106 3,213 3,408 3,766 
Arizona 155,031 192,860 400,980 1,234,009 1,643,430 1,767,206 
Arkansas 46,525 51,982 54,081 85,163 174,388 278,395 
California 140,042 363,353 2,636,757 4,036,383 10,610,811 10,580,445 
Colorado 388 17,270 117,738 173,921 182,651 242,832 
Connecticut 2,463 1,213 1,784 36,069 99,755 128,595 
Delaware 0 48,603 72,000 100 297,308 297,247 
District of 
Columbia 
0 0 0 0 29,650 246,642 
Florida 44,549 181,984 308,206 2,087,870 3,221,462 4,900,737 
Georgia 56,921 778,441 1,486,413 2,329,510 3,208,987 3,456,641 
Hawaii 6,571 8,126 8,713 9,213 758 30 
Idaho 0 49,380 225,474 353,867 536,130 542,009 
Illinois 28,114 9,954 19,121 150,202 181,667 305,272 
Indiana 11,028 72,679 164,837 211,145 257,567 303,192 
Iowa 14,946 48,847 74,120 121,751 128,116 143,163 
Kansas 5,878 25,047 20,570 41,781 108,395 184,292 
Kentucky 23,961 118,209 147,835 211,996 330,218 355,451 
Louisiana 2 3,597 12,021 34,087 40,063 220,128 
Maine 0 0 0 193,415 669,482 735,415 
Maryland 0 810 1,034 896 912 498,806 
Massachusetts 28,021 37,270 35,489 39,076 46,241 59,601 
Michigan 187,349 200,415 198,442 334,065 735,450 947,546 
Minnesota 10,203 53,561 66,777 91,395 172,810 121,264 
Mississippi 0 1,610 9,465 48,308 153,279 274,884 
Missouri 1,882 60,909 160,446 222,019 295,556 314,812 
Montana 212 3,532 6,459 11,991 17,593 18,830 
Nebraska 25 10,725 40,182 70,111 91,917 106,301 
Nevada 0 0 0 20,665 555,414 1,021,241 
New 
Hampshire 
75,094 72,512 76,085 76,125 100,345 153,882 
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 11,610 11,533 
New Mexico 0 6,215 24,384 46,139 72,506 80,808 
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New York 1,553 10,872 11,162 12,675 18,785 23,758 
North Carolina 30,759 206,150 285,532 420,956 556,214 716,349 
North Dakota 14,500 11,406 25,380 42,676 64,037 72,431 
Ohio 16,631 27,974 95,769 287,441 506,635 716,772 
Oklahoma 17,169 44,245 124,060 332,888 715,368 968,785 
Oregon 6,334 21,408 190,480 900,290 939,933 1,034,711 
Pennsylvania 1,376,261 1,392,41
0 
1,401,554 1,494,824 1,562,164 1,864,723 
Rhode Islands 0 0 0 0 205 211 
South Carolina 49,293 119,149 150,689 205,017 230,942 271,427 
South Dakota 0 16,820 22,793 95,155 102,671 127,805 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 336,940 515,971 
Texas 20,600 174,508 296,252 3,337,913 5,658,595 6,880,155 
Utah 1 2,485 12,860 17,080 35,163 22,480 
Vermont 0 0 0 0 123 343,769 
Virginia 0 8,402 105,371 158,244 306,378 400,698 
Washington 10,670 46,121 54,484 76,591 83,353 85,171 
West Virginia 0 0 95 0 0 81 
Wisconsin 2,278 49,423 355,935 497,851 507,674 523,044 
Wyoming 0 8,609 10,442 72,260 77,029 79,675 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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State 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Alabama 3.574043 3.419194 3.854611 4.32349 - 8.594616 
Alaska 0.0012786 0.867789 0.975313 1.000467 1.053126 1.157139 
Arizona 5.51163 6.805064 14.06397 43.11908 56.90275 60.96698 
Arkansas 3.094082 3.427637 3.547609 5.550953 11.31405 17.98528 
California 0.9509954 2.444418 17.78826 27.13571 71.01557 70.05267 
Colorado 0.0159773 0.6781785 4.755537 6.974581 7.28823 9.657625 
Connecticut 0.1451969 0.0702247 0.100381 1.761835 4.459087 5.606202 
Delaware 0 10.72038 15.79124 0.0217471 63.85947 63.0284 
District of 
Columbia 
0 0 0 0 10.72523 84.282 
Florida 0.4644406 1.889779 3.19742 21.58136 33.09873 49.88944 
Georgia 1.249557 16.944 32.1511 50.46812 69.44261 74.55403 
Hawaii 1.398594 1.721519 1.836636 1.93659 0.158487
2 
0.0062444 
Idaho 0 6.332734 28.66598 44.67837 67.4441 67.56448 
Illinois 0.4934815 0.173215 0.334200
2 
2.615782 3.076735 4.447383 
Indiana 0.3576089 2.35026 5.328817 6.803858 8.291503 9.722136 
Iowa 0.9716394 3.164859 4.791881 7.843997 8.230968 9.159472 
Kansas 0.3920747 1.656609 1.417452 2.868725 7.41801 12.57026 
Kentucky 1.080786 5.299771 6.640775 9.485348 14.80533 15.93959 
Louisiana 0.0000922 0.1630793 0.537919
8 
1.504611 1.761576 9.59825 
Maine 0 0 0 12.33185 42.56752 46.59958 
Maryland 0 0.0318618 0.040137
2 
0.0332912 0.031541 16.62465 
Massachuse
tts 
0.8338166 1.102432 1.034938 1.132209 1.323997 1.669009 
Michigan 3.876705 4.153277 4.142036 6.98059 15.35181 19.77548 
Minnesota 0.4013677 2.092503 2.594555 3.532986 6.657559 4.651811 
Mississippi 0 0.1095092 0.642447
5 
3.260831 10.32386 18.43744 
Missouri 0.0619077 1.98569 5.234411 7.218571 9.618017 10.21715 
Montana 0.0376526 0.622516 1.128399 2.086346 3.044514 3.233573 
Nebraska 0.0025494 1.084663 4.038087 7.010063 9.137142 10.5442 
Nevada 0 0 0 1.698694 45.27148 82.34042 
New 10.75965 10.33794 11.03073 10.635 13.89139 20.77953 
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Hampshire 





0 0.6331699 2.469506 4.629408 7.247636 8.041142 







0.648753 4.287323 5.902035 8.695331 11.45078 14.63912 
North 
Dakota 
3.900565 3.022153 6.63722 11.00981 16.23681 17.65271 
Ohio 0.2851339 0.482117 1.619447 4.252222 7.037637 9.493807 
Oklahoma 0.9064482 2.310053 6.436193 17.15086 36.68089 49.28819 
Oregon 0.341752 1.142357 10.11868 47.62199 49.57327 54.34132 
Pennsylvani
a 
22.73619 22.79429 22.94198 23.02663 22.0175 24.1698 
Rhode 
Island 
     0.0412895 
Rhode 
Islands 
0 0 0 0 0.040692  
South 
Carolina 
2.072915 4.932734 6.196792 8.42255 9.440704 11.03229 
South 
Dakota 
0 3.897958 5.225008 21.61955 23.0235 28.37564 
Tennessee 0 0 0 0 10.61522 16.17682 
Texas 0.1916487 1.580551 2.677636 30.00626 51.05125 61.15887 
Utah 0.000097 0.2367997 1.213883 1.598678 3.261239 2.059813 
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0.034165
8 
95.37058 
Virginia 0 0.2346901 2.925436 4.295102 8.408628 10.91361 





0 0 0.0079659 
Wisconsin 0.0782949 1.693664 12.14576 16.94754 17.22664 17.6965 
Wyoming 0 2.680579 3.226175 22.16415 23.52268 24.17163 




APPENDIX E   SMART METER DEPLOYMENT STATUS OF EU MEMBER 







Deployment Status Penetration Rate 
Austria 5.7 Mandatory smart meter roll-out started 
from 2012 
< 10%  
Belgium 9.1 No roll-out yet <10% 
Czech 
Republic 
5.7 No roll-out yet <10% 
Denmark 3.28 Voluntary roll-out has been carried out 
with 1.63 million smart meters already 
installed. A law introduced in June 
2013 mandates the full smart metering 
roll-out. 
Around 50% 
Estonia 0.709 Mandatory roll-out from 2013 to 2017 23% As of July 2014 
Finland 3.3 Voluntary roll-out started in the early 
2000’s. The Finnish government then 
mandated a smart meter roll-out. 
97% by the end of 
2013 
France 35 The government mandates the smart 
meter roll-out from 2014 to 2020. The 
universal deployment of smart meter 
system in France will entail the 
installation of 35 million meters. 
<10% 
Germany 47.9 The government hasn’t decided on the 
roll-out plan. 
The CBA suggests a 
penetration rate of 
23% by 2022, and 
31% by 2032. 
Greece 7 Mandatory roll-out between 2014 and 
2020. 
<10% 
Ireland 2.2 Mandatory roll-out between 2014 and 
2019. 
<10% 
Italy 36.7 The government defined the legal 
framework for mandatory roll-out to 
all metering points in the country in 
2006. 
95% as of 2011 
Latvia 1.1 No roll-out yet The CBA suggests a 
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penetration rate of 
23% by 2020. 
Lithuania 1.6 No roll-out yet The CBA suggests a 
penetration rate of 
80% by 2020. 
Luxembourg 0.26 Roll-out will start on July 1st, 2015 National law requires 
at least 95% 
penetration rate by 
the end of 2018 
Malta 0.26 Smart meter deployment is expected to 
complete in 2014. Currently around 





15.2 Mandatory roll-out but customers can 
choose to opt-out. Smart meter roll-out 
will occur between 2012 and 2020. 
<10% 
Poland 16.5 Mandatory roll-out to cover 80% of 
electricity consumers. Smart meter 
roll-out will occur between 2012 and 
2022. 
Penetration rate is 
around 4% as of 
2014. 
Portugal 6.5 No roll-out yet <10% 
Romania 9 An official smart metering roll-out 
plan has yet to be endorsed. 
<10% 
Slovakia 2.625 Mandatory roll-out for supply points 
with annual consumption of over 4 
MWh. 
A 23% penetration 
rate in 2020 
Slovenia Not 
available 
No roll-out yet <10% 
Spain 27.77 Mandatory roll-out for all domestic 
meters with contracted power lower 
than 15 kW between 2011 and 2018. 
Penetration rate by 
the end of 2014 will 
be around 35%. 
Sweden 5.2 Voluntary roll-out between 2003 and 
2009 
100% 
UK 63.8 59.6 million meters will be replaced 
between 2012 and 2030. 
<10% 
Source: European Commission (European Commission, 2014b) 
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Germany  33300 
France 31300 
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APPENDIX F   EU COUNTRY STATISTICS (continued) 
 
 







































APPENDIX G   A REVIEW OF TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND 





























































































































































































































APPENDIX H   LIST OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY 




1. Global Environment Facility 
2. International Energy Agency 
3. World Bank 
4. United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
5. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
6. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
8. Clean Energy Ministerial – International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN) 
9. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 
10. The Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition (JREC) 
11. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
12. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
13. International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) 
14. International Energy Forum (IEF) 
15. Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEFEC) 
16. Energy Charter Conference (ECC) 
17. Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC) 
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